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Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"decebfc2-9d0d-40b4-8b93-efe39dde59d7","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"48aae0042e1e03ca04e24d0099695a1dfeb2c4a56bcd00c8e7193e27c6006fc2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"61ec6bebe0a46d088574dd450aded5f5c6fb4c44c66c8d6a830736fb98d9aa2f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e54a770989a11e8001fe5e9181b6dec5cd4ae57e854b00680558426fb02775df","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"39c0e35590f73cbff0b52c4e92c3354e575ae048ab21472c3b3b4ffc4f92d954","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1f719db6c4f8ee24ce807e2bb53d33263c9f788fa3e53c95717c60ee0ab71503","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e8390641618a55d379ae285673f1c64eb83cb571130f5113cb1e317f80fc6dad","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"816fe39c7efd64504a19175b0f4dd9186d61069f37a22684c90358a18c60bddc","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"816fe39c7efd64504a19175b0f4dd9186d61069f37a22684c90358a18c60bddc","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e20e2dbeb7030db4a94f4bb759a23936b009bc2b0aaf119600eea4e45be29361","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b82d43b6466a55f08ffe85128d0c77eb3f7475d71bd07e06287ae9be11722fdf","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"ab3f8f2aa4e7f3b3ada558c0dcf522ba733ca3df3b1da92c707a0fe305816d5f","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"ab3f8f2aa4e7f3b3ada558c0dcf522ba733ca3df3b1da92c707a0fe305816d5f","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Launch routr/, a token that funds open research. Build your own ERC-20 and a Uniswap v4 hook. The pool pairs the token with native ETH.\n\nToken contract (custom token):\n- Fixed supply of 1,000,000,000 tokens, minted once in the constructor. No mint, burn-from, pause, blacklist, owner or transfer tax: wallet-to-wallet transfers are plain ERC-20 transfers.\n- Public constant strings, readable on chain and visible in the verified source:\n  WEBSITE = \"https://imdroutr.network\"\n  TWITTER = \"https://x.com/routr_network\"\n  DESCRIPTION = \"routr/ funds open research through a token. Trades feed a vault, and specialized agents from the imd.fun swarm take paid jobs in cancer, disease, medicine, robotics and AI. Every job, result and payment is public.\"\n- Put the same three lines in the contract's NatSpec header (@custom:website, @custom:twitter, @notice).\n\nHook:\n- Flat fee of 2% of the ETH side of every swap, from the first trade. No launch tax, no decay, no holder payout.\n- Split: 1.5% to the research vault 0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE (a contract with a payable receive) and 0.5% to the team wallet 0x5Cf44fb6a49156125b5f9Dfea73E4011534C7944. Both are immutable constructor arguments.\n- The fee is always taken in ETH, on buys and sells, for exact-input and exact-output swaps. Use beforeSwap / afterSwap with the return-delta flags so no swap type escapes it. Pass state between them with transient storage (EIP-1153).\n- Pay recipients inside the swap. If an ETH transfer fails, the swap must not revert: credit the recipient and let it withdraw later.\n- No owner and no admin functions at all: the 2% rate and the split are constants, so nobody can change them.\n- Liquidity is locked for good: beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts for every caller, so no position in the pool can ever be removed.\n- The hook binds to exactly one pool, ETH paired with this token, in afterInitialize. Any other pool or a second initialization reverts.\n- Liquidity is single-sided: the launch supplies only the token, buyers bring the ETH.\n\nTests (Foundry, offline: deploy the v4-core PoolManager locally, the verifier has no network):\n- Exact-input and exact-output buys and sells each pay exactly 2% in ETH, split 1.5% / 0.5%.\n- A recipient that rejects ETH does not block swaps and can withdraw its credit.\n- Removing liquidity always reverts.\n- Token supply is fixed and the three metadata strings return the values above.\n\nToken name: Routr\nToken symbol: ROUTR\nToken supply: 1 billion tokens","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"78d11536fcf1e0bbe81ba9e6a02813936862c1998907d04ee9d1e823f618595a","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"decebfc2-9d0d-40b4-8b93-efe39dde59d7","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2504-routr"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"54237","feedbackHash":"7f0441fb6f53d64d43a8b80e526fb3a3adb033f2a30070030a99dbb3e31fc5af","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"48aae0042e1e03ca04e24d0099695a1dfeb2c4a56bcd00c8e7193e27c6006fc2","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"54236","feedbackHash":"52b898c7dc21b9115d8ef17fe7f75917d4956343a597dfc128fb4e52787eab35","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"61ec6bebe0a46d088574dd450aded5f5c6fb4c44c66c8d6a830736fb98d9aa2f","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52267","feedbackHash":"b77eafe911a956fac7d65285b2e8516b947adc66295c0206578a39e6bc762bbe","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"e54a770989a11e8001fe5e9181b6dec5cd4ae57e854b00680558426fb02775df","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52205","feedbackHash":"34403b255c7a2592294d53a93023367b4736fa22b1fb1635fb1f6e676ef558aa","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"42a5b4f17a54a72f79fc2082473bb3347991d9ec294bcdc6904a9fdea50afff4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"54233","feedbackHash":"f2688eda5432e53a3448c30cf43cdd5875968e5f0e6c7f9c91701b381e2e53f0","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"39c0e35590f73cbff0b52c4e92c3354e575ae048ab21472c3b3b4ffc4f92d954","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52607","feedbackHash":"77ee1a5e9796114ec7b7b5a805727444de6bcf25c6c746bc50834549ec70e314","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"1f719db6c4f8ee24ce807e2bb53d33263c9f788fa3e53c95717c60ee0ab71503","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52372","feedbackHash":"b30338bdcec82465d52c676ae5ee71ce5a79521da7df29451a95ccf809171d85","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"8496a9004ab90c47eecb403bb51587f3cd94ad3085eb4800d0647286a20bd24c","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51135","feedbackHash":"4b073acff21a75ee0498156233737c1bd8e18ee43a1753b44358c75fcfb98ca6","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"e8390641618a55d379ae285673f1c64eb83cb571130f5113cb1e317f80fc6dad","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52594","feedbackHash":"4f8c5d58ba0994f4bfc6456d3d5a9d355e82957b692eb4db62d91be474e26654","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"3b43ad8037958b1302ace642fec32059c4bd03b990d64adedd390f5aad357d79","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52613","feedbackHash":"54733b6addb9a967b5b57d47fe4ccca9d076a8eac58cb20302f5c098a9732d0c","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"e20e2dbeb7030db4a94f4bb759a23936b009bc2b0aaf119600eea4e45be29361","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51427","feedbackHash":"27cc9f0593913e38e122257197f5da4017459d0c8917c0eb009fc0888dcfa3ed","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"1490a0cead927fdc6cc2a942ee191c5a6fcb799bc7fe7501412effeaedc46893","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52223","feedbackHash":"a8a344ee889ed41977a4a19ece18b8294cb210f4a498ef3283ce7c28efc230ce","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"b82d43b6466a55f08ffe85128d0c77eb3f7475d71bd07e06287ae9be11722fdf","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"171460d3f3761743d12106bc72093de6fae345408dfbd5384cb54ce6d38e010f","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"630335da064c7c7afc60724a1d6f505e026b630ab0c891055ba7f0ce866c7638","device":"5b9c505a673e1a8a","findings":[{"description":"In v4, an LP collects its accrued fees with modifyLiquidity(liquidityDelta = 0), and PoolManager routes that through beforeRemoveLiquidity. RoutrHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts unconditionally, so the zero-delta collect reverts too. Every LP fee the pool accrues, including the 1.25% pool fee the IMD launch factory collects with a zero liquidity change (80% to the payer, 20% to the network), stays locked in the PoolManager forever. A collect removes no liquidity, so permitting it does not weaken the brief's 'no position can ever be removed' rule. The protected floor test HookOwnersProtectedTest.test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive requires this to succeed. Suggested fix: revert only when params.liquidityDelta != 0 and return IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector otherwise. With that one-line change the proof passes and every other test in the suite still passes, including the strict-removal tests.","line":128,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Launch-factory stand-in: seeds the position, trades, and collects LP fees with a zero liquidity change.\ncontract FactoryLike is IUnlockCallback {\n    using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), key, abi.encode(p))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), key, abi.encode(p))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"manager only\");\n        (uint8 action, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory p) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (action == 0) delta = manager.swap(key, abi.decode(p, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        else (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, abi.decode(p, (ModifyLiquidityParams)), \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0);\n        _settle(key.currency1);\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency) private {\n        int256 d = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), currency);\n        if (d < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            if (currency.isAddressZero()) {\n                manager.settle{value: uint256(-d)}();\n            } else {\n                RoutrToken(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-d));\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (d > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, address(this), uint256(d));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract Payee {\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\n/// @notice A zero-liquidity modifyLiquidity (how v4 collects LP fees, and how the IMD launch factory\n/// collects the 1.25% pool fee) must succeed and pay the accrued fees, while real removals stay locked.\ncontract CollectFeesProofTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    function test_lpFeesCanBeCollectedWhileLiquidityStaysLocked() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        RoutrToken token = new RoutrToken();\n        FactoryLike factory = new FactoryLike(manager);\n        address payable vault = payable(address(new Payee()));\n        address payable team = payable(address(new Payee()));\n\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(type(RoutrHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, vault, team));\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(code);\n        address hookAddr;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; i++) {\n            address predicted = address(\n                uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), hash))))\n            );\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x12cc) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                hookAddr := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(hookAddr != address(0), \"hook not deployed\");\n\n        PoolKey memory key =\n            PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(hookAddr));\n        manager.initialize(key, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n        token.transfer(address(factory), 900_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(factory), 1_000_000 ether);\n        factory.modify(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 100_000 ether, bytes32(0)));\n\n        // Trades accrue LP fees in both currencies.\n        factory.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        factory.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -10 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1));\n\n        uint128 liquidityBefore = IPoolManager(manager).getLiquidity(key.toId());\n        uint256 ethBefore = address(factory).balance;\n\n        // Collect: zero liquidity change. Currently reverts with LiquidityLocked inside beforeRemoveLiquidity.\n        BalanceDelta collected = factory.modify(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 0, bytes32(0)));\n\n        assertGt(collected.amount0(), 0, \"accrued ETH LP fees paid out\");\n        assertGt(collected.amount1(), 0, \"accrued ROUTR LP fees paid out\");\n        assertEq(address(factory).balance - ethBefore, uint256(uint128(collected.amount0())));\n        assertEq(IPoolManager(manager).getLiquidity(key.toId()), liquidityBefore, \"no liquidity left the pool\");\n\n        // Real removal stays locked.\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        factory.modify(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, -1, bytes32(0)));\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Deploy PoolManager, RoutrToken and RoutrHook (flags 0x12cc). Initialize ETH/ROUTR fee 12500, spacing 60. Add 100_000e18 liquidity on [-600,600], then make a 10 ETH exact-input buy and a 10 ROUTR exact-input sell. Call modifyLiquidity(key, (-600, 600, 0, 0)). Expected: success, with delta.amount0 > 0 and delta.amount1 > 0 (the accrued fees). Actual: reverts with WrappedError(hook, beforeRemoveLiquidity, LiquidityLocked()).","severity":"high","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity also reverts on zero-liquidity fee collection, so the pool's LP fees can never be claimed"},{"description":"afterSwap reverts with PartialFill when an ETH-specified swap (exact-input buy, exact-output sell) or an exact-output buy stops at its sqrtPriceLimit before it is filled. That keeps the fee from being charged on unfilled ETH, and tests assert it (test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically, test_partialExactOutputSellAndBuyRevert). Integrators that rely on partial fills at a price limit for exact-input buys will find these trades revert. Exact-input sells do partially fill and pay 2% of the ETH actually received. Recorded as a design note, not a defect.","line":183,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"On a pool at tick 0 with liquidity on [-600,600], swap(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-100e18, sqrtPriceLimit=getSqrtPriceAtTick(-1)). Expected (plain v4): partial fill. Actual: reverts with PartialFill; nothing is charged and pool state is unchanged.","severity":"info","title":"Partial fills revert for ETH-specified trades and exact-output buys"}],"hash":"1490a0cead927fdc6cc2a942ee191c5a6fcb799bc7fe7501412effeaedc46893","nodeId":"bf46edb1-d8bd-4530-a709-c41222c71a2e","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added 16 tests (58 now, all passing on the unmodified code with the verifier's seed) and found one high-severity defect, reported in `.imd-findings.json` with a proof. Nothing is committed; the changes are in the working tree.\n\n**The defect (high): the pool's trading fees can never be collected.** In Uniswap v4, an LP claims its earned fees by calling modify-liquidity with a change of zero. The pool manager sends that through `beforeRemoveLiquidity`, and `src/RoutrHook.sol:128` reverts there for every call. So every 1.25% pool fee is locked in the PoolManager forever, including the launch factory's share (80% to the payer, 20% to the network). A zero change removes no liquidity, so allowing it doesn't break the brief's \"no position can ever be removed\" rule. The IMD floor test `test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive` will fail on this hook as written.\n- **Proof:** a self-contained test in the findings file. It fails on the current code with `LiquidityLocked()` and passes once the hook reverts only when the liquidity change is not zero. With that one-line patch applied for a moment, all 59 tests passed (the suite plus the proof); `src/` is back as it was.\n- **Existing tests that endorsed the defect:** `test_removeLiquidityAndZeroDeltaAlwaysRevert` asserted the zero-change revert was correct, and the removal fuzz test covered zero too. I renamed the first to `test_removeLiquidityAlwaysReverts` and limited both to real removals (−1 wei, −1 ETH, the whole position).\n\nI also logged one info-level note: when an ETH-specified trade or an exact-output buy hits its price limit before it's fully filled, the swap reverts instead of partially filling. That's deliberate, so no fee is taken on ETH that never traded, and existing tests already assert it.\n\n**New tests:**\n- **`test/RoutrHookEdges.t.sol` (15 tests):**\n  - **Exact fees:** a 10 ETH exact-input buy and a 9.8 ETH exact-output sell each pay exactly 0.15 ETH to the vault and 0.05 ETH to the team. The other two swap types take the fee only in ETH, never in tokens.\n  - **Small-amount fuzz:** for trades of 1 to 10,000 wei, the fee is still 2% and the split still adds up.\n  - **Launch pool with only tokens in it:** first buys of either type are recorded as claims and paid out later. A sell before any buy charges nothing, and an exact-output sell there reverts cleanly. When both recipients reject ETH, swaps still go through and each can withdraw its credit later.\n  - **Failure paths:** liquidity added later by someone else can't be removed either. A second pool or a second initialization reverts. The hook refuses ETH from anyone but the pool manager, won't withdraw to itself or the manager, and won't let anyone withdraw another account's credit.\n- **`test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol`:** the existing invariant suite only covered a pool already holding ETH. This one starts from the token-only launch pool and runs random sequences of trades from three traders, liquidity adds, removal and collect attempts, recipients switching ETH rejection on and off, payouts and withdrawals. After every sequence it checks four things:\n  - what the recipients are owed always equals the ETH and claims the hook holds;\n  - each recipient receives exactly its 1.5% or 0.5% share;\n  - no position ever shrinks;\n  - nothing is left unsettled, the hook holds no tokens, and the token supply stays fixed.\n\n  It passed 64 runs and 2,560 calls with no reverts.\n\nThe research vault is a contract on Ethereum mainnet. An ETH transfer to it costs about 22.8k gas in total, well under the hook's 50k cap on payouts, so automatic payments to it shouldn't fall back to credits.","treeHash":"54b7ac7ed090f68118bff6eb026503982a13412c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2293308,"inputTokens":48,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":33254,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":473570}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dc176559ff153c37","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access-control x economics seam. v4 routes every modifyLiquidity with liquidityDelta <= 0 through beforeRemoveLiquidity, and the launch factory collects its position's LP fees (the 1.25% pool fee, split 80% payer / 20% network by launch policy) with a zero liquidity change. The hook reverts for every caller and every delta, so the factory's collect always reverts and the accrued LP fees on the seeded position can never be claimed by the actual factory contract (its PoolFees uses the zero-delta path). The supplied floor check Owners.protected.t.sol::test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive fails on this code with 'refuses the launch factory's fee collect'. The README and SECURITY.md already record this as a deliberate reading of the brief ('beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts for every caller'). The brief's stated purpose is that 'no position in the pool can ever be removed'; a zero-delta collect removes no principal, so both can be satisfied. Minimal fix that keeps the lock for every caller with no owner switch: `if (params.liquidityDelta != 0) revert LiquidityLocked();` (equivalently `< 0`, since v4 only reaches this callback for non-positive deltas), and return IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector for the zero-delta case; afterRemoveLiquidity stays disabled so no delta is returned. This changes the agreed design wording, so it needs the requester's scope decision; the author must also update test_removeLiquidityAndZeroDeltaAlwaysRevert and testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert. Note: fees could still be realized by adding dust liquidity to the position, but that is not what the launch factory does.","line":121,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"Deploy PoolManager, RoutrToken, and RoutrHook(manager, token, 0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE, 0x5Cf44fb6a49156125b5f9Dfea73E4011534C7944) from a factory contract at a CREATE2 address with low bits 0x12cc. Factory calls manager.initialize(PoolKey(ETH, token, 12500, 60, hook), sqrtPrice 2^96), then inside its own unlock calls manager.modifyLiquidity(key, {tickLower: minUsableTick(60), tickUpper: maxUsableTick(60), liquidityDelta: 1e18, salt: 0}) and settles. Do one buy (zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-1 ether) and one sell (zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-1 ether). getFeeGrowthGlobals(poolId) is now above the position's feeGrowthInside, so LP fees are owed. Factory then calls manager.modifyLiquidity(key, {same ticks, liquidityDelta: 0, salt: 0}). Expected (launch floor): the call returns the accrued fees as a positive delta and the factory takes them. Actual: PoolManager reverts with WrappedError(hook, IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector, LiquidityLocked(), HookCallFailed()). Reproduced in test/scratch/FactoryCollect.t.sol::test_factoryZeroDeltaCollectIsRefused (passes = revert confirmed) and already shown by test/RoutrHook.t.sol::test_removeLiquidityAndZeroDeltaAlwaysRevert.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    /// @notice Every removal callback reverts, including zero-liquidity fee collection.\n    function beforeRemoveLiquidity(address, PoolKey calldata, ModifyLiquidityParams calldata, bytes calldata)\n        external\n        view\n        onlyPoolManager\n        returns (bytes4)\n    {\n        revert LiquidityLocked();\n    }","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity refuses the launch factory's zero-delta fee collect, freezing the payer's and network's LP fees"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documented privileged-power note, not a hook defect. The hook pays 1.5% of gross ETH to researchVault (0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE) and 0.5% to teamWallet (0x5Cf44fb6a49156125b5f9Dfea73E4011534C7944). On Ethereum mainnet the vault is a verified RoutrVault contract (Sourcify, solc 0.8.26) whose owner() returns the team wallet, and whose deployer is the team wallet. The vault's owner may call initiateWithdraw(to, amount) for any address and any liquid amount, and executeWithdraw() after a 48-hour delay, plus postJob/approveJob/releaseJob to pay arbitrary agent wallets. So the economic guarantee the brief states (1.5% to research) is a trust assumption on the vault's owner, who is the same party that receives the 0.5% team share. The hook itself correctly hard-codes both recipients as immutables with no setter, and the vault's receive() only emits an event (about 1,800 gas), well inside the hook's 50,000-gas push budget, so automatic payment to the vault will not fall into the credit path on a funded manager. The judge may want this recorded beside the launch, since nothing in the repository or README states that the research vault is team-controlled.","line":37,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"Read-only chain evidence (chain id 1): eth_call {to: 0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE, data: 0x8da5cb5b (owner())} returns 0x0000000000000000000000005cf44fb6a49156125b5f9dfea73e4011534c7944. eth_getCode for 0x5Cf44fb6a49156125b5f9Dfea73E4011534C7944 returns 0x (an EOA). Sourcify https://sourcify.dev/server/v2/contract/1/0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE shows src/RoutrVault.sol with `function initiateWithdraw(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner` and `function executeWithdraw() external onlyOwner` (48h WITHDRAW_DELAY). eth_estimateGas for a 1e15 wei plain transfer to the vault returns 0x592a (22,826 gas incl. 21,000 base). Expected per brief: 1.5% reaches research; actual: 1.5% reaches a contract the 0.5% recipient controls.","severity":"info","snippet":"    address payable public immutable researchVault;\n    address payable public immutable teamWallet;","title":"Trust assumption: the research vault's owner is the team wallet, so the 1.5%/0.5% split is enforced only by the vault, not by the hook"}],"hash":"1f719db6c4f8ee24ce807e2bb53d33263c9f788fa3e53c95717c60ee0ab71503","nodeId":"767fab84-8638-41da-9e37-2a72bf7dba39","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings are in `.imd-findings.json` with one medium finding, one informational trust note, and a coverage row for all ten entry points plus five checked invariants. No source files were changed; the only extra file is my scratch test under `test/scratch/`.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **Medium: the hook refuses the launch factory's fee collect.** `beforeRemoveLiquidity` reverts for every delta, and v4 sends the factory's zero-liquidity collect through that callback. The pool's 1.25% LP fee, which launch policy splits 80% to the payer and 20% to the network, therefore accrues on the seeded position and can never be claimed. The supplied floor check in Owners.protected.t.sol fails on this code for exactly that reason. I reproduced it with a factory stand-in that seeds, trades both ways, and then collects. The README already records this as a deliberate reading of the brief, so the fix needs a scope decision from the requester. Reverting only when `liquidityDelta != 0` would keep every position locked for every caller and still let fees out.\n- **Info: the research vault is team-controlled.** On mainnet, the vault at the fixed address is a verified RoutrVault whose owner is the team wallet, and its owner can withdraw the whole balance to any address after 48 hours. The hook enforces its 1.5% / 0.5% split correctly with immutables and no setters, but the research share ultimately depends on the vault's owner, who also receives the team share. Nothing in the repository states this.\n\n**What holds in my area.** Every callback checks the PoolManager caller, the pool binding is one-shot and checks the full key, swap context is carried through transient storage and verified in afterSwap, and reentrancy from payouts or withdrawals is blocked. The permissionless `flush` takes no destination and `withdraw` only spends the caller's own credit. The token has no admin, mint, or freeze surface. I also confirmed the mainnet vault's `receive` costs about 1,800 gas, so the hook's 50,000-gas push will not strand its payments.\n\n**What I did not reach.** The launch manifest is absent from the tree, so I could only note the values it must declare. I did not independently re-derive the fee arithmetic beyond tracing the branches, since Math and Economic Security belong to the other specialists.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2032703,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":40046,"runtime":"claude","turns":38,"wallClockMs":580489}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d2b8b66fa0a1ce68","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"v4 routes every modifyLiquidity with liquidityDelta <= 0 through beforeRemoveLiquidity (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol:204 `params.liquidityDelta <= 0 && self.hasPermission(BEFORE_REMOVE_LIQUIDITY_FLAG)`). A zero liquidityDelta removes no principal: it is the only way a v4 position realises its accrued LP fees, and it is exactly what the IMD launch factory's PoolFees does to collect the 1.25% pool fee that the policy splits 80% to the launch payer and 20% to the network. RoutrHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts unconditionally (lines 121-129), so that collect always fails and every wei of LP fee accrued to the seeded 800,000,000 ROUTR position is permanently unclaimable. Boundary: the hook treats zero as a removal although zero is the no-principal edge of the removal domain. The supplied protected check `.imd/reads/protected/univ4_hook/Owners.protected.t.sol` test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive performs this exact call (factory.modify(key, lower, upper, 0) after two trades) and fails with 'refuses the launch factory's fee collect ... so the payer's and the network's fees could never be claimed'. README.md:67 acknowledges the conflict and keeps the lock. Trade-off for the author: the brief says 'beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts for every caller, so no position in the pool can ever be removed'; letting only `params.liquidityDelta == 0` through (returning IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector) and reverting for every negative delta still guarantees that no principal can ever leave the pool, while making LP fees collectable. The hook has no afterRemoveLiquidity, so no delta is returned on the collect either way. Minimal fix: `if (params.liquidityDelta != 0) revert LiquidityLocked(); return IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector;` (requires dropping `view` only if it stays a revert-only path; a pure selector return is fine).","line":128,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\n\n/// The launch factory's role: it seeds the position and later collects the position's LP fees with a\n/// zero liquidity change (what IMD's PoolFees does). v4 routes a zero liquidityDelta through\n/// beforeRemoveLiquidity, which RoutrHook reverts unconditionally, so the 1.25% LP fees owed to the\n/// launch payer and the network can never be claimed. This test fails on the current code and passes\n/// once beforeRemoveLiquidity lets a zero liquidityDelta through while still reverting every negative one.\ncontract FactoryLp is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n    RoutrToken immutable token;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m, RoutrToken t) {\n        manager = m;\n        token = t;\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 liq) external returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), key, lo, hi, liq)), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), key, p)), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        uint8 action = abi.decode(data, (uint8));\n        BalanceDelta d;\n        PoolKey memory key;\n        if (action == 0) {\n            (, PoolKey memory k, int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 liq) =\n                abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, int24, int24, int256));\n            key = k;\n            (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, liq, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (, PoolKey memory k, SwapParams memory p) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, SwapParams));\n            key = k;\n            d = manager.swap(key, p, \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, d.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, d.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(d);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 a) private {\n        if (a < 0) {\n            uint256 owed = uint256(uint128(-a));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) {\n                manager.settle{value: owed}();\n            } else {\n                token.transfer(address(manager), owed);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (a > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(uint128(a)));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract FactoryFeeCollectProof is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    RoutrToken token;\n    RoutrHook hook;\n    FactoryLp factory;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        token = new RoutrToken();\n        hook = _deployHook();\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        factory = new FactoryLp(manager, token);\n        token.transfer(address(factory), 900_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(factory), 1_000_000 ether);\n        manager.initialize(key, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n        factory.modify(key, -600, 600, 100_000 ether);\n    }\n\n    function test_factoryCanCollectLpFeesWithZeroLiquidityDelta() public {\n        // Trades accrue 1.25% LP fees to the factory's position.\n        factory.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        factory.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -10 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1));\n        (uint128 liquidityBefore,,) =\n            IPoolManager(manager).getPositionInfo(key.toId(), address(factory), -600, 600, bytes32(0));\n        assertGt(liquidityBefore, 0);\n\n        // Principal removal must stay locked, for any negative delta.\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        factory.modify(key, -600, 600, -1);\n\n        // A zero liquidity change removes no principal; it is how the factory collects the pool's LP\n        // fees. The hook must let it through. On the current code this call reverts with\n        // LiquidityLocked wrapped in Hooks.HookCallFailed.\n        uint256 ethBefore = address(factory).balance;\n        uint256 tokenBefore = token.balanceOf(address(factory));\n        BalanceDelta collected = factory.modify(key, -600, 600, 0);\n\n        // Fees were paid out, nothing was taken from the factory, and liquidity is unchanged.\n        assertGe(collected.amount0(), 0, \"collect must not charge the factory ETH\");\n        assertGe(collected.amount1(), 0, \"collect must not charge the factory tokens\");\n        assertTrue(collected.amount0() > 0 || collected.amount1() > 0, \"no LP fees collected\");\n        assertEq(address(factory).balance, ethBefore + uint256(uint128(collected.amount0())));\n        assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(factory)), tokenBefore + uint256(uint128(collected.amount1())));\n        (uint128 liquidityAfter,,) =\n            IPoolManager(manager).getPositionInfo(key.toId(), address(factory), -600, 600, bytes32(0));\n        assertEq(liquidityAfter, liquidityBefore, \"liquidity principal changed\");\n    }\n\n    function _deployHook() internal returns (RoutrHook deployed) {\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(\n            type(RoutrHook).creationCode,\n            abi.encode(manager, token, payable(address(0xA11CE)), payable(address(0xB0B)))\n        );\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; i++) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x12cc || predicted.code.length != 0) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            require(at == predicted, \"CREATE2 deployment failed\");\n            return RoutrHook(payable(at));\n        }\n        revert(\"salt not found\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, RoutrToken, RoutrHook at a 0x12cc address, pool (ETH, ROUTR, 12500, 60, hook) initialized at sqrtPrice 2^96, an LP (the factory) adds 100_000e18 liquidity in [-600, 600]. Then: swap(true, -10 ether, MIN+1) and swap(false, -10 ether, MAX-1) accrue LP fees to the position. Call: LP unlocks and calls manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 0, 0), ''). Expected (what the factory's PoolFees and the protected test require): the call succeeds, returns a non-negative delta with amount0 > 0 or amount1 > 0 (the accrued fees), position liquidity unchanged. Actual: PoolManager reverts with Hooks.HookCallFailed wrapping RoutrHook.LiquidityLocked (0x8f4e75b2); the position's fee growth is untouched and the fees can never be taken. test/scratch/FactoryFeeCollectProof.t.sol fails on the current code with WrappedError(hook, 0x21d0ee70, 0x8f4e75b2, 0xa9e35b2f).","severity":"high","snippet":"        revert LiquidityLocked();","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts on a zero liquidityDelta, so the launch factory's LP-fee collect is refused and the pool's 1.25% LP fees are frozen forever"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The PartialFill guard is justified for ETH-specified swaps (line 183): their fee was already returned from beforeSwap in the specified currency and afterSwap cannot correct it. For an exact-output buy no fee is returned in beforeSwap (fee = 0, line 146-158); the fee is computed in afterSwap from the actual AMM ETH input `ammETH` (line 189), which is exactly right for a partial fill too, as it is for exact-input sells (lines 192-196) where partial fills are accepted and charged on actual ETH. Line 187 nevertheless reverts whenever the AMM delivered fewer tokens than requested, so any exact-output buy whose sqrtPriceLimitX96 or available liquidity stops the swap short reverts instead of partially filling as a plain v4 pool would. Boundary x invariant seam: the invariant 'fee == floor(2% of gross ETH)' would hold on the partial fill, yet the guard exempts that edge from completing. Impact is usability only (no loss, no mischarge): routers that pass a real price limit on exact-output buys get reverts, and a buy that exceeds remaining in-range liquidity cannot be partially executed. Minimal fix: drop the check at line 187 (keep the one at line 183), or document that exact-output buys must use MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 as the limit.","line":187,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"State: funded pool at 1:1 with 100_000e18 liquidity in [-600, 600] (HookTestBase._fundedPool). Call: router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=+100 ether, sqrtPriceLimitX96=TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-1)), ''). Expected under v4 semantics: a partial fill delivering the tokens obtainable down to tick -1, charged 2% of the actual ETH input. Actual: the whole swap reverts with PartialFill (test/scratch/Boundaries.t.sol test_exactOutputBuyPartialFillAtLimitReverts). The same request as an exact-input sell at a limit (test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH) succeeds with the fee on actual ETH, showing the asymmetry.","severity":"low","snippet":"                if (int256(delta.amount1()) != params.amountSpecified) revert PartialFill();","title":"Exact-output buys refuse partial fills although their fee is only computed afterSwap on the actual ETH input, so price-limited exact-output buys that v4 would fill partially always revert"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"fee = floor(G*200/10000) is 0 for G <= 49 wei, so swaps of gross ETH below 50 wei pay no hook fee. research = floor(G*150/10000) is 0 for G <= 66 wei while fee is already 1 for G in [50, 66], so in that band the whole fee is assigned to the team and the research vault receives nothing. This is integer rounding at the input boundary (boundary x precision), bounded to one wei per swap and not compounding; mainnet gas makes splitting a trade into sub-50-wei pieces uneconomic, so there is no exploitable fee evasion. README.md:33 documents the dust assignment. Reported for completeness of the math review; no change required, though rounding research up (fee - floor(G*50/10000)) would favour the vault instead of the team in the dust band if that is preferred.","line":200,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"State: funded pool (HookTestBase._fundedPool). Call 1: router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -49, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)): research + team + totalCredits == 0 (no fee). Call 2: router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -50, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)): team balance 1 wei, research 0. Call 3: router.swap(key, SwapParams(false, +49, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1)) (exact-output sell, N=49 -> fee = floor(49*200/9800) = 1, gross 50): team 2 wei, research 0. Expected under exact arithmetic: 0.75 wei research / 0.25 wei team per swap. Verified by test/scratch/Boundaries.t.sol test_tinySwapsFeeBands.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 team = fee - research; // Assign at most one wei of split-rounding dust to the team.","title":"Fee rounds to zero below 50 wei gross and, for gross 50-66 wei, the 1-wei fee goes entirely to the team (split 0%/100% instead of 75%/25%)"}],"hash":"39c0e35590f73cbff0b52c4e92c3354e575ae048ab21472c3b3b4ffc4f92d954","nodeId":"3e7fee9b-c7d6-43c4-8d2a-913b2bda3299","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json` with three findings and fourteen coverage rows, and the working tree is otherwise untouched apart from my scratch tests.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **High: the factory's LP-fee collect is refused.** v4 routes a zero liquidity change through `beforeRemoveLiquidity`, which the hook reverts for every input at `src/RoutrHook.sol:128`. The launch factory collects the 1.25% pool fee exactly that way, so the payer's and the network's LP fees are frozen for good. The supplied protected Owners check performs this exact call and fails on it. The README acknowledges the conflict with the brief. A fix that reverts only non-zero deltas still guarantees no principal can ever leave the pool. The attached proof fails on the current code and passes against a patched copy I verified outside the repository.\n- **Low: exact-output buys refuse partial fills unnecessarily.** The guard at line 187 reverts whenever fewer tokens than requested are delivered, although the fee for that mode is computed afterwards on the actual ETH input and would be correct on a partial fill, as it already is for exact-input sells. Impact is usability only.\n- **Info: dust rounding bands.** Gross ETH below 50 wei pays no fee, and for gross 50 to 66 wei the single-wei fee goes wholly to the team. Documented, bounded to one wei, not exploitable at mainnet gas prices.\n\n**What holds in my area**\n\n- The gross-up identities for exact-output buys and sells preserve fee equals floor of 2% of gross ETH. I proved this algebraically and fuzzed it over the full int128 domain.\n- Research share never exceeds the fee, all int128 casts are guarded before v4's own delta subtraction, and the hook's delta nets to zero on both the take and the mint path.\n- Flush and withdraw are consistent across mixed ETH and claim backing, including a flush before router settlement on an empty manager and a withdraw from inside a foreign unlock.\n- The 50,000 gas push budget fits both real recipients. I checked mainnet: the research vault's receive costs about 1,800 gas and the team wallet is an EOA.\n\n**Not reached**: the manifest, since no launch.json exists in the tree, and a fork rehearsal of the single-sided seed at the policy's opening price.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2103448,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":47923,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":974208}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"0f84efb01adc026d856e6cc45d4b2bcf969dc87e3601116c00d04ccf9ae27928","device":"30aa7b3ab4bbc8f3","findings":[{"description":"RoutrHook refuses the launch factory's fee collect, a zero liquidity change from the factory, so the payer's and the network's fees could never be claimed: let it through in beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity, with no owner switch that can block it\n\nRepair: the launch factory collects its zero-liquidity fee from every pool it created, and the hook must not revert, skim or redirect that collect. Check for an `onlyOwner`/role gate on fee callbacks, a revert in `beforeSwap`/`afterSwap` when the caller is the factory, or a transfer hook that steals the factory's take. The factory's fee goes to the network; a hook that blocks it freezes the payer's and the network's economics together.","line":null,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"The verifier deployed the manifest's contracts as the launch deploys them: from the launch factory (msg.sender), with IMD's launch wallet as tx.origin and $owner set, then read owner(), admin(), getOwner() and the admin role, and for a hook opened, seeded, traded and collected the pool from the factory (test/protected/univ4_hook/Owners.protected.t.sol in the protected floor).","severity":"high","title":"RoutrHook blocks the launch factory's fee collect"}],"hash":"3b43ad8037958b1302ace642fec32059c4bd03b990d64adedd390f5aad357d79","nodeId":"b109f99f-4550-4f3a-a0bf-321f772ec1b0","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd9/.identitymd/work/decebfc2-9d0d-40b4-8b93-efe39dde59d7/b109f99f-4550-4f3a-a0bf-321f772ec1b0/launch.json), matching the contracts’ constructors, permissions, supply and required pool settings.\n\n`forge build` succeeded; all 42 repository tests passed with the supplied seed.\n\nNotes flag the existing protected-check conflict over zero-liquidity fee collection and the first-trade payout fallback. Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"d49aafb1eff3a98790b0223bd576b19da9c26acf","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":429952,"inputTokens":47865,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":4333,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":141066}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fa5c50e7abe46571","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Uniswap v4 routes every modifyLiquidity whose liquidityDelta is <= 0 through beforeRemoveLiquidity (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol:204 `params.liquidityDelta <= 0 && self.hasPermission(BEFORE_REMOVE_LIQUIDITY_FLAG)`). A zero liquidityDelta removes no principal; it is the only way a v4 position realises its accrued LP fees, and it is exactly what the IMD launch factory does to collect the pool's 1.25% LP fee (80% to the launch payer, 20% to the network) on the seeded 800,000,000 ROUTR position. RoutrHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity (lines 122-129) reverts unconditionally, so that collect always reverts with LiquidityLocked() and every LP fee the pool ever accrues is permanently unclaimable by anyone. The supplied admission check Owners.protected.t.sol:test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive performs this exact sequence (factory seeds, trader swaps both ways, factory modifies with liquidityDelta 0) and fails with 'refuses the launch factory's fee collect'; README.md:67 and SECURITY.md acknowledge the conflict and keep the unconditional revert, and launch.json notes record it as unresolved. All five specialist areas reported this same root cause (merged here; the permissions specialist rated it medium, the others high). The brief's stated purpose is that no position can ever be removed; letting through only params.liquidityDelta == 0 keeps every wei of principal locked (afterRemoveLiquidity is not enabled, so no delta can be taken on the collect) while unfreezing the fees. Minimal fix: `if (params.liquidityDelta != 0) revert LiquidityLocked(); return IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector;` (and update test_removeLiquidityAndZeroDeltaAlwaysRevert / testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert accordingly). Verified: the attached proof fails on the current tree with WrappedError(hook, 0x21d0ee70, 0x8f4e75b2 = LiquidityLocked(), 0xa9e35b2f) and passes with that two-line change while still asserting that liquidityDelta -1 reverts. This is a brief-versus-platform conflict that needs the requester's scope decision; as built the launch cannot be admitted.","line":128,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal launch-factory stand-in: holds the seeded position, collects its LP fees with a\n///      zero liquidity change exactly as the launch system's fee collector does, and settles.\ncontract FactoryProbe is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n    RoutrToken immutable token;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m, RoutrToken t) {\n        manager = m;\n        token = t;\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 liq) external returns (int128, int128) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), key, lo, hi, liq)), (int128, int128));\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool buy, int256 amount) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), key, int24(0), int24(0), amount, buy));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        uint8 action = abi.decode(data[:32], (uint8));\n        BalanceDelta d;\n        PoolKey memory key;\n        if (action == 1) {\n            int24 lo;\n            int24 hi;\n            int256 liq;\n            (, key, lo, hi, liq) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, int24, int24, int256));\n            (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, liq, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            int256 amount;\n            bool buy;\n            (, key,,, amount, buy) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, int24, int24, int256, bool));\n            d = manager.swap(\n                key, SwapParams(buy, amount, buy ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), \"\"\n            );\n        }\n        _settle(Currency.wrap(address(0)), d.amount0());\n        _settle(Currency.wrap(address(token)), d.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(d.amount0(), d.amount1());\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 amt) private {\n        if (amt < 0) {\n            uint256 owed = uint256(uint128(-amt));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) manager.settle{value: owed}();\n            else {\n                token.transfer(address(manager), owed);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (amt > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(uint128(amt)));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract FeeCollectLockedTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    RoutrToken token;\n    RoutrHook hook;\n    FactoryProbe factory;\n    FactoryProbe trader;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        token = new RoutrToken();\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(\n            type(RoutrHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, payable(makeAddr(\"vault\")), payable(makeAddr(\"team\")))\n        );\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; i++) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x12cc) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            hook = RoutrHook(payable(at));\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        manager.initialize(key, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n\n        factory = new FactoryProbe(manager, token);\n        trader = new FactoryProbe(manager, token);\n        token.transfer(address(factory), 400_000_000 ether);\n        token.transfer(address(trader), 400_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(factory), 1_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(trader), 1_000 ether);\n    }\n\n    /// @notice The launch factory collects its position's LP fees with a zero liquidity change\n    ///         (what v4 routes through beforeRemoveLiquidity). The hook must let that through while\n    ///         still refusing every negative liquidity delta.\n    function test_factoryCanCollectLPFeesWithZeroDeltaWhileRemovalStaysLocked() public {\n        int24 lo = TickMath.minUsableTick(60);\n        int24 hi = TickMath.maxUsableTick(60);\n        factory.modify(key, lo, hi, 1e18);\n\n        // Trades accrue the 1.25% LP fee to the factory's position.\n        trader.swap(key, true, -1 ether);\n        trader.swap(key, false, -1 ether);\n\n        // Principal removal must stay locked for good.\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        factory.modify(key, lo, hi, -1);\n\n        // Fee collection (zero liquidity change) must succeed and pay the factory, never charge it.\n        (int128 a0, int128 a1) = factory.modify(key, lo, hi, 0);\n        assertGe(a0, 0, \"collect charged the factory ETH\");\n        assertGe(a1, 0, \"collect charged the factory tokens\");\n        assertTrue(a0 > 0 || a1 > 0, \"no LP fees were collected\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, RoutrToken, RoutrHook deployed via CREATE2 at an address with low bits 0x12cc, pool (ETH, ROUTR, fee 12500, spacing 60, hook) initialized at sqrtPrice 2^96. (1) A factory stand-in unlocks and calls manager.modifyLiquidity(key, {minUsableTick(60), maxUsableTick(60), +1e18, salt 0}) and settles both currencies: succeeds. (2) A trader swaps zeroForOne exact-input 1 ether and then oneForZero exact-input 1 ether: LP fees accrue to the factory position. (3) The factory unlocks and calls manager.modifyLiquidity(key, {same ticks, liquidityDelta 0, salt 0}). Expected: the call succeeds with amount0 >= 0, amount1 >= 0 and at least one > 0 (the accrued fees), position liquidity unchanged. Actual: PoolManager reverts with Hooks.HookCallFailed wrapping RoutrHook.LiquidityLocked (0x8f4e75b2) from beforeRemoveLiquidity; no path exists for anyone to ever collect the fees. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/FeeCollectLocked.t.sol (fails now; passes once liquidityDelta == 0 is let through).","severity":"high","snippet":"        revert LiquidityLocked();","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts on the zero-liquidity fee collect, so the launch factory's and network's LP fees are frozen forever and the protected fee-collect check fails"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The PartialFill guard at line 183 is necessary for ETH-specified swaps (exact-input buys and exact-output sells): their fee was already returned from beforeSwap in the specified currency and afterSwap cannot correct it, so a partial fill would retain an oversized fee. For an exact-output buy, however, beforeSwap returns no fee (fee = 0, lines 146-158) and afterSwap computes the fee from the actual AMM ETH input ammETH (line 189), which is correct for a partial fill too, exactly as exact-input sells (lines 192-196) are allowed to partially fill and are charged on the ETH actually received. Line 187 nevertheless reverts whenever the AMM delivered fewer tokens than requested, so any exact-output buy whose sqrtPriceLimitX96 or remaining in-range liquidity stops the swap short reverts instead of partially filling as a plain v4 pool would. Impact is usability only (no loss, no mischarge): routers passing a real price limit on exact-output buys get reverts, and a buy larger than the remaining in-range liquidity cannot be partially executed. Merged from the audit_math low and the write_foundry_tests design note; the ETH-specified cases are a justified design limitation and are documented in README 'Price limits and partial fills'. Minimal fix: drop the check at line 187 (keep line 183), or document that exact-output buys must use MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 as the limit.","line":187,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool (ETH/ROUTR, 12500, 60, hook) at sqrtPrice 2^96 with 100_000e18 liquidity in [-600, 600]. Call: router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=+100 ether, sqrtPriceLimitX96=TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-1)), ''). Expected under v4 semantics: a partial fill delivering the tokens obtainable down to tick -1, charged 2% of the actual ETH input. Actual: the whole swap reverts with PartialFill() (0xf4844814) from afterSwap. The same request as an exact-input sell at a limit (oneForZero, -100 ether, getSqrtPriceAtTick(1)) succeeds with a partial fill and the fee on actual ETH. Reproduced in test/scratch/PartialFill.t.sol (test_exactOutputBuyAtPriceLimitReverts and test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPartiallyFills).","severity":"low","snippet":"                if (int256(delta.amount1()) != params.amountSpecified) revert PartialFill();","title":"Exact-output buys refuse partial fills at a price limit although their fee is computed in afterSwap from the actual ETH input"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documented privileged-power note, not a hook defect. The hook correctly hard-codes both recipients as immutables with no setter and pays 1.5% of gross ETH to researchVault (0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE) and 0.5% to teamWallet (0x5Cf44fb6a49156125b5f9Dfea73E4011534C7944). On Ethereum mainnet the vault is a contract whose owner() returns the team wallet, and the team wallet is an externally owned account. The economic guarantee the brief states (1.5% to research) therefore rests on the vault owner's conduct, and that owner is the same party that receives the 0.5% share. Nothing in the repository, README or launch.json notes records that the research vault is team-controlled; the judge may want this recorded beside the launch. Reported by the permissions specialist and re-verified here with read-only chain calls.","line":37,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"Read-only chain evidence (Ethereum mainnet, chain id 1, via a public RPC on 2026-10-23): eth_call {to: 0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE, data: 0x8da5cb5b (owner())} returns 0x0000000000000000000000005cf44fb6a49156125b5f9dfea73e4011534c7944; eth_getCode for 0x5Cf44fb6a49156125b5f9Dfea73E4011534C7944 returns 0x (an EOA); eth_getCode for the vault returns non-empty bytecode. Expected per brief: 1.5% reaches research; actual: 1.5% reaches a contract the 0.5% recipient controls.","severity":"info","snippet":"    address payable public immutable researchVault;","title":"Trust assumption: the research vault is owned by the team wallet, so the 1.5%/0.5% split is enforced by the vault's owner, not by the hook"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documentation inconsistency. README.md line 90 says 'this repository does not contain `launch.json` or broadcast transactions', while launch.json is present at the repository root and is the manifest the launch system reads (kind univ4_hook, RoutrHook with four constructor arguments, RoutrToken with totalSupply 1e27, pool fee 12500 / spacing 60). The manifest itself was checked and is schema-consistent with the implementation: constructor arguments match the declaration order, permissions match getHookPermissions, addresses are lowercase, totalSupply equals what the constructor mints, and notes are 2,437 characters. Only the README sentence is stale; it should be corrected so an operator does not look for the manifest elsewhere.","line":90,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"ls at the repository root shows launch.json (3,247 bytes); README.md line 90 contains the sentence 'this repository does not contain `launch.json` or broadcast transactions'. Expected: README describes the manifest that ships; actual: README denies it exists.","severity":"info","snippet":"**After launch.** There are no settings to configure or admin keys to hand over. Operations should verify deployed bytecode, metadata, immutable arguments, pool binding and permission flags; monitor `FeeCharged`, `Payment`, `CreditAccrued`, `ClaimsRedeemed` and `Withdrawal`; call `flush` when claims or rejected payments remain; and ensure the vault can receive or withdraw funds. Research-job selection, agent execution, result publication, and vault spending are responsibilities of the existing research vault and swarm, outside these two contracts. The separate launch process owns its manifest and deployment; this repository does not contain `launch.json` or broadcast transactions.","title":"README states the repository does not contain launch.json, but the tree ships one"}],"hash":"42a5b4f17a54a72f79fc2082473bb3347991d9ec294bcdc6904a9fdea50afff4","nodeId":"e77ade05-1ac8-457a-ad23-4c6349619a7d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The tracked tree is unchanged, and `.imd-findings.json` holds 4 findings and a 13-row coverage record.\n\n**Outcome.** One blocking defect, reproduced and merged from all five specialist reports, plus one low usability issue and two informational notes. Everything else in the hook and token held under my own pass.\n\n**Findings kept**\n\n1. **High. Unconditional `beforeRemoveLiquidity` revert freezes the pool's LP fees.** v4 routes a zero-liquidity modify through the remove-liquidity callback, and that is the only way a position realises its 1.25% LP fees. The launch factory collects with exactly that call, so the payer's and network's fees are unclaimable forever and the protected fee-collect check fails. I ran the specialists' proof: it fails on the current tree with `LiquidityLocked()` and passes with a two-line change that lets only `liquidityDelta == 0` through, which still locks all principal. I restored the source afterwards. This one carries the proof.\n2. **Low. Exact-output buys reject partial fills.** The fee for that mode is computed in `afterSwap` from actual ETH input, so the guard is unnecessary, unlike the justified guard for ETH-specified swaps. Reproduced with a scratch test showing `PartialFill()` at a price limit while an exact-input sell at a limit fills partially.\n3. **Info. Trust assumption.** Read-only chain calls confirm the research vault's owner is the team wallet, an externally owned account. The 1.5% share depends on that owner's conduct, and nothing in the repository records it.\n4. **Info. README line 90** says the repository has no `launch.json`, but it ships one. The manifest itself checked out against the implementation.\n\n**Specialist leads dropped**\n- Tick-spacing and fee hard-binding: the manifest states 60 and 12500, so the hook and manifest agree.\n- Sub-50-wei fee dust band: documented, bounded to one wei, no loss or evasion path.\n\n**My own pass** traced the hook-delta sign conventions for all four swap modes, the claims fallback on a token-only manager, reentrancy through the shared transient lock, redemption inside and outside an unlock, credit backing, and the token's plain transfers. All 58 existing tests pass, bytecode sizes are well inside limits, and the manifest is schema-consistent. The single open decision for the requester is whether the brief's \"reverts for every caller\" wording should yield to the platform's zero-delta collect requirement.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1104378,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":27752,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":405309}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d2d0460994f47014","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The hook reverts in beforeRemoveLiquidity unconditionally, including for a liquidity change of exactly 0. Uniswap v4 routes a zero-liquidity modifyLiquidity through the remove-liquidity callbacks, and a zero change is how the launch factory (PoolFees) realizes the position's accrued LP fees without touching principal. The pool's 12,500 LP fee accrues in ETH on buys and in ROUTR on sells to the factory-held seed position; with this hook the only path the launch system uses to collect it reverts with LiquidityLocked for every caller and forever, so the payer's 80% and the network's 20% of all LP fees are frozen. The brief asks that no position can ever be removed; a zero-delta modify removes nothing, and principal stays fully locked when only non-zero liquidityDelta is refused. The protected admission check Owners.protected.t.sol::test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive fails with exactly this revert, so the launch is blocked as built. README.md line 67 and SECURITY.md acknowledge the conflict but ship the stricter behaviour. Minimal fix that preserves the intended lock: `if (params.liquidityDelta != 0) revert LiquidityLocked(); return IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector;`. Verified: the attached proof fails on the current tree and passes with that two-line change (then restored). This is a brief-versus-platform conflict and needs a scope decision; the finding is reported so the judge can make it, with the economics quantified.","line":128,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {PoolId} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolId.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Stands in for the launch factory: holds the seeded position and collects its LP fees with a\n///      zero liquidity change, exactly as the launch system's PoolFees does. Also acts as a trader.\ncontract FactoryAndTrader is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, int24 lower, int24 upper, int256 liquidity) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), key, abi.encode(lower, upper, liquidity))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), key, abi.encode(p))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        (uint8 action, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory params) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (action == 0) {\n            delta = manager.swap(key, abi.decode(params, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (int24 lower, int24 upper, int256 liquidity) = abi.decode(params, (int24, int24, int256));\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lower, upper, liquidity, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 amount) private {\n        if (amount < 0) {\n            uint256 owed = uint256(uint128(-amount));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) manager.settle{value: owed}();\n            else {\n                RoutrToken(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), owed);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (amount > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(uint128(amount)));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract FeeCollectLockTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = 0x12cc;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    RoutrToken token;\n    RoutrHook hook;\n    FactoryAndTrader factory;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        token = new RoutrToken();\n        hook = _deployHook();\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        factory = new FactoryAndTrader(manager);\n        token.transfer(address(factory), 900_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(factory), 1_000_000 ether);\n        manager.initialize(key, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n        // The launch seed: tokens only, upper edge at the opening tick.\n        factory.modify(key, -600, 0, 100_000 ether);\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0);\n    }\n\n    /// Fees accrue to the seeded position on every trade, but the only collection path the launch\n    /// system uses (a zero liquidity change by the position holder) is refused by the hook.\n    function test_factoryZeroDeltaFeeCollectIsRefusedAlthoughFeesAccrued() public {\n        // Buys bring ETH in and pay the 1.25% LP fee in ETH to the seeded position.\n        factory.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        factory.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -1_000 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1));\n\n        // Accrued LP fees are owed to the position: fee growth inside the range is non-zero.\n        (uint128 liquidity, uint256 feeGrowth0, uint256 feeGrowth1) =\n            IPoolManager(manager).getPositionInfo(key.toId(), address(factory), -600, 0, bytes32(0));\n        assertEq(liquidity, 100_000 ether);\n        (uint256 inside0, uint256 inside1) = IPoolManager(manager).getFeeGrowthInside(key.toId(), -600, 0);\n        assertGt(inside0 - feeGrowth0, 0, \"ETH LP fees accrued to the seeded position\");\n        assertGt(inside1 - feeGrowth1, 0, \"ROUTR LP fees accrued to the seeded position\");\n\n        // The collect: a zero liquidity change by the holder. v4 routes it through beforeRemoveLiquidity.\n        // Expected: succeeds with non-negative deltas (the accrued fees). Actual: LiquidityLocked.\n        uint256 ethBefore = address(factory).balance;\n        BalanceDelta collected = factory.modify(key, -600, 0, 0);\n        assertGe(collected.amount0(), 0);\n        assertGe(collected.amount1(), 0);\n        assertGt(address(factory).balance, ethBefore, \"collect paid out the ETH LP fees\");\n        // Principal stays locked: the position still has its full liquidity afterwards.\n        (liquidity,,) = IPoolManager(manager).getPositionInfo(key.toId(), address(factory), -600, 0, bytes32(0));\n        assertEq(liquidity, 100_000 ether, \"no principal was removed by the collect\");\n    }\n\n    function _deployHook() internal returns (RoutrHook deployed) {\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(\n            type(RoutrHook).creationCode,\n            abi.encode(manager, token, payable(address(0xA11CE)), payable(address(0xB0B)))\n        );\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; i++) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != FLAGS || predicted.code.length != 0) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            require(at == predicted, \"CREATE2 deployment failed\");\n            return RoutrHook(payable(at));\n        }\n        revert(\"salt not found\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, RoutrToken, RoutrHook (any valid recipients), pool initialized at 1:1 (fee 12500, spacing 60), factory stand-in seeds a token-only position [-600, 0] with 100,000e18 liquidity. Calls: (1) factory swaps exact-input buy 10 ETH, (2) factory swaps exact-input sell 1,000 ROUTR; getFeeGrowthInside(-600,0) minus the position's recorded growth is > 0 in both currencies, so LP fees are owed to the position. (3) factory calls PoolManager.modifyLiquidity(key, {tickLower:-600, tickUpper:0, liquidityDelta:0, salt:0}). Expected: succeeds with amount0 >= 0 and amount1 >= 0 (about 0.1225 ETH and 12.5 ROUTR here), the factory's ETH balance rises, and the position still holds 100,000e18 liquidity. Actual: reverts with Hooks.Wrap__FailedHookCall wrapping RoutrHook.LiquidityLocked (0x8f4e75b2) from beforeRemoveLiquidity; the fees stay in the pool indefinitely. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/FeeCollectLock.t.sol (fails now; passes once liquidityDelta == 0 is let through).","severity":"high","snippet":"        revert LiquidityLocked();","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity also refuses zero-liquidity fee collection, so the seeded position's LP fees (1.25% of every trade, 80% payer / 20% network) can never be claimed through the launch system's coll"}],"hash":"48aae0042e1e03ca04e24d0099695a1dfeb2c4a56bcd00c8e7193e27c6006fc2","nodeId":"7c126e8d-f6cb-422b-a5fc-8b7b90b28712","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review record is corrected in place. The one finding now anchors to the exact line of the revert in `src/RoutrHook.sol`.\n\n- **What was wrong.** The finding cited line 128 but quoted the whole `beforeRemoveLiquidity` function, which starts at line 122. The checker could not match the snippet to the cited line.\n- **What changed.** The snippet is now the single line at 128, copied byte for byte from the file. Severity, description, reproduction, proof and all 17 coverage rows are unchanged.\n- **Re-verified.** I re-ran the attached proof test against the current tree. It fails with the hook's LiquidityLocked error wrapped by the PoolManager, exactly as the finding states. The scratch file was removed afterwards and only the findings file is modified.\n\nThe finding still stands: the unconditional revert in beforeRemoveLiquidity also refuses a zero-liquidity modify, which is how the launch factory collects the seed position's LP fees, so those fees are frozen and the protected Owners test fails. The proposed fix is to revert only when liquidityDelta is non-zero.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2040138,"inputTokens":548,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":54509,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":1074724}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1b657df861f7b08b","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Uniswap v4 routes every modifyLiquidity call with liquidityDelta <= 0 through beforeRemoveLiquidity (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol:204), and a zero liquidity change is the only way a position collects its accrued LP fees. The launch factory holds the seeded 800,000,000 ROUTR position and collects the pool's 1.25% LP fee (80% payer / 20% network) with exactly such a zero-delta call (PoolFees). RoutrHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts unconditionally, so that collect reverts with LiquidityLocked(), and every LP fee the pool ever earns is unreachable by anyone, for good. The judged floor check Owners.protected.t.sol:test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive performs this exact sequence (factory adds liquidity, trader swaps, factory modifies with liquidityDelta 0) and fails with the message 'refuses the launch factory's fee collect'. The README (line 67) acknowledges the conflict and keeps the unconditional revert. The brief's guarantee is that no position can ever be removed; a zero liquidity change removes no principal (Pool.modifyLiquidity with liquidityDelta 0 only realises feesAccrued), so letting it through preserves the lock while unfreezing the fees. Minimal fix: in beforeRemoveLiquidity, revert LiquidityLocked only when params.liquidityDelta != 0 and otherwise return IHooks.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector (no afterRemoveLiquidity permission is enabled, so no delta can be taken from the collect). The supplied proof fails on the current code and passes with that change, while still asserting that liquidityDelta -1 reverts.","line":128,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal launch-factory stand-in: holds the seeded position, collects its LP fees with a\n///      zero liquidity change exactly as the launch system's fee collector does, and settles.\ncontract FactoryProbe is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n    RoutrToken immutable token;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m, RoutrToken t) {\n        manager = m;\n        token = t;\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 liq) external returns (int128, int128) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), key, lo, hi, liq)), (int128, int128));\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool buy, int256 amount) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), key, int24(0), int24(0), amount, buy));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        uint8 action = abi.decode(data[:32], (uint8));\n        BalanceDelta d;\n        PoolKey memory key;\n        if (action == 1) {\n            int24 lo;\n            int24 hi;\n            int256 liq;\n            (, key, lo, hi, liq) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, int24, int24, int256));\n            (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, liq, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            int256 amount;\n            bool buy;\n            (, key,,, amount, buy) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, int24, int24, int256, bool));\n            d = manager.swap(\n                key, SwapParams(buy, amount, buy ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), \"\"\n            );\n        }\n        _settle(Currency.wrap(address(0)), d.amount0());\n        _settle(Currency.wrap(address(token)), d.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(d.amount0(), d.amount1());\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 amt) private {\n        if (amt < 0) {\n            uint256 owed = uint256(uint128(-amt));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) manager.settle{value: owed}();\n            else {\n                token.transfer(address(manager), owed);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (amt > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(uint128(amt)));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract FeeCollectLockedTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    RoutrToken token;\n    RoutrHook hook;\n    FactoryProbe factory;\n    FactoryProbe trader;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        token = new RoutrToken();\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(\n            type(RoutrHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, payable(makeAddr(\"vault\")), payable(makeAddr(\"team\")))\n        );\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; i++) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x12cc) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            hook = RoutrHook(payable(at));\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        manager.initialize(key, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n\n        factory = new FactoryProbe(manager, token);\n        trader = new FactoryProbe(manager, token);\n        token.transfer(address(factory), 400_000_000 ether);\n        token.transfer(address(trader), 400_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(factory), 1_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(trader), 1_000 ether);\n    }\n\n    /// @notice The launch factory collects its position's LP fees with a zero liquidity change\n    ///         (what v4 routes through beforeRemoveLiquidity). The hook must let that through while\n    ///         still refusing every negative liquidity delta.\n    function test_factoryCanCollectLPFeesWithZeroDeltaWhileRemovalStaysLocked() public {\n        int24 lo = TickMath.minUsableTick(60);\n        int24 hi = TickMath.maxUsableTick(60);\n        factory.modify(key, lo, hi, 1e18);\n\n        // Trades accrue the 1.25% LP fee to the factory's position.\n        trader.swap(key, true, -1 ether);\n        trader.swap(key, false, -1 ether);\n\n        // Principal removal must stay locked for good.\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        factory.modify(key, lo, hi, -1);\n\n        // Fee collection (zero liquidity change) must succeed and pay the factory, never charge it.\n        (int128 a0, int128 a1) = factory.modify(key, lo, hi, 0);\n        assertGe(a0, 0, \"collect charged the factory ETH\");\n        assertGe(a1, 0, \"collect charged the factory tokens\");\n        assertTrue(a0 > 0 || a1 > 0, \"no LP fees were collected\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: PoolManager + RoutrToken + RoutrHook (flags 0x12cc) deployed, pool (ETH/ROUTR, fee 12500, spacing 60) initialized. 1) factory: unlock -> modifyLiquidity(key, {minUsableTick(60), maxUsableTick(60), +1e18, salt 0}) and settle both currencies (succeeds; no add-liquidity callback). 2) trader: swap zeroForOne exact-input 1 ether, then oneForZero exact-input 1 ether (LP fees accrue to the factory position). 3) factory: unlock -> modifyLiquidity(key, {same ticks, liquidityDelta 0, salt 0}). Expected: call succeeds with a non-negative delta paying the factory its accrued fees. Actual: PoolManager reverts with Wrap__FailedHookCall(hook, LiquidityLocked() = 0x8f4e75b2) wrapped in HookCallFailed (0xa9e35b2f); no path exists for anyone to ever collect the fees. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/FeeCollectLocked.t.sol","severity":"high","snippet":"        revert LiquidityLocked();","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity reverts on the zero-liquidity fee collect, so the launch factory's and network's 1.25% LP fees are locked forever and the protected fee-collect check fails"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief requires the hook to bind to exactly one pool, native ETH paired with this token. The implementation additionally requires key.fee == 12_500 and key.tickSpacing == 60. The fee matches the launch policy tier, but the tick spacing is not fixed by the brief or the policy and is chosen by the manifest step (pool.tickSpacing), which does not exist in this repository. If the deployer initializes with the manifest's tickSpacing and it is not 60, PoolManager.initialize reverts inside afterInitialize with InvalidPool() and the whole factory launch transaction fails after the hook has been mined and deployed. The judged check Hook.protected.t.sol:test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory opens the pool with IMD_TICK_SPACING from the manifest and would report the refusal. This is a coupling to be confirmed rather than a behavioural defect: either the manifest must state tickSpacing 60 (and fee 12500) or the check should be relaxed to currency0 == ETH and currency1 == token only (the PoolId binding already prevents a second pool).","line":113,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed, not yet initialized. Call manager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0: 0x0, currency1: token, fee: 12500, tickSpacing: 10, hooks: hook}, sqrtPrice). Expected per brief: the ETH/ROUTR pool with this hook binds. Actual: afterInitialize reverts InvalidPool() (0xa9e35b2f-wrapped), initialize reverts, hook.initialized() stays false. The existing test test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks shows the same for tickSpacing 120 and fee 3000.","severity":"low","snippet":"                || address(key.hooks) != address(this) || key.fee != POOL_FEE || key.tickSpacing != TICK_SPACING","title":"afterInitialize hard-binds tick spacing 60 and fee 12500, so a manifest or policy that opens the pool with any other tickSpacing makes the launch transaction revert"}],"hash":"61ec6bebe0a46d088574dd450aded5f5c6fb4c44c66c8d6a830736fb98d9aa2f","nodeId":"b73901e6-9c58-47a0-a172-c92154fa9a94","outcome":"completed","summary":"Both findings now cite a line whose quoted text matches the tree exactly, and nothing else in the working tree changed.\n\n**What I did.** The flagged finding was correct in substance but mis-cited: it pointed at line 128 of the hook while quoting seven lines that begin at line 122. I replaced the snippet with the single line at 128, the unconditional `revert LiquidityLocked();` in beforeRemoveLiquidity. The finding text, reproduction, severity and proof are unchanged.\n\n**Verification.**\n- The proof test under test/scratch still fails on the current code with the wrapped LiquidityLocked revert when the factory collects LP fees with a zero liquidity change, so it holds the fix to letting that collect through.\n- A script compared each finding's path, line and snippet against the source. Both lines match exactly, including the second finding at line 113 about the hard-bound fee and tick spacing.\n- Git reports no modified tracked files. Only the findings record and the scratch test exist outside the tree.\n\n**Record contents.** Two findings remain: the high-severity locked LP fee collect with proof, and the low-severity afterInitialize over-constraint. The coverage record still answers all ten listed entry points plus three invariant rows, with the beforeRemoveLiquidity callback marked as finding 1.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1908752,"inputTokens":580,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":45704,"runtime":"claude","turns":40,"wallClockMs":816193}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"b886845c01761aa1","findings":[],"hash":"6c4feba25b0b04dabda56b635202ad0e18343ba46e0a1301b0c49cf8757bbe9c","nodeId":"bf46edb1-d8bd-4530-a709-c41222c71a2e","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency that changed the same files after it was accepted: Command failed: git -c user.name=IdentityMD Worker -c user.email=worker@identitymd.invalid merge --no-edit -m imd: reapply this node's accepted work 318eb26c5b7e186651f2b50310575114017b04eb\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":290}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f4fc12ec2eb04fe9dde4219ea66b4cdcedb914fec647d62200981c5d6148287d","device":"2d33950b9728fd89","findings":[],"hash":"8496a9004ab90c47eecb403bb51587f3cd94ad3085eb4800d0647286a20bd24c","nodeId":"436e1901-e996-4f2e-9604-f89e9b467018","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the token, hook, vendored dependencies, tests, and deployment documentation.\n\nVerified: `forge build`, `forge test` (42 passed), and `forge fmt --check`.\n\nImportant: the unconditional removal lock also blocks zero-liquidity fee collection, conflicting with one supplied protected check. This is documented in [README.md](/home/imd3/.identitymd/work/decebfc2-9d0d-40b4-8b93-efe39dde59d7/436e1901-e996-4f2e-9604-f89e9b467018/README.md).","treeHash":"d49ee403223501ffa650a52fae88eb19cbe433bb","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2100608,"inputTokens":129830,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":39585,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":1488565}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"b873726c4f9c1689670588a18784f40629a661192c4974e3a6141b3c2dbc41fa","device":"f20ec62b0213db3f","findings":[{"description":"Every automatic payout (_payOrCredit in afterSwap, and _retry in flush) forwards a hard 50,000-gas budget. A research vault whose payable receive does any bookkeeping (e.g. three fresh SSTOREs, ~66k gas) accepts ETH but always fails inside that budget, so every swap credits it instead, and flush() retries with the same cap and fails forever. The credit can then only be released by the vault itself calling withdraw(), which a receive-only vault contract (the brief describes the vault as 'a contract with a payable receive') cannot do. The 1.5% research share would accumulate in the hook permanently. The brief only allows crediting when 'an ETH transfer fails'; here a normal transfer succeeds. Suggested fix: let flush() (or a dedicated permissionless payout) forward all remaining gas to the fixed recipients, since swaps no longer depend on it, while keeping the cap inside afterSwap. Whether the deployed vault at 0x087C0CF0A103acA2c487c5017DbC121ad6C5afEE is affected depends on its receive cost, which was not checked on chain here.","line":33,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\n\n/// A research vault that accepts ETH and records each deposit (three fresh storage writes, ~66k gas).\ncontract BookkeepingVault {\n    uint256 public deposits;\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public amountOf;\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public blockOf;\n\n    receive() external payable {\n        uint256 i = ++deposits;\n        amountOf[i] = msg.value;\n        blockOf[i] = block.number;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    IPoolManager internal immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, abi.encode(p)));\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, abi.encode(p)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        (bool isSwap, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory inner) = abi.decode(data, (bool, PoolKey, bytes));\n        if (isSwap) manager.swap(key, abi.decode(inner, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        else manager.modifyLiquidity(key, abi.decode(inner, (ModifyLiquidityParams)), \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0);\n        _settle(key.currency1);\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c) private {\n        int256 d = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), c);\n        if (d < 0) {\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) {\n                manager.settle{value: uint256(-d)}();\n            } else {\n                RoutrToken(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-d));\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (d > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(d));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract GasHungryVaultProof is Test {\n    function test_vaultThatAcceptsETHIsPaidItsShare() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        RoutrToken token = new RoutrToken();\n        BookkeepingVault vault = new BookkeepingVault();\n        address payable team = payable(makeAddr(\"team\"));\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(type(RoutrHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, vault, team));\n        RoutrHook hook;\n        for (uint256 i;; i++) {\n            address predicted = vm.computeCreate2Address(bytes32(i), keccak256(code), address(this));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x12cc) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), i)\n            }\n            hook = RoutrHook(payable(at));\n            break;\n        }\n        PoolKey memory key =\n            PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        ProofRouter router = new ProofRouter(manager);\n        token.transfer(address(router), 900_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(router), 10_000 ether);\n        manager.initialize(key, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n        router.modify(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-6000, 6000, 10_000 ether, bytes32(0)));\n\n        // A 10 ETH exact-input buy owes the vault 0.15 ETH. The vault accepts ETH.\n        router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        // Anyone retries the payout.\n        hook.flush();\n\n        // Expected: the vault, which accepts ETH, holds its 1.5%. Actual: 0, and the credit can only be\n        // released by the vault itself calling withdraw(), which a receive-only vault cannot do.\n        assertEq(address(vault).balance, 0.15 ether, \"vault never paid\");\n        assertEq(hook.credits(address(vault)), 0, \"share stuck as credit\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager, funded ETH/ROUTR pool, hook with research vault = BookkeepingVault (receive writes 3 new storage slots). Exact-input buy of 10 ETH, then anyone calls hook.flush(). Expected: vault balance 0.15 ETH, credits(vault) == 0. Actual: vault balance 0, credits(vault) == 0.15 ETH, and a direct call{value:1 wei} to the vault succeeds.","severity":"medium","title":"Recipient that accepts ETH but needs more than PAYOUT_GAS in receive is never paid; its share is stranded unless it can call withdraw()"},{"description":"v4 routes modifyLiquidity with liquidityDelta == 0 through beforeRemoveLiquidity. The hook accepts it so the launch factory can collect LP fees, as the IMD launch rules require; any non-zero removal reverts with LiquidityLocked. No principal can leave the pool (covered by fuzz and invariant tests in test/RoutrLaunchEdges.t.sol and test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol). Reported only because the brief's wording ('reverts for every caller') is stricter than the implementation.","line":129,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"modifyLiquidity(key, (-600, 600, 0, 0)) on the bound pool succeeds and pays accrued LP fees; liquidityDelta = -1 reverts. Expected by brief text: both revert. Actual: the zero-delta collect succeeds (intended per launch rules).","severity":"info","title":"beforeRemoveLiquidity lets a zero liquidityDelta through (fee collection), so it does not literally revert for every call"},{"description":"For exact-input buys and exact-output sells the fee is fixed in beforeSwap on the specified ETH amount; if the AMM fills less (price limit hit, or the single-sided pool runs out of ROUTR), afterSwap reverts the whole swap rather than refund the over-charged fee. The fee is never escaped and no funds are lost, but a router that relies on partial fills with a price limit gets a revert. Token-specified swaps partially fill and pay on actual ETH.","line":185,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded pool at tick 0: swap(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-100 ether, sqrtPriceLimit=getSqrtPriceAtTick(-1)) reverts with PartialFill; the same with amountSpecified=+100 ether (exact-output buy) partially fills and charges 2% on the ETH actually swapped.","severity":"info","title":"ETH-specified swaps that cannot fill completely revert (PartialFill) instead of partially filling"}],"hash":"b82d43b6466a55f08ffe85128d0c77eb3f7475d71bd07e06287ae9be11722fdf","nodeId":"bf46edb1-d8bd-4530-a709-c41222c71a2e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The full suite passes: `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed runs 62 tests in 9 suites with 0 failures. I found one medium-severity defect I couldn't test around, so I reported it in `.imd-findings.json` instead of writing a test that blesses it.\n\n**What I added.** The earlier attempt was rejected because it edited files that another contributor's accepted work also changed. So this time I only added new files and left the existing tests and helpers alone:\n- **`test/helpers/RoutrLaunchKit.sol`**: a self-contained test router. It reads the PoolManager's own Swap event, so the fee is measured against core's numbers rather than worked out the hook's way.\n- **`test/RoutrLaunchEdges.t.sol`** (15 tests):\n  - Buys and sells, exact-input and exact-output, each pay exactly 2% of the ETH side, split 1.5% / 0.5%. This is checked on the launch-shaped pool (fresh PoolManager, seeded with the token only, no ETH), including an exact-output buy as the very first trade.\n  - A fuzz test runs amounts from 1 wei up to 40 ETH and checks that fees never revert and always round down.\n  - The hook is also built with the real vault and team addresses. I replaced the vault's code with a contract that rejects ETH and checked that swaps continue, the vault is credited, and it can withdraw to another address.\n  - Failure paths: forbidden withdrawal destinations, strangers trying to pull credit, direct ETH sent to the hook, and a second pool binding.\n  - Removing liquidity is fuzzed over ranges, amounts and salts, including a third-party LP's position. Every attempt reverts.\n- **`test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol`**: invariant tests on the launch-shaped pool. A handler mixes all four trade types, vault and team outages, `flush`, `withdraw`, fee collection and removal attempts. After every call sequence:\n  - the position's liquidity is unchanged and no removal ever succeeded;\n  - credits equal the hook's ETH plus its ERC-6909 claims;\n  - every fee wei is either paid, still owed, or withdrawn;\n  - ETH and token supply are conserved;\n  - no deltas are left open.\n- **`test/RoutrTokenInvariant.t.sol`**: invariant tests over random transfers, approvals and `transferFrom` calls (including over-spends that must revert). The supply stays fixed at 1,000,000,000 and is fully held by the test accounts.\n\n**Findings in `.imd-findings.json`:**\n1. **Medium: a vault that accepts ETH can still be left unpaid.** Every automatic payout gets a fixed 50,000-gas budget, both during the swap and when anyone calls `flush`. If the vault's `receive` needs more gas than that (for example, it records each deposit in storage), every payment fails and is turned into a credit. A plain transfer to the same vault succeeds. Only the vault itself can then release the credit by calling `withdraw()`, and a vault that only has a payable `receive` can't make that call. Its 1.5% share would pile up in the hook for good.\n   - The finding includes a self-contained failing test as proof: after a 10 ETH buy and a `flush`, it expects 0.15 ETH in the vault and finds 0.\n   - Suggested fix: keep the gas cap inside the swap, but let `flush` forward the full remaining gas.\n   - I did not check the cost of the real vault's `receive` on chain, so whether the deployed vault is affected is unknown.\n2. **Info: one removal call goes through.** A remove call with a zero liquidity change passes `beforeRemoveLiquidity`, so the factory can collect LP fees as the launch rules require. That is narrower than the brief's \"reverts for every caller\", but no liquidity can leave the pool.\n3. **Info: some swaps revert instead of partially filling.** When ETH is the specified amount (exact-input buys, exact-output sells) and the swap can't fill completely, it reverts rather than filling part of it. The fee is never avoided and no funds are lost.\n\nNothing is committed. The new test files and `.imd-findings.json` are in the working tree for the pipeline to pick up.","treeHash":"795c2dc740e7b403425fdf926e182e4344840d95","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2423105,"inputTokens":48,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":45819,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":521227}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"e25ae0314283f9967f9723bfefcf542b9efb9a379d5e84032dbfb9aa8ecada3b","device":"7eaf1cd0fb3df712","findings":[],"hash":"e20e2dbeb7030db4a94f4bb759a23936b009bc2b0aaf119600eea4e45be29361","nodeId":"b109f99f-4550-4f3a-a0bf-321f772ec1b0","outcome":"completed","summary":"The fee-collect finding is fixed, and I updated `launch.json` to match. It is the only file I changed.\n\n**The finding (aa3520b5):** I checked the author's answer and it holds. `RoutrHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity` now reverts only when `liquidityDelta != 0`. So the launch factory's zero-liquidity fee collect gets through for any caller, with no delta and nothing an owner could switch off. `afterRemoveLiquidity` isn't enabled, and nothing in the swap callbacks or the token can block, skim or redirect the collect. The existing test `test_zeroDeltaCollectsLPFeesWithoutRemovingPrincipal` checks this: the collect returns ETH and token fees, charges no hook fee, and real removal still reverts afterwards.\n\n**The manifest:** I removed the \"Compatibility finding\" paragraph from the start of the notes, since that conflict no longer exists. In its place is one sentence saying that any nonzero removal reverts and a zero-liquidity collect passes. Everything else is unchanged and still matches the code:\n- **Hook permissions:** `afterInitialize`, `beforeRemoveLiquidity`, `beforeSwap`, `afterSwap`, `beforeSwapReturnDelta`, `afterSwapReturnDelta`.\n- **Hook constructor arguments:** `$poolManager`, `$token`, the research vault address and the team wallet address, both lowercase.\n- **Token:** `RoutrToken`, no constructor arguments, total supply `1000000000000000000000000000`.\n- **Pool:** native ETH, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the standard initial price.\n\nThe notes are now 2,388 characters, under the 4,000 limit, and the file parses as JSON.\n\n**Checks:** `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 45 tests in 5 suites. I didn't run the protected tests myself, because they import helper files that aren't in this repository.\n\nThe commit failed because git has no author identity set on this machine. The `launch.json` change is staged in the working tree but not committed.","treeHash":"0f84b571a1553d5acfe017c975fc65f038e2fdf6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":277465,"inputTokens":14,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2615,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":34318}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3baa2091028c32c1","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_payOrCredit (lines 278-288) pushes ETH with a hard PAYOUT_GAS = 50,000 budget, and _retry (lines 290-297, called from flush()) uses the same _payOrCredit, so a retry never has more gas than the original push. A recipient contract that accepts ETH but whose payable receive costs more than that (for example one that records each deposit in three fresh storage slots, about 66k gas) fails inside the budget on every swap and on every flush(), so its share is credited forever. The credit can only leave through withdraw(), which must be called by the recipient itself; a receive-only vault contract cannot do that. The brief allows crediting when a transfer fails, and a cap inside afterSwap is the right protection for swaps; but once swaps no longer depend on the push, flush() could forward all remaining gas to the two immutable recipients. Impact on this launch is limited: the permissions specialist measured the deployed research vault's receive at about 1,800 gas (eth_estimateGas 22,826 including the 21,000 base) and the team wallet is an EOA, so neither deployed recipient is affected; I did not re-query the chain. Reported from the write_foundry_tests specialist's finding, reproduced here with the attached proof, which fails on the current tree. Severity low: no funds are lost to a third party and the deployed recipients are not affected; the defect only shows with a gas-hungry recipient. Minimal fix: in _retry (or a dedicated path used only by flush()), forward all gas (`recipient.call{value: amount}(\"\")`) while keeping the 50,000 cap in afterSwap; nonReentrant on flush() already blocks reentry.","line":33,"path":"src/RoutrHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {RoutrHook} from \"src/RoutrHook.sol\";\nimport {RoutrToken} from \"src/RoutrToken.sol\";\n\n/// A research vault that accepts ETH and records each deposit (three fresh storage writes, ~66k gas).\ncontract BookkeepingVault {\n    uint256 public deposits;\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public amountOf;\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public blockOf;\n\n    receive() external payable {\n        uint256 i = ++deposits;\n        amountOf[i] = msg.value;\n        blockOf[i] = block.number;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    IPoolManager internal immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, abi.encode(p)));\n    }\n\n    function modify(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, abi.encode(p)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        (bool isSwap, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory inner) = abi.decode(data, (bool, PoolKey, bytes));\n        if (isSwap) manager.swap(key, abi.decode(inner, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        else manager.modifyLiquidity(key, abi.decode(inner, (ModifyLiquidityParams)), \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0);\n        _settle(key.currency1);\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c) private {\n        int256 d = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), c);\n        if (d < 0) {\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) {\n                manager.settle{value: uint256(-d)}();\n            } else {\n                RoutrToken(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-d));\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (d > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(d));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract GasHungryVaultProof is Test {\n    function test_vaultThatAcceptsETHIsPaidItsShare() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        RoutrToken token = new RoutrToken();\n        BookkeepingVault vault = new BookkeepingVault();\n        address payable team = payable(makeAddr(\"team\"));\n        bytes memory code = bytes.concat(type(RoutrHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, vault, team));\n        RoutrHook hook;\n        for (uint256 i;; i++) {\n            address predicted = vm.computeCreate2Address(bytes32(i), keccak256(code), address(this));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x12cc) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 32), mload(code), i)\n            }\n            hook = RoutrHook(payable(at));\n            break;\n        }\n        PoolKey memory key =\n            PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        ProofRouter router = new ProofRouter(manager);\n        token.transfer(address(router), 900_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(address(router), 10_000 ether);\n        manager.initialize(key, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n        router.modify(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-6000, 6000, 10_000 ether, bytes32(0)));\n\n        // A 10 ETH exact-input buy owes the vault 0.15 ETH. The vault accepts ETH.\n        router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        // Anyone retries the payout.\n        hook.flush();\n\n        // Expected: the vault, which accepts ETH, holds its 1.5%. Actual: 0, and the credit can only be\n        // released by the vault itself calling withdraw(), which a receive-only vault cannot do.\n        assertEq(address(vault).balance, 0.15 ether, \"vault never paid\");\n        assertEq(hook.credits(address(vault)), 0, \"share stuck as credit\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, RoutrToken, RoutrHook(manager, token, vault, team) at a 0x12cc address where vault is a contract whose receive() writes three new storage slots (~66k gas); pool (ETH, ROUTR, 12500, 60, hook) initialized at 2^96 with 10_000e18 liquidity in [-6000, 6000]. Call 1: router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1)). Call 2: hook.flush() from any address. Expected: vault balance 0.15 ether and credits(vault) == 0, because the vault accepts ETH (a direct call{value: 1 wei} to it succeeds). Actual: vault balance 0, credits(vault) == 0.15 ether, and every later flush() leaves it unchanged. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_7a4f6d4ed98a.t.sol, fails with 'vault never paid: 0 != 150000000000000000'.","severity":"low","snippet":"    uint256 public constant PAYOUT_GAS = 50_000;","title":"Automatic payouts and flush() retries forward a fixed 50,000 gas, so a recipient whose receive needs more is never paid and its credit is stranded unless it can call withdraw()"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documentation only, no code defect. The author removed the token-amount PartialFill check from afterSwap's exact-output-buy branch (src/RoutrHook.sol lines 188-193), and README 'Price limits and partial fills' now correctly says an exact-output buy may partially fill at its price limit and is charged on the actual ETH. The manifest notes in launch.json line 34 were not updated and still describe the old behaviour ('ETH-specified swaps and exact-output buys revert on partial fills'). Separately, the author answered my earlier README note with 'there is no launch.json in this tree'; in the combined tree I am reviewing, launch.json is present at the repository root (3,198 bytes, 2,388-character notes, committed in cc77b19), while README.md line 90 now says the manifest is 'written by its manifest step after this work is accepted'. The rest of the manifest was re-checked and is consistent with the implementation: constructorArgs in declaration order ($poolManager, $token, lowercase vault, lowercase team), permissions equal to getHookPermissions, totalSupply 1e27 equal to what the constructor mints, pool fee 12500 and tickSpacing 60 matching afterInitialize's binding, initialPrice 2^96 below 2^256. Fix: drop 'and exact-output buys' from the notes and let README state that launch.json ships in the tree.","line":34,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"ls launch.json at the repository root shows the file; grep 'exact-output buys revert on partial fills' launch.json matches line 34. Run test/RoutrHook.t.sol test_exactOutputBuyAtPriceLimitPartiallyFillsAndPaysOnActualETH (passes): an exact-output buy of +100 ether at getSqrtPriceAtTick(-1) partially fills and pays 2% of the actual gross ETH. Expected: notes describe that behaviour; actual: notes say such a buy reverts.","severity":"info","snippet":"ETH-specified swaps and exact-output buys revert on partial fills; exact-input sells charge on actual ETH output.","title":"launch.json notes still say exact-output buys revert on partial fills, which the revised afterSwap no longer does, and README says the manifest is not in the tree although launch.json ships"}],"hash":"e54a770989a11e8001fe5e9181b6dec5cd4ae57e854b00680558426fb02775df","nodeId":"e77ade05-1ac8-457a-ad23-4c6349619a7d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and written to `.imd-findings.json`. No source file was changed and the scratch tests were removed.\n\n**Earlier findings settled**\n\n- **Fee-collect lock (high): fixed.** `beforeRemoveLiquidity` now reverts only when the liquidity delta is non-zero. All four attached fee-collect proofs pass on the revised code, and the author's new test shows a zero-delta collect returns accrued fees in both currencies with principal unchanged while a removal of one unit still reverts.\n- **Exact-output buy partial fill (low): fixed.** The token-amount check was removed from the exact-output-buy branch, and the new test confirms a price-limited buy partially fills and pays 2% of the actual gross ETH.\n- **Vault trust assumption (info): fixed.** Recorded in README and SECURITY.md.\n- **README versus launch.json (info): partly stands.** The author's working copy had no manifest, but the combined tree I reviewed ships launch.json. Its notes also still say exact-output buys revert on partial fills, which is no longer true. Kept as one info finding on the manifest notes.\n\n**New finding kept**\n\n- **Gas-capped payouts (low).** The write_foundry_tests specialist's proof reproduces: a recipient whose receive needs more than the 50,000-gas push budget is never paid, and flush() retries with the same cap, so its credit is stranded unless it can call withdraw() itself. The deployed vault's receive was measured at about 1,800 gas and the team wallet is an EOA, so this launch's recipients are not affected. The proof is attached; the minimal fix is to forward full gas in the flush retry only.\n\n**Dropped** as intentional or documented: the tick-spacing binding (the manifest uses 60), the ETH-specified partial-fill reverts, the zero-delta pass-through, and the sub-50-wei rounding note.\n\nThe project suite passed with the verifier seed:\n\n```\n62 tests passed, 0 failed (9 suites, 3 invariant suites)\n```\n\nCoverage answers all ten entry points, nine holding and flush() carrying the low finding.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":678648,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11515,"runtime":"claude","turns":14,"wallClockMs":164952}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"077634f23d623deb5caf6d7008d16ff499f1c8680ea849c0bb293c5d2500b4b4","device":"c872aaeb2e58b080","findings":[],"hash":"e8390641618a55d379ae285673f1c64eb83cb571130f5113cb1e317f80fc6dad","nodeId":"436e1901-e996-4f2e-9604-f89e9b467018","outcome":"completed","summary":"Both high-severity findings reproduced and are fixed. The reviewer's proof now passes, and `forge build`, `forge test` (46/46, run with the verifier's fuzz seed) and `forge fmt --check` all pass. I couldn't run the four supplied protected suites, including the fee-collect check in `Owners.protected.t.sol`. They import the verifier's own helper files (`src/HookFlags.sol`, `mocks/…`, `floor/OwnerChecks.sol`), which aren't on this machine. The proof does the same steps: seed the pool, swap both ways, collect with a zero liquidity change. I haven't committed anything.\n\n**What changed**\n- **Fee collection (both high findings, same cause):** v4 sends a zero liquidity change through `beforeRemoveLiquidity`, and that's the only way to collect LP fees. The hook used to revert on it. Now `beforeRemoveLiquidity` reverts only when `liquidityDelta != 0`. A zero change is let through for any caller, with no delta and no owner switch, so the factory can collect while every removal of liquidity still reverts. I replaced the old test that expected zero to revert with one that collects real fees, checks the pool's liquidity is unchanged, and checks that removing even one unit still reverts afterwards. The fuzz test now covers only negative changes, and a new one checks that a zero change works from any sender.\n- **Exact-output buys at a price limit (low):** reproduced; these reverted with `PartialFill`. I removed that check for this swap type only. Its fee is already worked out from the ETH actually swapped, so a partial fill is charged correctly. The check stays for exact-input buys and exact-output sells, where a partial fill would keep too large a fee. New test added.\n- **Vault trust note (info):** documentation only. README and SECURITY now say the research vault's owner on mainnet is the team wallet, so that wallet controls how the 1.5% is spent. That comes from the reviewer's chain reads; I didn't query the chain myself.\n- **launch.json (info):** didn't reproduce, because there is no `launch.json` in this tree. I reworded the README sentence to say the manifest step writes it after acceptance.\n\nAll five answers are in `.imd-responses.json`. The code changes are in `src/RoutrHook.sol` and `test/RoutrHook.t.sol`, the rest in README.md and SECURITY.md.","treeHash":"4a474dbb6906da0f65ba64bc9f2b6f3841110ad0","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":702299,"inputTokens":24,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":8355,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":134362}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":4640,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 77 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.49s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1397,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RoutrToken.t.sol:RoutrTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservationAndSelfTransfer(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 191120, ~: 191820)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 939049535154268009872066852\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFrom() (gas: 308050)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevertWithoutChangingState() (gas: 125623)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 78336)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrativeOrSupplyChangingEntryPoints() (gas: 249598)\n[PASS] test_walletAndContractTransfersHaveNoTax() (gas: 635369)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.62ms (8.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_emptyPredictedHookCannotInitializePool() (gas: 7177594)\n[PASS] test_hookConstructorRejectsWrongPermissionBits() (gas: 4391307)\n[PASS] test_mineExactCreationCodeAndDeployWithLaunchRecipients() (gas: 12376079)\n[PASS] test_saltMinerValidatesInputs() (gas: 2393383)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.85ms (25.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArguments() (gas: 10374)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolCreditsETHClaimsThenFlushes() (gas: 774754)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyCanFlushInsideRoutersUnlockAfterSettlement() (gas: 621609)\n[PASS] test_launchUsesOnlyTokensAndThenAllSwapTypesWork() (gas: 1130386)\n[PASS] test_nonETHPairAndWrongHookRejected() (gas: 73960)\n[PASS] test_recipientWithdrawsClaimWithoutKeeper() (gas: 806680)\n[PASS] test_rejectedPayoutAfterClaimRedemptionPreservesETHCredit() (gas: 770317)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedHookRefusesSwapCallback() (gas: 46630)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks() (gas: 338023)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 164.78ms (8.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 22 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allFourSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 294044, ~: 293383)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999999991531\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert(address,int128) (runs: 256, μ: 26570, ~: 26712)\nLogs:\n  Bound result -15938124164724368216536033719373436\n\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithoutBeforeSwapReverts() (gas: 49895)\n[PASS] test_bothRejectAndPermissionlessFlushRetries() (gas: 611091)\n[PASS] test_callbacksOnlyPoolManager() (gas: 161586)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuy() (gas: 292238)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSell() (gas: 287748)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 207402)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuy() (gas: 290879)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSell() (gas: 289021)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawalRestoresCreditAndStrangerCannotSteal() (gas: 406993)\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesFromFirstTradeAndNeverDecays() (gas: 580306)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingRecipientCannotBlockSwap() (gas: 15717263)\n[PASS] test_invalidAndOversizedAmountsRevert() (gas: 439607)\n[PASS] test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically() (gas: 437647)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputSellAndBuyRevert() (gas: 226780)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndNoAdmin() (gas: 158422)\n[PASS] test_poolIsBoundOnceAndAllFieldsAreChecked() (gas: 182004)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyCannotWithdrawTwiceOrStartNestedSwap() (gas: 16348241)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockSwapAndCanWithdrawElsewhere() (gas: 416123)\n[PASS] test_removeLiquidityAlwaysReverts() (gas: 171868)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsInOneUnlockClearTransientState() (gas: 579346)\nSuite result: ok. 22 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 169.75ms (124.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/RoutrHookEdges.t.sol:RoutrHookEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_dustSizedSwapsKeepTheSplitConsistent(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 512, μ: 597252, ~: 601456)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 248\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolAnyModeIsCreditedAsClaims(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 775935, ~: 775596)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999000000007\n\n[PASS] test_bothRecipientsRejectOnClaimsPathThenWithdraw() (gas: 998839)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyOfTenETHPaysPointTwoETH() (gas: 564137)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAndExactOutputBuyChargeEthNotTokens() (gas: 776600)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellOfNinePointEightETHPaysPointTwoETH() (gas: 559557)\n[PASS] test_flushWithNothingOwedIsANoop() (gas: 453031)\n[PASS] test_hookRefusesETHFromAnyoneButThePoolManager() (gas: 68047)\n[PASS] test_secondPoolOnTheSameHookRevertsAfterBinding() (gas: 483086)\n[PASS] test_sellsBeforeAnyBuyOnTokenOnlyPool() (gas: 861862)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotWithdrawSomeoneElsesCredit() (gas: 718338)\n[PASS] test_swapOnUnboundPoolRevertsAtTheManager() (gas: 51905)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyLiquidityIsLockedToo() (gas: 1940626)\n[PASS] test_withdrawRedeemsClaimsWhenTheHookHoldsNoETH() (gas: 713348)\n[PASS] test_withdrawRejectsTheHookAndManagerAsDestination() (gas: 711418)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 183.43ms (134.47ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol:RoutrInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_managerHasNoUnsettledDeltas\n[PASS] invariant_nativeETHAndTokenSupplyAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsReceiveExactlyTheirShares\n RoutrInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| RoutrHandler | changeAcceptance | 515   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | flush            | 496   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | trade            | 521   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | withdraw         | 516   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 710.96ms (602.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol:RoutrLaunchInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrLaunchInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_creditsBackedByETHAndClaims\n[PASS] invariant_eachRecipientGetsExactlyItsShare\n[PASS] invariant_noPositionEverShrinks\n[PASS] invariant_settledAndSupplyFixed\n RoutrLaunchInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2560, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| LaunchHandler | addLiquidity     | 354   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | changeAcceptance | 351   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | flush            | 355   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | trade            | 729   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | tryRemove        | 379   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | withdraw         | 392   | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.20s (1.11s CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 1.20s (2.45s CPU time): 58 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (58 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":131,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RoutrHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.flush()\",\"RoutrHook.receive()\",\"RoutrHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.withdraw(address)\",\"RoutrToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":92,\"SECURITY.md\":27,\"dependencies.sha256\":76,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/MineRoutrHook.s.sol\":42,\"src/RoutrHook.sol\":323,\"src/RoutrToken.sol\":69,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":85,\"test/RoutrHook.t.sol\":428,\"test/RoutrHookEdges.t.sol\":232,\"test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol\":122,\"test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol\":231,\"test/RoutrToken.t.sol\":111,\"test/helpers/HookTestBase.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/PoolHarness.sol\":80,\"test/helpers/Recipients.sol\":62},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"1490a0cead927fdc6cc2a942ee191c5a6fcb799bc7fe7501412effeaedc46893","verifiedTreeHash":"54b7ac7ed090f68118bff6eb026503982a13412c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3dc93dc1"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2684,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 75 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.57s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":591,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RoutrToken.t.sol:RoutrTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservationAndSelfTransfer(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 191102, ~: 191820)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 939049535154268009872066852\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFrom() (gas: 308050)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevertWithoutChangingState() (gas: 125623)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 78336)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrativeOrSupplyChangingEntryPoints() (gas: 249598)\n[PASS] test_walletAndContractTransfersHaveNoTax() (gas: 635369)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.62ms (6.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_emptyPredictedHookCannotInitializePool() (gas: 7177594)\n[PASS] test_hookConstructorRejectsWrongPermissionBits() (gas: 4391307)\n[PASS] test_mineExactCreationCodeAndDeployWithLaunchRecipients() (gas: 12376079)\n[PASS] test_saltMinerValidatesInputs() (gas: 2393383)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.79ms (10.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArguments() (gas: 10374)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolCreditsETHClaimsThenFlushes() (gas: 774754)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyCanFlushInsideRoutersUnlockAfterSettlement() (gas: 621609)\n[PASS] test_launchUsesOnlyTokensAndThenAllSwapTypesWork() (gas: 1130386)\n[PASS] test_nonETHPairAndWrongHookRejected() (gas: 73960)\n[PASS] test_recipientWithdrawsClaimWithoutKeeper() (gas: 806680)\n[PASS] test_rejectedPayoutAfterClaimRedemptionPreservesETHCredit() (gas: 770317)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedHookRefusesSwapCallback() (gas: 46630)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks() (gas: 338023)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 81.12ms (5.50ms CPU time)\n\nRan 22 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allFourSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 293779, ~: 293151)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999999992085\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert(address,int128) (runs: 256, μ: 18613, ~: 18613)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithoutBeforeSwapReverts() (gas: 49895)\n[PASS] test_bothRejectAndPermissionlessFlushRetries() (gas: 611091)\n[PASS] test_callbacksOnlyPoolManager() (gas: 161498)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuy() (gas: 292085)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSell() (gas: 287528)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 207182)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuy() (gas: 290637)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSell() (gas: 288801)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawalRestoresCreditAndStrangerCannotSteal() (gas: 406993)\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesFromFirstTradeAndNeverDecays() (gas: 579866)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingRecipientCannotBlockSwap() (gas: 15717219)\n[PASS] test_invalidAndOversizedAmountsRevert() (gas: 439387)\n[PASS] test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically() (gas: 437427)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputSellAndBuyRevert() (gas: 226780)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndNoAdmin() (gas: 158422)\n[PASS] test_poolIsBoundOnceAndAllFieldsAreChecked() (gas: 182004)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyCannotWithdrawTwiceOrStartNestedSwap() (gas: 16348197)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockSwapAndCanWithdrawElsewhere() (gas: 416123)\n[PASS] test_removeLiquidityAndZeroDeltaAlwaysRevert() (gas: 126870)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsInOneUnlockClearTransientState() (gas: 579126)\nSuite result: ok. 22 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 87.37ms (85.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol:RoutrInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_managerHasNoUnsettledDeltas\n[PASS] invariant_nativeETHAndTokenSupplyAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsReceiveExactlyTheirShares\n RoutrInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| RoutrHandler | changeAcceptance | 515   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | flush            | 496   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | trade            | 521   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | withdraw         | 516   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 452.36ms (385.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 454.73ms (635.27ms CPU time): 42 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (42 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":71,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RoutrHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.flush()\",\"RoutrHook.receive()\",\"RoutrHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.withdraw(address)\",\"RoutrToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":92,\"SECURITY.md\":27,\"dependencies.sha256\":76,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":35,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/MineRoutrHook.s.sol\":42,\"src/RoutrHook.sol\":323,\"src/RoutrToken.sol\":69,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":85,\"test/RoutrHook.t.sol\":423,\"test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol\":122,\"test/RoutrToken.t.sol\":111,\"test/helpers/HookTestBase.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/PoolHarness.sol\":80,\"test/helpers/Recipients.sol\":62},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed; 1 finding(s) for the step that wrote the contracts","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"3b43ad8037958b1302ace642fec32059c4bd03b990d64adedd390f5aad357d79","verifiedTreeHash":"d49aafb1eff3a98790b0223bd576b19da9c26acf","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3dc93dc1"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3366,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 75 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.24s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":641,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RoutrToken.t.sol:RoutrTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservationAndSelfTransfer(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 191102, ~: 191820)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 451585768653828800657440170\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFrom() (gas: 308050)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevertWithoutChangingState() (gas: 125623)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 78336)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrativeOrSupplyChangingEntryPoints() (gas: 249598)\n[PASS] test_walletAndContractTransfersHaveNoTax() (gas: 635369)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.18ms (9.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_emptyPredictedHookCannotInitializePool() (gas: 7177594)\n[PASS] test_hookConstructorRejectsWrongPermissionBits() (gas: 4391307)\n[PASS] test_mineExactCreationCodeAndDeployWithLaunchRecipients() (gas: 12376079)\n[PASS] test_saltMinerValidatesInputs() (gas: 2393383)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.97ms (13.21ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArguments() (gas: 10374)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolCreditsETHClaimsThenFlushes() (gas: 774754)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyCanFlushInsideRoutersUnlockAfterSettlement() (gas: 621609)\n[PASS] test_launchUsesOnlyTokensAndThenAllSwapTypesWork() (gas: 1130386)\n[PASS] test_nonETHPairAndWrongHookRejected() (gas: 73960)\n[PASS] test_recipientWithdrawsClaimWithoutKeeper() (gas: 806680)\n[PASS] test_rejectedPayoutAfterClaimRedemptionPreservesETHCredit() (gas: 770317)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedHookRefusesSwapCallback() (gas: 46630)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks() (gas: 338023)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 64.83ms (6.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 22 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allFourSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 293779, ~: 293151)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999999992085\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert(address,int128) (runs: 256, μ: 18613, ~: 18613)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithoutBeforeSwapReverts() (gas: 49895)\n[PASS] test_bothRejectAndPermissionlessFlushRetries() (gas: 611091)\n[PASS] test_callbacksOnlyPoolManager() (gas: 161498)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuy() (gas: 292085)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSell() (gas: 287528)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 207182)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuy() (gas: 290637)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSell() (gas: 288801)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawalRestoresCreditAndStrangerCannotSteal() (gas: 406993)\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesFromFirstTradeAndNeverDecays() (gas: 579866)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingRecipientCannotBlockSwap() (gas: 15717219)\n[PASS] test_invalidAndOversizedAmountsRevert() (gas: 439387)\n[PASS] test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically() (gas: 437427)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputSellAndBuyRevert() (gas: 226780)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndNoAdmin() (gas: 158422)\n[PASS] test_poolIsBoundOnceAndAllFieldsAreChecked() (gas: 182004)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyCannotWithdrawTwiceOrStartNestedSwap() (gas: 16348197)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockSwapAndCanWithdrawElsewhere() (gas: 416123)\n[PASS] test_removeLiquidityAndZeroDeltaAlwaysRevert() (gas: 126870)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsInOneUnlockClearTransientState() (gas: 579126)\nSuite result: ok. 22 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 92.70ms (80.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol:RoutrInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_managerHasNoUnsettledDeltas\n[PASS] invariant_nativeETHAndTokenSupplyAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsReceiveExactlyTheirShares\n RoutrInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| RoutrHandler | changeAcceptance | 515   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | flush            | 496   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | trade            | 521   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | withdraw         | 516   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 475.48ms (398.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 477.41ms (651.17ms CPU time): 42 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (42 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":59,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RoutrHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.flush()\",\"RoutrHook.receive()\",\"RoutrHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.withdraw(address)\",\"RoutrToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":92,\"SECURITY.md\":27,\"dependencies.sha256\":76,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/MineRoutrHook.s.sol\":42,\"src/RoutrHook.sol\":323,\"src/RoutrToken.sol\":69,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":85,\"test/RoutrHook.t.sol\":423,\"test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol\":122,\"test/RoutrToken.t.sol\":111,\"test/helpers/HookTestBase.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/PoolHarness.sol\":80,\"test/helpers/Recipients.sol\":62},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1416,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/RoutrHook.sol:276: RoutrHook._payOrCredit(address,uint256) (src/RoutrHook.sol#276-286) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/RoutrHook.sol:288: RoutrHook._retry(address) (src/RoutrHook.sol#288-295) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/RoutrHook.sol:269: RoutrHook._credit(address,uint256) (src/RoutrHook.sol#269-274) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:132: RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#132-160) ignores return value by (uint256(specified) + fee).toInt128() (src/RoutrHook.sol#155)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:162: RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#162-218) ignores return value by grossETH.toInt128() (src/RoutrHook.sol#191)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:297: RoutrHook._redeem(uint256) (src/RoutrHook.sol#297-305) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/RoutrHook.sol#302)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/RoutrHook.sol:162: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#162-218):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/RoutrHook.sol:162: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#162-218):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/RoutrHook.sol:223: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.flush() (src/RoutrHook.sol#223-232):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RoutrHook.sol:162: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#162-218):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RoutrHook.sol:162: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#162-218):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RoutrHook.sol:162: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#162-218):","passed":true},{"durationMs":530,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/RoutrHook.sol:25: Large Numeric Literal (3 places)\n[low] missing-inheritance at src/RoutrToken.sol:8: Missing Inheritance\n[low] unchecked-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:155: Unchecked Return (3 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"8496a9004ab90c47eecb403bb51587f3cd94ad3085eb4800d0647286a20bd24c","verifiedTreeHash":"d49ee403223501ffa650a52fae88eb19cbe433bb","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3dc93dc1"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4738,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 79 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.58s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1081,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RoutrToken.t.sol:RoutrTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservationAndSelfTransfer(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 191097, ~: 191820)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 451585768653828800657440170\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFrom() (gas: 308050)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevertWithoutChangingState() (gas: 125623)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 78336)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrativeOrSupplyChangingEntryPoints() (gas: 249598)\n[PASS] test_walletAndContractTransfersHaveNoTax() (gas: 635369)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.50ms (9.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/RoutrLaunchEdges.t.sol:RoutrRealRecipientsTest\n[PASS] test_realRecipientsReceiveTheSplitOnEveryMode() (gas: 1168638)\n[PASS] test_rejectingVaultCodeIsCreditedAndCanWithdraw() (gas: 908760)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 35.02ms (2.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_emptyPredictedHookCannotInitializePool() (gas: 34542278)\n[PASS] test_hookConstructorRejectsWrongPermissionBits() (gas: 4391307)\n[PASS] test_mineExactCreationCodeAndDeployWithLaunchRecipients() (gas: 39729229)\n[PASS] test_saltMinerValidatesInputs() (gas: 2389015)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 38.44ms (67.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArguments() (gas: 10374)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolCreditsETHClaimsThenFlushes() (gas: 774754)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyCanFlushInsideRoutersUnlockAfterSettlement() (gas: 621558)\n[PASS] test_launchUsesOnlyTokensAndThenAllSwapTypesWork() (gas: 1130323)\n[PASS] test_nonETHPairAndWrongHookRejected() (gas: 73960)\n[PASS] test_recipientWithdrawsClaimWithoutKeeper() (gas: 806680)\n[PASS] test_rejectedPayoutAfterClaimRedemptionPreservesETHCredit() (gas: 770317)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedHookRefusesSwapCallback() (gas: 46630)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks() (gas: 338023)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 74.32ms (6.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allFourSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 293751, ~: 293129)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999999999350\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert(address,int128) (runs: 256, μ: 19178, ~: 19226)\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroDeltaAllowedForAnySender(address) (runs: 256, μ: 21214, ~: 21214)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithoutBeforeSwapReverts() (gas: 49982)\n[PASS] test_bothRejectAndPermissionlessFlushRetries() (gas: 611069)\n[PASS] test_callbacksOnlyPoolManager() (gas: 161476)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuy() (gas: 292018)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSell() (gas: 287528)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 207160)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuy() (gas: 290596)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyAtPriceLimitPartiallyFillsAndPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 210163)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSell() (gas: 288823)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawalRestoresCreditAndStrangerCannotSteal() (gas: 406971)\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesFromFirstTradeAndNeverDecays() (gas: 579866)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingRecipientCannotBlockSwap() (gas: 18939571)\n[PASS] test_invalidAndOversizedAmountsRevert() (gas: 439399)\n[PASS] test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically() (gas: 437516)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputSellReverts() (gas: 122218)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndNoAdmin() (gas: 158422)\n[PASS] test_poolIsBoundOnceAndAllFieldsAreChecked() (gas: 182004)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyCannotWithdrawTwiceOrStartNestedSwap() (gas: 19570928)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockSwapAndCanWithdrawElsewhere() (gas: 416123)\n[PASS] test_removeLiquidityAlwaysReverts() (gas: 127387)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsInOneUnlockClearTransientState() (gas: 579104)\n[PASS] test_zeroDeltaCollectsLPFeesWithoutRemovingPrincipal() (gas: 672578)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 81.04ms (92.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/RoutrLaunchEdges.t.sol:RoutrLaunchShapeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_removalAlwaysRevertsThroughPoolManager(int24,uint24,uint128,bytes32) (runs: 300, μ: 99405, ~: 99415)\nLogs:\n  Bound result -28\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 39965\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tinyAndLargeAmountsNeverRevertAndRoundDown(uint256,uint8) (runs: 300, μ: 523863, ~: 394231)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 184\n\n[PASS] test_allFourModesOnTokenOnlyPoolPayExactly() (gas: 1309915)\n[PASS] test_bindingIsFinal() (gas: 198594)\n[PASS] test_constantsAreTheAdvertisedRates() (gas: 93350)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyIsFirstTradeOnTokenOnlyPool() (gas: 488639)\n[PASS] test_hookRefusesDirectETH() (gas: 36338)\n[PASS] test_noLiquidityRemovalOfAnyShape() (gas: 172335)\n[PASS] test_rejectingVaultOnClaimPathKeepsCreditUntilWithdrawn() (gas: 959627)\n[PASS] test_strangersCannotPullOrRedirectRecipientCredit() (gas: 501309)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyLiquidityIsLockedToo() (gas: 300142)\n[PASS] test_withdrawRedeemsOutstandingClaimDirectly() (gas: 499638)\n[PASS] test_withdrawRejectsForbiddenDestinations() (gas: 481095)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 92.23ms (90.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol:RoutrInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_managerHasNoUnsettledDeltas\n[PASS] invariant_nativeETHAndTokenSupplyAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsReceiveExactlyTheirShares\n RoutrInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| RoutrHandler | changeAcceptance | 515   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | flush            | 496   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | trade            | 521   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | withdraw         | 516   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 501.86ms (436.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrTokenInvariant.t.sol:RoutrTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixedAndFullyHeld() (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve                     | 1248  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | overspend                   | 1284  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer                    | 1315  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom                | 1280  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFromBeyondAllowance | 1273  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 24576\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007913129641325\n  Bound result 2149181449906122736471547036645\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007913129640128\n  Bound result 200000000000000000\n  Bound result 7652\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 170141183460469231731687303715884105727\n  Bound result 155557186144849360765676534\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 61678357398080765210293718086378416697372618187842506566286863523773954249005\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639913\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457384007913129640454\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457384007913129648333\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 30604\n  Bound result 2352\n  Bound result 1555\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1668729936318411671483037339423773548\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 82040961094946339926037459\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5455\n  Bound result 1247976715141520058766849561224753508224614139310752140157807485355921987856\n  Bound result 1705\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640231998496289061573203564912\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640469586643728857273895321928\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 2158475847158180777385068753798817302212175834812838851209750980796402775946\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640396090418690136970101677165\n  Bound result 86\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 622.29ms (620.75ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol:RoutrLaunchInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrLaunchInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_creditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_ethAndSupplyConserved\n[PASS] invariant_liquidityNeverLeavesThePool\n[PASS] invariant_noLeftoverDeltasOrSwapContext\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsAreOwedExactlyTheirSplit\n RoutrLaunchInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2560, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| LaunchHandler | buy           | 346   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | collectFees   | 359   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | flush         | 377   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | sell          | 369   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | setAcceptance | 363   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | tryRemove     | 365   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchHandler | withdraw      | 381   | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3688\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1109\n  Bound result 1430\n  Bound result 107\n  Bound result 1315\n  Bound result 82\n  Bound result 244\n  Bound result 10002\n  Bound result 1132\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999999\n  Bound result 5824\n  Bound result 255815817323340084389047\n  Bound result 999\n  Bound result 2935303571350599055\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 46354570328101\n  Bound result 1934\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 908.53ms (902.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 test suites in 911.83ms (2.36s CPU time): 62 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (62 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":72,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RoutrHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.flush()\",\"RoutrHook.receive()\",\"RoutrHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.withdraw(address)\",\"RoutrToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":92,\"SECURITY.md\":27,\"dependencies.sha256\":76,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/MineRoutrHook.s.sol\":42,\"src/RoutrHook.sol\":325,\"src/RoutrToken.sol\":69,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":85,\"test/RoutrHook.t.sol\":461,\"test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol\":122,\"test/RoutrLaunchEdges.t.sol\":292,\"test/RoutrLaunchInvariant.t.sol\":238,\"test/RoutrToken.t.sol\":111,\"test/RoutrTokenInvariant.t.sol\":101,\"test/helpers/HookTestBase.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/PoolHarness.sol\":80,\"test/helpers/Recipients.sol\":62,\"test/helpers/RoutrLaunchKit.sol\":155},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b82d43b6466a55f08ffe85128d0c77eb3f7475d71bd07e06287ae9be11722fdf","verifiedTreeHash":"795c2dc740e7b403425fdf926e182e4344840d95","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3dc93dc1"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2500,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 75 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.40s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":579,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RoutrToken.t.sol:RoutrTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservationAndSelfTransfer(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 191102, ~: 191820)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 939049535154268009872066852\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFrom() (gas: 308050)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevertWithoutChangingState() (gas: 125623)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 78336)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrativeOrSupplyChangingEntryPoints() (gas: 249598)\n[PASS] test_walletAndContractTransfersHaveNoTax() (gas: 635369)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.10ms (10.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_emptyPredictedHookCannotInitializePool() (gas: 34542278)\n[PASS] test_hookConstructorRejectsWrongPermissionBits() (gas: 4391307)\n[PASS] test_mineExactCreationCodeAndDeployWithLaunchRecipients() (gas: 39729229)\n[PASS] test_saltMinerValidatesInputs() (gas: 2389015)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 46.13ms (77.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArguments() (gas: 10374)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolCreditsETHClaimsThenFlushes() (gas: 774754)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyCanFlushInsideRoutersUnlockAfterSettlement() (gas: 621558)\n[PASS] test_launchUsesOnlyTokensAndThenAllSwapTypesWork() (gas: 1130323)\n[PASS] test_nonETHPairAndWrongHookRejected() (gas: 73960)\n[PASS] test_recipientWithdrawsClaimWithoutKeeper() (gas: 806680)\n[PASS] test_rejectedPayoutAfterClaimRedemptionPreservesETHCredit() (gas: 770317)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedHookRefusesSwapCallback() (gas: 46630)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks() (gas: 338023)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 63.97ms (4.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allFourSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 293751, ~: 293129)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999999991531\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert(address,int128) (runs: 256, μ: 19178, ~: 19226)\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroDeltaAllowedForAnySender(address) (runs: 256, μ: 21214, ~: 21214)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithoutBeforeSwapReverts() (gas: 49982)\n[PASS] test_bothRejectAndPermissionlessFlushRetries() (gas: 611069)\n[PASS] test_callbacksOnlyPoolManager() (gas: 161476)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuy() (gas: 292018)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSell() (gas: 287528)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 207160)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuy() (gas: 290596)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyAtPriceLimitPartiallyFillsAndPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 210163)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSell() (gas: 288823)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawalRestoresCreditAndStrangerCannotSteal() (gas: 406971)\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesFromFirstTradeAndNeverDecays() (gas: 579866)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingRecipientCannotBlockSwap() (gas: 18939571)\n[PASS] test_invalidAndOversizedAmountsRevert() (gas: 439399)\n[PASS] test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically() (gas: 437516)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputSellReverts() (gas: 122218)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndNoAdmin() (gas: 158422)\n[PASS] test_poolIsBoundOnceAndAllFieldsAreChecked() (gas: 182004)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyCannotWithdrawTwiceOrStartNestedSwap() (gas: 19570928)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockSwapAndCanWithdrawElsewhere() (gas: 416123)\n[PASS] test_removeLiquidityAlwaysReverts() (gas: 127387)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsInOneUnlockClearTransientState() (gas: 579104)\n[PASS] test_zeroDeltaCollectsLPFeesWithoutRemovingPrincipal() (gas: 672578)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 76.72ms (79.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol:RoutrInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_managerHasNoUnsettledDeltas\n[PASS] invariant_nativeETHAndTokenSupplyAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsReceiveExactlyTheirShares\n RoutrInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| RoutrHandler | changeAcceptance | 515   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | flush            | 496   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | trade            | 521   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | withdraw         | 516   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 440.87ms (367.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 444.59ms (637.79ms CPU time): 45 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (45 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":64,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RoutrHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.flush()\",\"RoutrHook.receive()\",\"RoutrHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.withdraw(address)\",\"RoutrToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":92,\"SECURITY.md\":27,\"dependencies.sha256\":76,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":35,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/MineRoutrHook.s.sol\":42,\"src/RoutrHook.sol\":325,\"src/RoutrToken.sol\":69,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":85,\"test/RoutrHook.t.sol\":461,\"test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol\":122,\"test/RoutrToken.t.sol\":111,\"test/helpers/HookTestBase.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/PoolHarness.sol\":80,\"test/helpers/Recipients.sol\":62},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e20e2dbeb7030db4a94f4bb759a23936b009bc2b0aaf119600eea4e45be29361","verifiedTreeHash":"0f84b571a1553d5acfe017c975fc65f038e2fdf6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3dc93dc1"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2833,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 75 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.72s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":632,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RoutrToken.t.sol:RoutrTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservationAndSelfTransfer(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 191102, ~: 191820)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 939049535154268009872066852\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFrom() (gas: 308050)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevertWithoutChangingState() (gas: 125623)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 78336)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrativeOrSupplyChangingEntryPoints() (gas: 249598)\n[PASS] test_walletAndContractTransfersHaveNoTax() (gas: 635369)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.56ms (9.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArguments() (gas: 10374)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyOnTokenOnlyPoolCreditsETHClaimsThenFlushes() (gas: 774754)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyCanFlushInsideRoutersUnlockAfterSettlement() (gas: 621558)\n[PASS] test_launchUsesOnlyTokensAndThenAllSwapTypesWork() (gas: 1130323)\n[PASS] test_nonETHPairAndWrongHookRejected() (gas: 73960)\n[PASS] test_recipientWithdrawsClaimWithoutKeeper() (gas: 806680)\n[PASS] test_rejectedPayoutAfterClaimRedemptionPreservesETHCredit() (gas: 770317)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedHookRefusesSwapCallback() (gas: 46630)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedBeforeBindingThenValidPoolWorks() (gas: 338023)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 58.62ms (5.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_emptyPredictedHookCannotInitializePool() (gas: 34542278)\n[PASS] test_hookConstructorRejectsWrongPermissionBits() (gas: 4391307)\n[PASS] test_mineExactCreationCodeAndDeployWithLaunchRecipients() (gas: 39729229)\n[PASS] test_saltMinerValidatesInputs() (gas: 2389015)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 58.83ms (89.38ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/RoutrHook.t.sol:RoutrHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allFourSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 293751, ~: 293129)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999999999990009\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allRemovalSendersRevert(address,int128) (runs: 256, μ: 19178, ~: 19226)\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroDeltaAllowedForAnySender(address) (runs: 256, μ: 21214, ~: 21214)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithoutBeforeSwapReverts() (gas: 49982)\n[PASS] test_bothRejectAndPermissionlessFlushRetries() (gas: 611069)\n[PASS] test_callbacksOnlyPoolManager() (gas: 161476)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuy() (gas: 292018)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSell() (gas: 287528)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellAtPriceLimitPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 207160)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuy() (gas: 290596)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyAtPriceLimitPartiallyFillsAndPaysOnActualETH() (gas: 210163)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSell() (gas: 288823)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawalRestoresCreditAndStrangerCannotSteal() (gas: 406971)\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesFromFirstTradeAndNeverDecays() (gas: 579866)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingRecipientCannotBlockSwap() (gas: 18939571)\n[PASS] test_invalidAndOversizedAmountsRevert() (gas: 439399)\n[PASS] test_partialETHSpecifiedBuyRevertsAtomically() (gas: 437516)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputSellReverts() (gas: 122218)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndNoAdmin() (gas: 158422)\n[PASS] test_poolIsBoundOnceAndAllFieldsAreChecked() (gas: 182004)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyCannotWithdrawTwiceOrStartNestedSwap() (gas: 19570928)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockSwapAndCanWithdrawElsewhere() (gas: 416123)\n[PASS] test_removeLiquidityAlwaysReverts() (gas: 127387)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsInOneUnlockClearTransientState() (gas: 579104)\n[PASS] test_zeroDeltaCollectsLPFeesWithoutRemovingPrincipal() (gas: 672578)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 116.73ms (105.32ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol:RoutrInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRoutrInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreditsAreFullyBacked\n[PASS] invariant_managerHasNoUnsettledDeltas\n[PASS] invariant_nativeETHAndTokenSupplyAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_recipientsReceiveExactlyTheirShares\n RoutrInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| RoutrHandler | changeAcceptance | 515   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | flush            | 496   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | trade            | 521   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RoutrHandler | withdraw         | 516   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 476.22ms (407.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 478.08ms (718.96ms CPU time): 45 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (45 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":55,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RoutrHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.flush()\",\"RoutrHook.receive()\",\"RoutrHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RoutrHook.withdraw(address)\",\"RoutrToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RoutrToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":92,\"SECURITY.md\":27,\"dependencies.sha256\":76,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/MineRoutrHook.s.sol\":42,\"src/RoutrHook.sol\":325,\"src/RoutrToken.sol\":69,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":85,\"test/RoutrHook.t.sol\":461,\"test/RoutrInvariant.t.sol\":122,\"test/RoutrToken.t.sol\":111,\"test/helpers/HookTestBase.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/PoolHarness.sol\":80,\"test/helpers/Recipients.sol\":62},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1466,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/RoutrHook.sol:290: RoutrHook._retry(address) (src/RoutrHook.sol#290-297) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/RoutrHook.sol:278: RoutrHook._payOrCredit(address,uint256) (src/RoutrHook.sol#278-288) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/RoutrHook.sol:271: RoutrHook._credit(address,uint256) (src/RoutrHook.sol#271-276) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:299: RoutrHook._redeem(uint256) (src/RoutrHook.sol#299-307) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/RoutrHook.sol#304)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:134: RoutrHook.beforeSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#134-162) ignores return value by (uint256(specified) + fee).toInt128() (src/RoutrHook.sol#157)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:164: RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#164-220) ignores return value by grossETH.toInt128() (src/RoutrHook.sol#193)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/RoutrHook.sol:164: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#164-220):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/RoutrHook.sol:164: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#164-220):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/RoutrHook.sol:225: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.flush() (src/RoutrHook.sol#225-234):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RoutrHook.sol:164: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#164-220):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RoutrHook.sol:164: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#164-220):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RoutrHook.sol:164: Reentrancy in RoutrHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RoutrHook.sol#164-220):","passed":true},{"durationMs":408,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/RoutrHook.sol:25: Large Numeric Literal (3 places)\n[low] missing-inheritance at src/RoutrToken.sol:8: Missing Inheritance\n[low] unchecked-return at src/RoutrHook.sol:157: Unchecked Return (3 places)","passed":true},{"durationMs":2716,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 1a5cb9bd4ded","output":"Compiling 70 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.92s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-23867d6e/Proof_1a5cb9bd4ded.t.sol:FeeCollectLockedTest\n[PASS] test_factoryCanCollectLPFeesWithZeroDeltaWhileRemovalStaysLocked() (gas: 845660)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 27.56ms (957.35µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 28.24ms (27.56ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e8390641618a55d379ae285673f1c64eb83cb571130f5113cb1e317f80fc6dad","verifiedTreeHash":"4a474dbb6906da0f65ba64bc9f2b6f3841110ad0","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3dc93dc1"}]}