{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"583d6d41-bf45-4af4-beca-cb8ac23a2128","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"621088092cc71cc14571141af43fad2fbd25793f50cc611026222ccf3fe3d00f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"602102e510e61908e2181a4c8c93a524ac49016ec40e26b97054e94f890a2b25","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8bc4fbe24bd09b38d6be18c8877ffaf2d6f0d9b4a34098b73fc16e4f47be469e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"65928837530da93dbe5bbeb165c0e3845f0d694772e03322831fdd9926222a0d","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6fbc2a41717c4842e4b9f0e40e0a94c9a87b5a7edd3ea01b15880f4bb138b642","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"60f3eb5f19c0c72c8ad3e34305efef039d97743bc37a2147091461c3fde75a53","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f6b4e88851a588387395e7ca80785f8d74939bc36ca18472535ffdbf2c9e7293","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b5e588f721dfcf11b73e4db4db99b2367821ef69c73c9fe69a776df9422152e2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build and deploy BetPool, a live (in-play) pari-mutuel betting pool for NIGHTSHIFT's skill games (NIGHT CHESS, Space Pinball and later games) and its Agent Arena, where AI agents and people play each other. Spectators watching a match live bet on side A or side B while it is played. Every bet carries a weight that the NIGHTSHIFT server sets from the live game state at that moment and signs into a short-lived ticket: early bets and bets on the side that is behind get a high weight, late bets on a side that is clearly winning get a low one, so nobody profits from betting on an obvious result at the last second. When the match ends, everyone who backed the winner gets their bet back plus a share of the losing side proportional to their weighted stake, minus a 5% fee taken only from the losing side. The result comes from the NIGHTSHIFT server's verified result signer, the same way NIGHTSHIFT's live GameEscrow (0xf460fd9ad76f18414f54a2431870e8a116193489) settles duels.\n\nTokens: only IMD (0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) and $SHIFT (0xe5e58e53d0bb204aa62c995a6c8cc8a48e60c3ac), both plain ERC-20 with 18 decimals and no transfer fee. Each market uses one token. Per-bet limits, set in the constructor: IMD min 0.1, max 500; SHIFT min 1000, max 25000000 (whole tokens). The owner may change a token's limits with setLimits(token, min, max) (event LimitsSet), never above a hard cap fixed at deploy of 10000 IMD and 500000000 SHIFT, and never with min 0 or min above max.\n\nAll signatures are EIP-712 from the result signer, domain name \"NightshiftBets\", version \"1\", chainId, this contract.\n\nFlow:\n1. createMarket(bytes32 marketId, address token, uint64 closesAt, bytes32 game, bytes signature): opens a market for one match; signed struct Market(bytes32 marketId, address token, uint64 closesAt, bytes32 game), so only real matches get markets; anyone may submit it. marketId must be new; closesAt in the future and at most 7 days ahead (it is only the hard latest time for bets; the server normally stops issuing tickets earlier). Emits MarketCreated(marketId, token, closesAt, game).\n2. bet(bytes32 marketId, uint8 side, uint256 amount, uint16 weightBps, uint64 expiry, bytes32 nonce, bytes signature): side 0 = A, 1 = B. Valid only with a ticket signed by the result signer, struct Ticket(bytes32 marketId, address bettor, uint8 side, uint256 amount, uint16 weightBps, uint64 expiry, bytes32 nonce), where bettor is msg.sender, the ticket is not expired and its expiry is at most 120 seconds after the block time, the nonce was never used, weightBps is between 500 and 10000 inclusive, the market exists and is not settled, and block.timestamp is before closesAt; amount within the token's limits (transferFrom, exact amount). Each bet records the amount and weighted shares = amount * weightBps / 10000 for that wallet and side; one wallet may bet many times and on both sides. Emits BetPlaced(marketId, bettor, side, amount, weightBps, shares).\n3. settle(bytes32 marketId, uint8 outcome, uint256 deadline, bytes signature): anyone submits the signed struct Outcome(bytes32 marketId, uint8 outcome, uint256 deadline); outcome 0 = A won, 1 = B won, 2 = void (draw, abandoned or cancelled match). Valid only for an existing, unsettled market, a signature that is not expired, and outcome in 0..2. Settling also closes betting. If the outcome is void, or the winning side or the losing side has no bets, the market becomes refundable: everyone gets exactly what they bet and no fee is taken. Otherwise the fee is exactly 5% of the losing side's total amount (rounded down), sent at settlement to the NIGHTSHIFT fee splitter 0x1119d5df2f046bc2d3c0f6279ef2e9ce49422d44, and the remaining 95% of the losing side is shared among winners pro rata to their weighted shares on the winning side. Emits Settled(marketId, outcome, fee).\n4. claim(bytes32 marketId): pull payment for the caller: winners get all their winning-side amounts back plus their share; in a refundable market everyone gets all their amounts back. Each wallet claims once; losers get nothing. Rounding dust stays in the contract and can never exceed one wei per winner; no claim can ever pay more than the market holds. Emits Claimed(marketId, bettor, amount). Add claimMany(bytes32[] marketIds).\n5. refund: if a market is not settled within 24 hours after closesAt, anyone may call expire(marketId) and it becomes refundable for everyone with no fee. Emits Expired(marketId).\n6. Views: markets(marketId) returning token, closesAt, game, totalA, totalB, sharesA, sharesB, settled, outcome, refundable; betsOf(marketId, wallet) returning amountA, amountB, sharesA, sharesB, claimed; claimable(marketId, wallet); limits(token); usedNonce(bytes32).\n\nOwner: 0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5. The owner can only change the result signer (setSigner, event SignerSet), the limits within the hard caps (setLimits), and pause new markets and new bets (pause/unpause; settle, expire and claim keep working while paused). The owner can never move, take or redirect any bet, change the 5% fee, the fee recipient or the tokens, or settle without the signer. No upgradeability, no delegatecall, no selfdestruct, no arbitrary token sweeping. Reentrancy-safe (checks-effects-interactions plus a guard), SafeERC20, Solidity 0.8.x, NatSpec on every external function, events for every state change.\n\nTests (Foundry): full flows for both tokens with several bettors on both sides at different weights and amounts at and between the limits; payouts summing to the pot minus the fee and following weighted shares; fee exactly 5% of the losing side to the splitter, including odd amounts and many bettors; void outcome and one-sided markets refunding everything with no fee; expiry after 24 hours; tickets with a wrong bettor, side, amount, weight outside 500..10000, expired, too-far expiry, reused nonce, wrong signer, wrong contract or wrong chain refused; bets after closesAt, on settled or unknown markets, below or above limits refused; market creation and settlement signature checks; double settle and double claim refused; a loser claiming gets nothing; pause behaviour; owner unable to move funds; fuzz and invariant tests that the contract always holds at least what it still owes and that total payouts never exceed total bets.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"5da6cfb92d39b1cd9c437ce94df4fe104d63dcf891ea29c8438940fe2046366e","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"583d6d41-bf45-4af4-beca-cb8ac23a2128","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2235-build-deploy-betpool-live"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52128","feedbackHash":"163f6b902d09f93b615dcf9eb2e9be2f2f0cfa85f51d97d421cc696d96fc85a8","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"621088092cc71cc14571141af43fad2fbd25793f50cc611026222ccf3fe3d00f","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52169","feedbackHash":"aac0d8dad91d1b5b9e7f5aa6839d141ee832104d67f5d447d9e315973dff367d","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"602102e510e61908e2181a4c8c93a524ac49016ec40e26b97054e94f890a2b25","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52220","feedbackHash":"8ef74b823c4867dcaebc0b993f5ebe5927d7692b00bf31d2bef4c445cf0faa5d","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"682c24e21d09ab1a53b040796e5628b9a0a5ca68a2f43b41ff243e45965f9bdc","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50958","feedbackHash":"90f42bb3c7cd5f695e98085db7c9a72450e7bc603ce346634bdc3e16d60a9bb7","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"8bc4fbe24bd09b38d6be18c8877ffaf2d6f0d9b4a34098b73fc16e4f47be469e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52124","feedbackHash":"1821991c43c75eed12b83fa7e1ef9f46112e29733129dc97de362f1febbebd2b","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"65928837530da93dbe5bbeb165c0e3845f0d694772e03322831fdd9926222a0d","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51494","feedbackHash":"b758edcac049c010245ad4b425322c14409874841e5903a580b2a20fa6c703ab","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"6fbc2a41717c4842e4b9f0e40e0a94c9a87b5a7edd3ea01b15880f4bb138b642","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52584","feedbackHash":"62f0140d395e938c92b71f53b501ecf6e88371795fbb5defaf23ab27d4110173","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"60f3eb5f19c0c72c8ad3e34305efef039d97743bc37a2147091461c3fde75a53","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52568","feedbackHash":"065ab37ec2b918f929f56856ae5d9813c1b2f3553dc2ede989b4dcc6d5fe8366","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"9808145b78cfba585a5169141140238bad27caf108d010464d265d1aa64f94f6","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52162","feedbackHash":"376af2a3c8e4e2ee1485db07c1dd8f1eb76fed5114571e8aefec006835f900eb","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"f6b4e88851a588387395e7ca80785f8d74939bc36ca18472535ffdbf2c9e7293","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52216","feedbackHash":"f551f400003ddc5d85d086747389f454e3f3c7f65d7d5a1f6938dc3c486befc8","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"b5e588f721dfcf11b73e4db4db99b2367821ef69c73c9fe69a776df9422152e2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"8c5fc872598350851c4b7b8c7edc9380baa7f0fa5507509c652f7ed2ef30ed74","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e8816d4386532a66","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"settle() (src/BetPool.sol:294-313) has no upper time bound: it only requires an unsettled market and an unexpired Outcome signature, while expire() (src/BetPool.sol:318-327) becomes callable by anyone one second after closesAt + 24h. From that second on both entry points are valid on the same market and each permanently blocks the other (both set m.settled, and both check m.settled || m.refundable). The two paths pay different people: settle pays the winning side stake + 95% of the losing side and sends 5% to the fee splitter; expire refunds everyone and takes no fee. So once the server is late, a losing bettor who sees the signed settle transaction in the mempool can submit expire() first (or a builder can order it first), the signed outcome is then rejected with MarketSettled, the loser recovers the full stake and the winners lose their winnings. Symmetrically a winner holding the outcome signature can race an expire(). The README documents that a late settle is still possible, so this is a design hazard rather than a spec violation, but the contract makes the economic result of a late match depend on MEV ordering instead of on the signed result. Minimal fix that keeps the agreed design: give the window one owner, either refuse settle() once block.timestamp > closesAt + EXPIRY_DELAY (the result is then always a refund after the deadline, as the brief's expiry rule implies), or make expire() unavailable while a not-yet-expired Outcome signature could still be submitted. Either way the NIGHTSHIFT server should sign and submit results well inside the 24 h window.","line":322,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"State: market M (IMD) with closesAt = T; alice bet 100 IMD on side A (weight 10000), bob bet 100 IMD on side B. Nobody settles before T + 24h. At block.timestamp = T + 24h + 1 the signer signs Outcome(M, 0, deadline = now + 10 min). Sequence in one block: (1) bob calls expire(M) -> succeeds, Expired(M), m.settled = true, m.refundable = true; (2) anyone calls settle(M, 0, deadline, validSig) -> reverts MarketSettled. Expected if the signed result governed: alice claimable = 195 IMD, bob claimable = 0, fee splitter receives 5 IMD. Actual: alice claimable = 100 IMD, bob claimable = 100 IMD, fee = 0. Reversing the order of (1) and (2) in the same block gives the opposite result, so the payout is decided by ordering. Scratch test test/scratch/SettleExpireRace.t.sol (test_loserFrontRunsLateSettleWithExpire) runs this sequence and passes on the current code, i.e. it confirms the behaviour.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.timestamp <= uint256(m.closesAt) + EXPIRY_DELAY) revert NotExpirable();\n        m.settled = true;\n        m.outcome = OUTCOME_VOID;\n        m.refundable = true;","title":"After closesAt + 24h a valid late outcome can be neutralised by front-running settle() with expire(); who gets paid depends on transaction ordering"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect: the brief requires setSigner and says the owner must not settle without the signer. Recorded as the privileged-power note the review method asks for. Because setSigner takes effect immediately and has no delay, the owner key alone is sufficient to decide every open market (rotate to a key the owner holds, sign Outcome(marketId, outcome, deadline), call settle). The owner still cannot pay anyone who did not bet on the winning side, cannot change the fee or recipient, and cannot take funds out (verified: no sweep, no selfdestruct, no delegatecall; test_ownerCannotMoveFunds covers it). Operationally, the owner wallet 0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5 is therefore as sensitive as the signer key. No code change is requested; if a stronger guarantee is wanted, a timelock on setSigner would be a scope decision for the requester.","line":170,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"State: market M open with bets on both sides. Owner calls setSigner(K) where K is a key the owner controls (succeeds, SignerSet emitted), then signs Outcome(M, 1, deadline) with K and calls settle(M, 1, deadline, sig): settle succeeds and pays side B. Expected per the brief's wording ('settle without the signer' impossible): true only in the sense that a signer signature is always required; the owner chooses who that signer is.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function setSigner(address newSigner) external onlyOwner {\n        if (newSigner == address(0)) revert InvalidSigner();\n        emit SignerSet(signer, newSigner);\n        signer = newSigner;\n    }","title":"Trust assumption: the owner can replace the result signer at any time, so setSigner + a self-signed Outcome lets the owner settle any open market (documented, within the brief)"}],"hash":"602102e510e61908e2181a4c8c93a524ac49016ec40e26b97054e94f890a2b25","nodeId":"71e7cac2-6f4b-4797-ac30-fe5b658c29cd","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written with 2 findings and 17 coverage rows; the quoted snippets match the source lines exactly.\n\n**Outcome.** BetPool is sound against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checklists. I found no loss-of-funds, access-control or accounting defect. All 63 project tests pass.\n\n**Findings recorded**\n\n- **Low: settle and expire share the post-deadline window.** Once the block time passes closesAt plus 24 hours, both a valid signed `settle` and an anyone-may-call `expire` are accepted, and each permanently blocks the other. A loser who sees a late settle in the mempool can front-run it with expire and recover their full stake while winners lose their winnings. The scratch test in `test/scratch/SettleExpireRace.t.sol` confirms this ordering on the current code. The README documents late settling as intended, so I framed this as a design hazard with two minimal fixes for the requester to choose from.\n- **Info: owner power note.** The owner can rotate the signer instantly, so the owner key alone can decide any open market. This is within the brief and is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect.\n\n**What I verified as holding**\n\n- Every entry point's guards, effects ordering and failure paths, including ticket binding to sender, market, chain and contract, global nonce consumption before transfer, exact balance-delta check, fee rounding, one-sided and void refunds, and the no-division-by-zero path in claims.\n- The vendored OpenZeppelin tree is byte-identical to upstream 5.4.0.\n- On mainnet, IMD and SHIFT are plain 18-decimal tokens with no pause or blacklist selectors, and the fee splitter and GameEscrow addresses have code.\n- The slither and aderyn leads all resolved as benign.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing within the assigned area was left unexamined. I did not run long fuzz campaigns beyond the project's configured runs.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":922641,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":28689,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":430847}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"c15ef2dd1264383b7125c93fc322a7f295267ce4c4c0f266b2533a984e0f3d71","device":"6f41bd9b44d3e708","findings":[],"hash":"60f3eb5f19c0c72c8ad3e34305efef039d97743bc37a2147091461c3fde75a53","nodeId":"b77105ea-f85d-41cc-8b70-6f967cdcd92d","outcome":"completed","summary":"I built `BetPool` and committed it on `main`. From a clean checkout, `forge build`, `forge test` (63 of 63 pass, using the verifier's fuzz seed) and `forge fmt --check` all pass with solc 0.8.26. I couldn't run the two protected checks locally: they need the launch's environment values. My own test does run the same opcode and size scan on the contract.\n\n**One thing must happen after launch:** the result signer starts unset. Until the owner calls `setSigner`, creating markets, betting and settling all revert with `SignerNotSet()`, so no money can come in before then. The brief didn't give the signer's address, so I didn't hard-code one. On 2026-10-19 the live GameEscrow's `signer()` returned `0x3B5919586FC04F7e99b450a72bcB14Eeb6977497`. The README lists it under \"After launch\"; confirm it's the key you want before setting it.\n\n**What it does**\n- **Markets, bets, settlement:** all three need the signer's EIP-712 signature (domain \"NightshiftBets\", version \"1\"). Every rule in the brief is enforced: ticket expiry at most 120 s ahead, nonces used once, weights 500–10000, per-token limits, closing time at most 7 days ahead.\n- **Payouts:** the 5% fee comes only from the losing side and goes to the fee splitter when the market settles. Each winner gets their stake plus a share proportional to their weighted stake, rounded down. Leftover dust stays below one wei per winner and can never be swept out.\n- **Refunds:** a void result, a market with bets on only one side, or `expire()` once 24 hours have passed after the closing time all refund everyone in full with no fee.\n- **Owner:** the only constructor argument, set to `0x6c4c78f2…d19b5`. The owner can change the signer, change limits within the hard caps, pause new markets and bets, and hand over ownership in two steps. The owner can't move bets, change the fee, the recipient or the tokens, or settle. There's no sweep, upgrade, delegatecall or selfdestruct.\n\n**Choices the brief left open**\n- An expired market shows as settled, with outcome 2 (void) and refundable.\n- A claim that would pay nothing (a loser, or a wallet that never bet) reverts with `NothingToClaim`. `claimMany` skips markets with nothing owed.\n- After the 24 hours, a signed result can still settle a market if nobody has expired it yet.\n- `renounceOwnership` is disabled, so someone can always replace a leaked signer key.\n- A bet is refused if the tokens actually received don't match the amount, which blocks any fee-on-transfer behaviour.\n\n**Tests:** they cover everything the brief lists, plus a reentrancy test and a fee-on-transfer test. The invariant tests check that the pool always holds at least what it owes, and that what it holds plus what it paid out and sent in fees exactly equals everything bet.\n\nThe signer key is the real point of trust: a leaked key could sign a wrong result for a market. Passing tests are not an audit, and an independent security review is still needed before real funds go in. I didn't run Slither or Mythril.\n\n**Repository notes**\n- forge-std v1.11.0 and OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 are copied in as plain files, with no submodules.\n- The sandbox wouldn't let me delete an unused `.gitmodules` file left in `lib/openzeppelin-contracts/`. That folder is listed in `.gitignore`, so it isn't committed.\n- The commit is authored as \"Claude\" because this machine has no git identity set.\n\nThe README covers the deployment settings, the server's duties and the assumptions.","treeHash":"a08f0f3625183172dec8b97f852c900fe10f720c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2348101,"inputTokens":66,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":60387,"runtime":"claude","turns":37,"wallClockMs":592755}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9c6767b941fcfedc","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security / Flow Gap (execution x first principles). The brief's guarantee is that 'nobody profits from betting on an obvious result at the last second' and that the weight achieves this. In the contract the weight only scales the share of the losing pool; the winning stake itself is returned unweighted (src/BetPool.sol:472) and the floor weight is 500 bps (line 250). A bet on the winning side therefore can never lose and always earns at least a 5%-weighted slice of the losing pool. Because tickets stay valid for up to 120 s (line 252), bets are accepted until closesAt regardless of whether the match has ended (line 248), and settle(...) is permissionless with the signed Outcome visible in calldata (line 294), a bettor who holds any unexpired winning-side ticket when the result becomes known (from the live stream, or from the pending settle transaction in the mempool) submits the bet first and extracts value from the honest early backers. The server-side mitigation ('the server normally stops issuing tickets earlier') is outside the contract and the contract offers no second line: no minimum gap between a bet and settlement, no requirement that settle happen at or after closesAt, and no weighting of the stake refund. Victims are the early winners whose share is diluted; the attacker's only cost is gas.","line":472,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"IMD market. alice bets 100 IMD on A at weight 10000; bob bets 100 IMD on B at weight 10000. The server issues mallory a ticket for A, amount 500 IMD, weight 500 (the minimum, A is clearly ahead), expiry now+120. The match ends and the server signs Outcome(A, deadline). 60 s later the settle tx is broadcast; mallory calls bet(id, 0, 500e18, 500, expiry, nonce, sig) in front of it (ticket still valid: block.timestamp <= expiry, expiry <= now+120, now < closesAt, market not settled). Then settle(id, 0, deadline, sig). Fee = 5 IMD. distributable = 95. sharesA = 100 + 25 = 125. claimable(alice) = 100 + 95*100/125 = 176 IMD (expected 195 without the late bet); claimable(mallory) = 500 + 95*25/125 = 519 IMD, i.e. 19 IMD risk-free profit on a bet placed after the result was known. Run test/scratch/EconReview.t.sol::test_lateWinnerTicketFrontRunsSettle (passes on current code, printing alice 176 / mallory 519). Suggested mitigations that keep the design: refuse bets whose ticket was issued within N seconds of the settle (e.g. settle only valid when block.timestamp >= lastBetAt + MAX_TICKET_TTL, or closesAt bound), or let the server sign a 'bettingClosed' message that the contract enforces before settlement; at minimum document that the 120 s ticket window is a live exposure for every market.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        return stake + distributable * shares / winningShares;","title":"Winning stake is always returned in full, so a low-weight ticket on the known winner is risk-free profit; permissionless settle lets it be front-run"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Flow Gap (execution x first principles). settle(...) has no upper time bound (it is valid for any unsettled market while the Outcome signature is unexpired, line 294-300), and expire(...) is permissionless once block.timestamp > closesAt + 24h. Both transitions are terminal and mutually exclusive (both check m.settled || m.refundable). Whoever lands first decides whether winners are paid or everyone is refunded. A bettor on the losing side who sees the server's settle transaction in the mempool after the 24h mark, or who simply polls and calls expire() at closesAt + 24h + 1, converts a decided loss into a no-fee refund and the winners lose their winnings. The brief asks for both behaviours, so this is a consequence of the agreed design rather than a coding error, but the result is that any settlement delayed past 24h is effectively at the losers' discretion and the fee splitter receives nothing. Worth stating explicitly in the operating runbook (settle well inside the window), or, if the author accepts a design change, letting settle() still succeed on an expired-but-unclaimed market only when no claim has been made yet.","line":322,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"IMD market, closesAt = T. alice bets 100 IMD on A, bob bets 100 IMD on B. Warp to T + 24h + 1. Server signs Outcome(A, deadline = now + 10 min). bob calls expire(id) first: market becomes settled/refundable. settle(id, 0, deadline, sig) now reverts MarketSettled. claimable(alice) = 100 IMD (expected 195), claimable(bob) = 100 IMD (expected 0), fee to splitter 0 (expected 5 IMD). Run test/scratch/EconReview.t.sol::test_loserFrontRunsLateSettleWithExpire (passes on current code, demonstrating the state).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.timestamp <= uint256(m.closesAt) + EXPIRY_DELAY) revert NotExpirable();","title":"After closesAt + 24h, expire() and settle() race: a loser can front-run the server's late settlement with expire() and recover their full stake"}],"hash":"621088092cc71cc14571141af43fad2fbd25793f50cc611026222ccf3fe3d00f","nodeId":"6bbc0b94-30c2-4caf-a7db-921eeda06ea1","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is valid JSON, the quoted snippets match the tree exactly, and the only files I created are the findings file and the scratch test, which is not kept.\n\n**Outcome.** BetPool's economics hold up well. Conservation, fee math, rounding, settlement state transitions, access control and the repo's invariant suite all check out. I report two findings, no critical or high.\n\n**Finding 1, medium.** A winning bet never loses its stake. The weight only scales the share of the losing pool, and the floor is 5%. Tickets stay valid for 120 seconds and `settle` is permissionless with the outcome visible in calldata. A bettor holding an unexpired ticket on the side that just won can front-run settlement for risk-free profit. In the reproduced case the late bettor turns 500 IMD into 519 IMD and an honest early backer drops from 195 to 176 IMD. The brief's claim that nobody profits from a last-second obvious bet is not achieved by the contract alone.\n\n**Finding 2, low.** After the 24-hour mark, `expire` and `settle` are both open and mutually exclusive. A loser who calls `expire` first turns a decided loss into a full refund and winners get only their stake back. This follows the brief's design, so I flagged it as an operational hazard rather than a coding error.\n\n**Coverage.** All 12 entry points have a row. Nine hold, three carry findings, none unreached. I also recorded rows for the holdings-versus-owed and dust invariants and for the static-analysis leads, none of which turned into defects.\n\n**Not a finding but worth knowing.** The signer starts unset at deploy, so nothing works until the owner calls `setSigner`. The owner can rotate the signer to a key they control, which makes the \"owner can never settle\" guarantee a trust assumption rather than a code guarantee.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":955686,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":21216,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":387640}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"03845cacb54c3a73","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary x precision seam. _setLimits (src/BetPool.sol:446) only enforces `min == 0 || min > max || max > cap`, so the owner may set a token minimum of 1..19 wei. bet() then computes shares = amount * weightBps / 10000 and reverts with ZeroShares whenever amount * weightBps < 10000, i.e. for every amount below 20 wei at the minimum weight of 500 (below 2 wei at weight 10000). The specification says a ticket is valid when 'amount within the token's limits', and the public limits(token) view advertises that range, but a server-signed ticket inside the advertised range is refused. The two acceptance rules (limits range vs. non-zero shares) are enforced in different places with different arithmetic, so the view promises an input domain the write path does not accept. Impact is limited to owner misconfiguration (the deploy defaults of 0.1 IMD and 1000 SHIFT are far above the threshold) and the bettor only loses gas, so severity is low. Minimal fix that preserves the design: in _setLimits also require `min * MIN_WEIGHT_BPS >= BPS` (min >= 20 wei) so every amount the limits view admits yields at least one share; the ZeroShares guard then becomes unreachable and can stay as a backstop.","line":257,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {BetPool} from \"src/BetPool.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\ncontract ZsToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Z\", \"Z\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice setLimits accepts a minimum that bet() can never honour at the minimum weight:\n/// limits(IMD) reports (1, 10e18) but a 19 wei ticket at weight 500 reverts with ZeroShares.\n/// Passes once _setLimits rejects a min below BPS / MIN_WEIGHT_BPS (20 wei), or once bet accepts it.\ncontract LimitsZeroSharesProof is Test {\n    address constant OWNER = 0x6C4c78f2C3bDf4C4318Fe305FB1C8BC1694d19b5;\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant SHIFT = 0xE5e58E53d0Bb204Aa62c995A6c8CC8a48e60C3AC;\n    bytes32 constant DOMAIN_TYPEHASH =\n        keccak256(\"EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract)\");\n\n    BetPool pool;\n    uint256 key = 0xBEEF;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        deployCodeTo(\"LimitsZeroShares.t.sol:ZsToken\", IMD);\n        deployCodeTo(\"LimitsZeroShares.t.sol:ZsToken\", SHIFT);\n        pool = new BetPool(OWNER);\n        vm.prank(OWNER);\n        pool.setSigner(vm.addr(key));\n    }\n\n    function _sig(bytes32 structHash) internal view returns (bytes memory) {\n        bytes32 domain = keccak256(\n            abi.encode(DOMAIN_TYPEHASH, keccak256(\"NightshiftBets\"), keccak256(\"1\"), block.chainid, address(pool))\n        );\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(key, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(\"\\x19\\x01\", domain, structHash)));\n        return abi.encodePacked(r, s, v);\n    }\n\n    function test_limitsViewMatchesWhatBetAccepts() public {\n        // Owner sets a legal-looking minimum of 1 wei (spec only forbids min 0 and min > max).\n        vm.prank(OWNER);\n        try pool.setLimits(IMD, 1, 10 ether) {}\n        catch {\n            // A fix that rejects unusable minimums in _setLimits is acceptable.\n            return;\n        }\n        (uint256 mn, uint256 mx) = pool.limits(IMD);\n        uint256 amount = 19; // within [mn, mx] as reported by the view\n        assertGe(amount, mn);\n        assertLe(amount, mx);\n\n        bytes32 id = keccak256(\"m\");\n        uint64 closesAt = uint64(block.timestamp + 1 hours);\n        pool.createMarket(\n            id, IMD, closesAt, id, _sig(keccak256(abi.encode(pool.MARKET_TYPEHASH(), id, IMD, closesAt, id)))\n        );\n\n        address alice = address(0xA11CE);\n        ZsToken(IMD).mint(alice, amount);\n        uint64 expiry = uint64(block.timestamp + 60);\n        bytes32 nonce = keccak256(\"n\");\n        bytes memory sig = _sig(\n            keccak256(abi.encode(pool.TICKET_TYPEHASH(), id, alice, uint8(0), amount, uint16(500), expiry, nonce))\n        );\n        vm.startPrank(alice);\n        ZsToken(IMD).approve(address(pool), amount);\n        // A server-signed ticket whose amount is inside the published limits must be accepted.\n        pool.bet(id, 0, amount, 500, expiry, nonce, sig);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        (uint256 aA,,,,) = pool.betsOf(id, alice);\n        assertEq(aA, amount);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) owner calls setLimits(IMD, 1, 10 ether) -> succeeds, emits LimitsSet(IMD, 1, 10e18); limits(IMD) returns (1, 10000000000000000000). 2) createMarket for IMD with a valid signature. 3) bettor submits a correctly signed Ticket(marketId, bettor, side 0, amount 19, weightBps 500, expiry now+60, fresh nonce) with 19 wei approved. Expected (spec: amount within the token's limits, weight within 500..10000, valid signature): bet accepted, BetPlaced emitted, amountA = 19. Actual: revert ZeroShares() at src/BetPool.sol:257 because 19 * 500 / 10000 == 0. Same for any amount in [1, 19] at weight 500, [1, 9] at weight 1000, and amount 1 at any weight below 10000. Proof test test/scratch/LimitsZeroShares.t.sol fails on the current tree with ZeroShares() and passes once _setLimits rejects min < 20 wei (or bet accepts the amount).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (shares == 0) revert ZeroShares();","title":"setLimits accepts a minimum below 20 wei that bet() can never honour at weight 500 (limits view disagrees with ZeroShares guard)"}],"hash":"65928837530da93dbe5bbeb165c0e3845f0d694772e03322831fdd9926222a0d","nodeId":"c3777886-7a87-47bd-a90a-53d2e8122069","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is at the repository root with one finding and a 16-row coverage record. No tracked file was changed. Only the findings file and test/scratch/ were added, both ignored by git.\n\n**Outcome.** The pari-mutuel arithmetic in `src/BetPool.sol` holds under the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap checklists. I found one low-severity boundary seam and no loss-of-funds defect.\n\n**What I verified, with tests I wrote under test/scratch/MathProbe.t.sol and ran:**\n- Conservation: a 256-run fuzz with 3 to 12 bettors at random amounts and weights inside the limits, both tokens, both outcomes. Payouts plus fee never exceed the pot. Dust is strictly less than the number of winners. The pool keeps only the dust.\n- Fee: exactly the losing total times 500 over 10000, rounded down, and the same formula is reused in `_owed`, so fee plus distributable equals the losing total exactly.\n- Overflow: 20 bets of 500 million SHIFT at weight 10000 settle and claim correctly. The largest intermediate product is far below the uint256 limit.\n- Time boundaries: closesAt at now rejected and now plus one accepted, seven days accepted and seven days plus one rejected. Ticket expiry at now plus 120 accepted and plus 121 rejected, at now accepted, now minus one rejected. Settle deadline inclusive. Expire rejected at closesAt plus 24 hours and accepted one second later.\n- Limits: max equal to the hard cap accepted, cap plus one rejected, min zero and min above max rejected.\n- Hedger math, share flooring at the minimum amount, and the existing invariant suite all pass.\n\n**The one finding (low).** The owner may set a per-bet minimum of 1 to 19 wei, which the spec allows. The limits view then advertises a range that `bet` refuses at the low end, because 19 wei at weight 500 yields zero shares and the guard on line 257 reverts. A server-signed ticket inside the published limits is rejected. The repro is owner calling setLimits with min 1, then a 19 wei bet at weight 500. The attached proof test fails on the current code with ZeroShares and passes once `_setLimits` also rejects a minimum below 20 wei, which I confirmed against a patched scratch copy. Impact is limited to owner misconfiguration and wasted gas.\n\n**Not covered in depth.** Signature construction, access control and reentrancy belong to other specialists. I traced them only as far as my arithmetic paths required, and the coverage rows say so.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1766970,"inputTokens":578,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":35738,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":508040}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"4ca9ed4f0937da89","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief names the owner as 0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5. Under the launch recipe, '$owner' means the wallet that paid for the launch. An owner address written in the brief has to appear as that static address. The owner controls setSigner. Since _verify (src/BetPool.sol:451-456) trusts whatever signer is current, the owner effectively decides every market's outcome and its tickets. If the paying wallet is not 0x6c4c…19b5, the contract gets an owner the brief never approved. The notes say the owner is 'resolved through $owner', which shows the author meant the named address but didn't write it.","line":6,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"The launch is paid by wallet P != 0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5. The factory deploys BetPool with constructorArgs ['$owner'], which resolves to P. Then BetPool.owner() == P. Expected: owner() == 0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5. P can call setSigner(P's key) and then sign Outcome/Ticket messages for every market. Fix: constructorArgs [\"0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5\"].","severity":"medium","snippet":"      \"constructorArgs\": [\"$owner\"]","title":"Manifest deploys with $owner instead of the owner address the brief names"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"This merges the reports from write_foundry_tests (info), audit_permissions, audit_economics and audit_flow, which all describe the same root cause. settle (lines 294-300) has no upper time bound. expire opens to anyone at closesAt+24h+1. Both functions are terminal and each blocks the other (line 297 and line 321). Once a settlement is late, whichever transaction lands first decides between paying the winners and refunding everyone. A loser who sees a pending settle can call expire() first and turn a decided loss into a full refund, which also cancels the 5% fee. The brief requires both behaviours, so this is an ordering hazard rather than a spec violation. Fix: make settle revert once block.timestamp > closesAt + EXPIRY_DELAY, or document that the server must settle inside the window.","line":322,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"IMD market with closesAt = T. alice bets 100e18 on A and bob bets 100e18 on B, both at weight 10000. At T+24h+1 the signer signs Outcome(M,0,deadline=now+600). bob calls expire(M), which succeeds. settle(M,0,deadline,sig) then reverts MarketSettled. claimable(alice)=100e18 (expected 195e18), claimable(bob)=100e18 (expected 0), fee to splitter = 0 (expected 5e18). If settle lands first, the payout is the opposite.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.timestamp <= uint256(m.closesAt) + EXPIRY_DELAY) revert NotExpirable();","title":"After closesAt+24h, settle() and expire() race; a losing bettor can front-run the signed result with expire()"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"This merges write_foundry_tests (info), audit_permissions (low) and audit_flow (info). setSigner takes effect immediately, and _verify uses the current signer rather than one fixed per market. The owner can switch to a key it holds, issue itself a ticket with weight 10000 on the side it chooses, sign the Outcome and settle, all in one block. The brief allows setSigner and also says the owner can never take a bet or settle without the signer. In practice that guarantee only means some signer signature is required. This is a trust assumption of the requested design, not a permission bypass. Narrowing options: store the signer per market at createMarket, or add a delay of at least 8 days to setSigner.","line":170,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Market M on IMD. alice bets 100e18 on A and bob bets 100e18 on B, both with tickets from the server signer. The owner calls setSigner(vm.addr(0xB0B)). The owner calls bet(M,0,500e18,10000,now+60,n,sigB0B), which is accepted. Then settle(M,0,now+3600,sigB0B) is accepted with fee 5e18. The owner claims 500e18 + 95e18*500/600 = 579.1666e18, and bob gets 0. Expected per brief: the owner cannot decide outcomes or take bets.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function setSigner(address newSigner) external onlyOwner {","title":"Owner can rotate the signer instantly and decide outcomes of markets that are already funded"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reported by audit_economics as medium; recalibrated to low. The brief itself asks for winners to get 'their bet back' at full value, and the weight floor of 500 is in the spec. The exposure exists only when the server has issued a ticket that is still within its 120 s lifetime after the result is known, because the contract keeps accepting bets until settle (line 247) or closesAt (line 248). The contract has no second line of defence, such as a requirement that settle come at least MAX_TICKET_TTL after the last ticket. The impact is dilution of early winners, limited to tickets the server chose to issue.","line":472,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"alice bets 100e18 on A (weight 10000) and bob bets 100e18 on B (weight 10000). mallory holds a ticket for A, 500e18 at weight 500, expiring at now+120. The match ends and a settle(A) transaction is pending. mallory's bet lands first. sharesA = 125e18. claimable(alice) = 100e18 + 95e18*100/125 = 176e18 (195e18 without the late bet). claimable(mallory) = 519e18, a risk-free profit of 19e18.","severity":"low","snippet":"        return stake + distributable * shares / winningShares;","title":"Winning stake is returned unweighted, so a still-valid low-weight ticket on the known winner is risk-free; bets stay open until a settle lands"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The constructor leaves signer = address(0), and _verify reverts with SignerNotSet (line 453). The evm_contracts recipe asks for applications to be fully configured in their constructors, with no post-deployment initialization calls. The brief doesn't state the signer address. The contract is safe but cannot do anything until the owner sends a transaction. Taking the signer as a constructor argument would remove that step.","line":159,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Deploy new BetPool(OWNER). createMarket(id, IMD, now+1h, g, anySig) reverts SignerNotSet. Expected: usable once deployed.","severity":"low","snippet":"    constructor(address owner_) Ownable(owner_) EIP712(\"NightshiftBets\", \"1\") {","title":"Signer is unset at deployment, so every signed action reverts until the owner sends setSigner"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"_setLimits allows min = 1..19 wei. bet() computes shares = amount*weightBps/10000 and reverts with ZeroShares (line 257) whenever amount*weightBps < 10000. As a result, limits(token) advertises amounts that a correctly signed ticket cannot use. This can only happen if the owner misconfigures limits, and the bettor loses only gas. Fix: require min*MIN_WEIGHT_BPS >= BPS in _setLimits. (The specialist's proof file fails in setUp with vm.getCode 'no matching artifact', so it is not attached.)","line":446,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Owner calls setLimits(IMD, 1, 10e18), which succeeds. A valid market exists. Bettor submits a correctly signed Ticket(M, bettor, 0, 19, 500, now+60, nonce) with 19 wei approved. Expected: bet accepted, since amount and weight are within limits. Actual: revert ZeroShares(), because 19*500/10000 = 0.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (min == 0 || min > max || max > cap) revert InvalidLimits();","title":"setLimits accepts a minimum below 20 wei, which bet() rejects with ZeroShares at weight 500"}],"hash":"682c24e21d09ab1a53b040796e5628b9a0a5ca68a2f43b41ff243e45965f9bdc","nodeId":"4664e5d4-f646-40cb-ba48-f97d94b8f34a","outcome":"completed","summary":"I've written the review to `.imd-findings.json`: 6 findings and a coverage row for all 12 entry points. I found no critical or high issue, so no finding carries a proof file. The existing suite passes (106 tests, 0 failures) and no tracked file was changed.\n\n**Findings, most severe first:**\n1. **Medium: the manifest uses the wrong owner reference** (`launch.json:6`). It deploys with `$owner`, which means the wallet that paid for the launch. The brief names the owner `0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5`, and the launch rules say an owner the brief names must be written as that fixed address. The owner can change the result signer, so a different owner would effectively decide every market's outcome. The specialists all missed this; I found it on my own read.\n2. **Low: `settle` and `expire` race after the 24-hour window.** Four specialist reports describe this, so I merged them into one. Once a settlement is late, a bettor on the losing side can call `expire` first. In my traced example, the winner gets 100 IMD back instead of 195, the loser gets 100 instead of 0, and the fee splitter gets nothing instead of 5.\n3. **Low: the owner can change the signer instantly.** Three specialist reports, merged. This lets the owner decide outcomes of markets that already hold bets. The brief allows `setSigner`, so I kept it as a trust assumption, not a permission bypass.\n4. **Low (a specialist rated it medium): a late bet on the known winner is risk-free.** A bettor still holding a valid ticket when the result is known can still bet on the winner, because betting stays open until `settle` lands. I lowered the severity because returning the winning stake in full and the 500 minimum weight are what the brief asks for. The exposure only exists if the server has issued a ticket that is still valid.\n5. **Low: the result signer is unset at deployment.** Every signed action reverts until the owner sends `setSigner`.\n6. **Low: `setLimits` accepts a minimum below 20 wei.** `bet` then rejects amounts in that range with `ZeroShares`. I confirmed this by tracing the code. The specialist's proof file fails during setup with \"no matching artifact\" rather than for the reason given, so I didn't attach it.\n\nI dropped none of the specialist findings: each one reproduced when I traced it through the code. The rest of the contract held up when traced: signature and replay checks, the exact 5% fee, rounding (payouts never exceed the pot minus the fee), claiming only once, and the pause behaviour.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":297188,"inputTokens":10,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":6901,"runtime":"claude","turns":5,"wallClockMs":86403}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3a40eaafbd83a6bc","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam: access x economics. Actor: the owner. The brief grants the owner setSigner and separately states that the owner can never take any bet or settle without the signer. In the code the second guarantee holds only as long as the owner is not the signer, and setSigner takes effect immediately for markets that are already open and funded: _verify (line 451-456) reads the current `signer` with no per-market binding and no delay. The owner can therefore rotate to a key it controls, self-issue a Ticket at weight 10000 and the per-bet maximum on whichever side it likes, sign Outcome for that side and call settle, all within one block and after the match result is known. Each guard is correct in isolation (onlyOwner on setSigner, signature check in settle/bet) and the payout formula is correct, but together they let the owner extract up to 95% of the other side of every open market. This is design-permitted power, so it is reported as a material trust assumption rather than a permission bypass. The existing test test_ownerCannotMoveFunds only tries a forged signature from a random key and never exercises the setSigner path, so the suite does not document this. Options that preserve the agreed owner role: (a) store the signer in the Market at createMarket and verify tickets and outcomes for that market against it, so a rotation only affects markets created afterwards (markets whose signer key is lost fall through to expire() refunds after closesAt + 24h, which already exists); or (b) a pending-signer delay of at least MAX_MARKET_DURATION + EXPIRY_DELAY so no open market can still be settled by a key the owner chose after bets were placed. Either is a scope decision for the requester; at minimum the README should state that the signer trust extends to the owner.","line":170,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Run test/scratch/TrustGap.t.sol (test_ownerCanRigOpenMarketViaSetSigner and test_ownerCanSettleWithoutServerSigner). State: market M1 on IMD created and alice bet 100 IMD on A, bob bet 100 IMD on B, both with tickets from the server signer. Calls: (1) OWNER calls setSigner(vm.addr(0x0B0B)); (2) OWNER places bet(M1, 0, 500 ether, 10000, now+60, nonce, sig) with a Ticket signed by key 0x0B0B for bettor = OWNER: accepted; (3) anyone calls settle(M1, 0, now+1h, sig) signed by 0x0B0B: accepted, 5 IMD fee sent; (4) OWNER calls claim(M1): receives 579.166666666666666666 IMD (500 stake + 95 * 500/600), bob's claimable is 0. Expected per brief: the owner cannot settle without the NIGHTSHIFT signer and cannot take any bet. Actual: the owner alone decides the outcome of every open market and nets ~79 IMD of bob's stake. The second test shows settle(M1, 1, ...) by the owner-chosen key alone flips 195 IMD to bob and 0 to alice with no server involvement.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function setSigner(address newSigner) external onlyOwner {\n        if (newSigner == address(0)) revert InvalidSigner();\n        emit SignerSet(signer, newSigner);\n        signer = newSigner;\n    }","title":"Trust assumption (access x economics): instant setSigner lets the owner settle and bet on every open market without the NIGHTSHIFT server"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between settle and expire. expire (line 322) opens at closesAt + 24h + 1 for anyone; settle has no upper time bound other than the signer-chosen deadline. From that second on, the same market has two valid, mutually exclusive terminal transitions and the first transaction to land decides between 'winners get 195% and the splitter gets 5%' and 'everyone is refunded, no fee'. Who lands first is a public-mempool race, and the party with the incentive to win it is a bettor on the losing side (or anyone with a losing position bigger than a winning one): they watch for settle(marketId, outcome, ...) and submit expire(marketId) with a higher tip. Winners, and the fee splitter, bear the loss. The brief's text ('if a market is not settled within 24 hours after closesAt, anyone may call expire') is satisfied, so this is a design gap rather than a spec violation; test_settleStillPossibleLateIfNotExpired shows the author intends late settles to work. Minimal fix that keeps the brief's intent and removes the race: make the window exclusive in settle as well, i.e. revert settle with NotExpirable-style error once block.timestamp > closesAt + EXPIRY_DELAY (and update that test), so the only terminal transition after the window is expire. If late settles must remain possible, document that losers can race them and that the server must settle within the 24h window to guarantee a decided outcome.","line":297,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Run test/scratch/TrustGap.t.sol test_loserFrontRunsLateSettleWithExpire. State: market M1 on IMD, closesAt = T; alice bet 100 IMD on A, bob bet 100 IMD on B. The server's signed Outcome(M1, 0, deadline = T + 24h + 1h + 1) is pending. At block.timestamp = T + 24h + 1: (1) bob calls expire(M1): succeeds, market settled/refundable/outcome 2; (2) settle(M1, 0, deadline, serverSig) reverts MarketSettled. claimable(M1, bob) = 100 IMD, claimable(M1, alice) = 100 IMD, fee splitter balance 0. Expected if the server's result lands: alice 195 IMD, bob 0, splitter 5 IMD. Actual: order-dependent; bob can always force the refund branch by winning the race.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (m.settled || m.refundable) revert MarketSettled();\n        if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert SignatureExpired();","title":"settle stays callable after the expire window opens, so a losing bettor can front-run a late settle with expire() and turn a loss into a full refund"}],"hash":"6fbc2a41717c4842e4b9f0e40e0a94c9a87b5a7edd3ea01b15880f4bb138b642","nodeId":"23e452ab-4bb9-4f96-bb9f-8d34c5eced5f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place and validated, and the harness excludes it and the scratch directory from git on purpose. The review is complete.\n\n**Outcome:** The permission model of `src/BetPool.sol` holds up. No permission bypass, missing guard, escalation path or fund-moving owner function exists. I report two low-severity design gaps, both reproduced by a scratch test that passes on the current code and documents the behaviour.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n- **Finding 1, low, trust assumption.** The owner can call `setSigner` with a key they control and it takes effect instantly on open, funded markets. The owner then self-issues a max-weight ticket and signs the outcome. In the reproduction the owner nets about 79 IMD of a counterparty's 100 IMD stake with no server involvement. The brief grants `setSigner`, so this is reported as design-permitted power that makes the \"owner can never settle without the signer\" guarantee depend on the owner not becoming the signer. Suggested options preserve the owner role: bind each market to the signer at creation, or add a rotation delay. Either is a scope decision for the requester.\n- **Finding 2, low, asymmetry.** Once the 24-hour expire window opens, `settle` and `expire` are both valid for the same market and the first to land wins. A losing bettor can front-run the server's late settle with `expire` and receive a full refund instead of losing. The minimal fix is to bound `settle` by the same window, which would require updating one existing test that asserts late settles work.\n\n**Coverage:** All 12 entry points have a row, with 9 holding and 3 tied to the findings above, plus rows for the owner-cannot-move-funds invariant, fee symmetry between settle and claim, and the Slither leads, all of which hold. The existing suite of 63 tests passes.\n\n**Not reached:** nothing in the assigned area was left untraced. Outside it, I did not independently re-derive the numerical rounding bounds beyond confirming the settle and claim formulas agree.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":863028,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":22936,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":381004}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d20c1a95c50699ea","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried over from last round as advisory and still present in unchanged code. Duplicates from write_foundry_tests, audit_permissions, audit_economics and audit_flow are merged here. settle (lines 294-300) has no upper time bound. expire opens to anyone at closesAt+24h+1. Both are terminal and each blocks the other (line 297 and line 321), so once a settlement is late, transaction ordering decides between paying the winners and refunding everyone. The brief requires both behaviours, so this is an ordering hazard, not a spec violation. Fix: make settle revert once block.timestamp > closesAt + EXPIRY_DELAY, or document that the server must settle inside the window.","line":322,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"IMD market with closesAt=T. alice bets 100e18 on A and bob bets 100e18 on B, both at weight 10000. At T+24h+1 the signer signs Outcome(M,0,now+600). bob calls expire(M), which succeeds. settle then reverts MarketSettled. claimable(alice)=100e18 (expected 195e18), claimable(bob)=100e18 (expected 0), fee=0 (expected 5e18).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.timestamp <= uint256(m.closesAt) + EXPIRY_DELAY) revert NotExpirable();","title":"After closesAt+24h, settle() and expire() race; a losing bettor can front-run the signed result with expire() (advisory, unchanged)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried over as advisory. Duplicates from write_foundry_tests, audit_permissions and audit_flow are merged here. setSigner takes effect immediately, and _verify (lines 451-456) checks against the current signer, not one fixed per market. The brief grants setSigner, so this is a trust assumption of the design, not a bypass. Narrowing options: bind the signer per market at createMarket, or put a delay of at least 8 days on setSigner.","line":170,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Market M on IMD. alice bets 100e18 on A and bob bets 100e18 on B. Owner calls setSigner(vm.addr(0xB0B)), then bet(M,0,500e18,10000,now+60,n,sigB0B), then settle(M,0,now+3600,sigB0B). Owner claims 579.1666e18 and bob gets 0.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function setSigner(address newSigner) external onlyOwner {","title":"Owner can rotate the signer instantly and decide outcomes of funded open markets (trust assumption, unchanged)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried over as advisory. audit_economics rated it medium; recalibrated to low because the brief mandates returning the full stake and a weight floor of 500. The exposure exists only for tickets the server issued that are still within their 120 s lifetime when the result is known (lines 247-252). Impact is dilution of early winners.","line":472,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"alice bets 100e18 on A at weight 10000 and bob bets 100e18 on B at weight 10000. mallory's ticket (A, 500e18, weight 500, expiry now+120) lands before settle(A). Result: claimable(alice)=176e18 (195e18 without the late bet) and claimable(mallory)=519e18.","severity":"low","snippet":"        return stake + distributable * shares / winningShares;","title":"Winning stake is returned unweighted, so a still-valid low-weight ticket on the known winner is risk-free; bets stay open until settle lands (advisory, unchanged)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried over as advisory. The constructor leaves signer = 0, and _verify reverts SignerNotSet (line 453). The brief does not give the signer address. The launch.json notes now state that the owner must call setSigner, which makes the step explicit. The pool is safe while unset but does nothing.","line":159,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Deploy new BetPool(0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5). createMarket(id, IMD, now+1h, g, anySig) reverts SignerNotSet.","severity":"low","snippet":"    constructor(address owner_) Ownable(owner_) EIP712(\"NightshiftBets\", \"1\") {","title":"Signer is unset at deployment; every signed action reverts until the owner sends setSigner (advisory, unchanged, now documented in launch.json notes)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried over as advisory; duplicate from audit_math merged. _setLimits allows min = 1..19 wei, but bet computes shares = amount*weightBps/10000 and reverts ZeroShares (line 257) when the product is below 10000. Reachable only through owner misconfiguration, and the bettor loses only gas. Fix: also require min*MIN_WEIGHT_BPS >= BPS.","line":446,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"setLimits(IMD, 1, 10e18) succeeds. A correctly signed Ticket(M, bettor, 0, 19, 500, now+60, nonce) reverts ZeroShares() because 19*500/10000 = 0.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (min == 0 || min > max || max > cap) revert InvalidLimits();","title":"setLimits accepts a minimum below 20 wei, which bet() rejects with ZeroShares at weight 500 (advisory, unchanged)"}],"hash":"8bc4fbe24bd09b38d6be18c8877ffaf2d6f0d9b4a34098b73fc16e4f47be469e","nodeId":"4664e5d4-f646-40cb-ba48-f97d94b8f34a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The one blocking finding from last round is fixed, and nothing new turned up. The report is in `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Blocking finding, fixed:** `launch.json` now passes the owner address the brief names, `\"0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5\"`, as a fixed value instead of `$owner` (which would have meant whoever paid for the launch). The rest of the manifest is valid: only the allowed keys, one argument for the one constructor parameter, and notes that also tell the owner to set the result signer with `setSigner`. `src/BetPool.sol` has not changed. The full test suite passes (106 of 106).\n\n**Advisory findings, all still present and all low severity:**\n1. **Late settle vs. expire race** (`src/BetPool.sol:322`): once a market is more than 24 hours past its close, a losing bettor can call `expire()` ahead of a pending signed result and turn their loss into a full refund.\n2. **Instant signer change** (`:170`): the owner can switch the result signer at any moment, so in practice they can decide open markets. The brief grants that power, so this is a trust assumption rather than a bypass.\n3. **Late bets on a known winner** (`:472`): a minimum-weight ticket that is still valid after the result is known carries no risk, because the full stake comes back. I kept this at low rather than medium because the brief asks for the full stake back and sets the 500 weight floor.\n4. **Signer unset at deploy** (`:159`): every signed action reverts until the owner calls `setSigner`. The manifest notes now document this step.\n5. **Limits below 20 wei** (`:446`): `setLimits` accepts minimums that `bet()` then rejects with `ZeroShares`. This only happens if the owner misconfigures limits, and the bettor loses only gas.\n\nThe specialists' reports all fall into these five; I merged their duplicates and found no new defect. The coverage record answers all 12 entry points, plus a row confirming the manifest fix.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":298112,"inputTokens":10,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":4840,"runtime":"claude","turns":5,"wallClockMs":65667}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"45d7b9f56da97166559d10d1bf21e5f231b14383be404b04a3585fd8176660e0","device":"629adec6a25d9241","findings":[],"hash":"9808145b78cfba585a5169141140238bad27caf108d010464d265d1aa64f94f6","nodeId":"e331fc1a-45dc-4cd8-ae77-679b33ed6da1","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](launch.json) for `BetPool` with `[\"$owner\"]`. Structure and constructor checks passed; no other files changed.\n\n`forge build` and seeded `forge test` both failed because the Solidity compiler returned `Permission denied`.\n\nThe owner must set the result signer before use.","treeHash":"b539860694e5abd6fbabe15468bd4fa5806a44e4","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":233216,"inputTokens":41736,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":3897,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":125560}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"9fc0f53befd74eb21ad9c28a77b2db84e97eb4075b9356b666adc54d55821541","device":"47f3603854a893a3","findings":[{"description":"The constructor takes only owner_ and leaves signer = address(0). Every createMarket, bet and settle goes through _verify, which reverts SignerNotSet until the owner calls setSigner. The evm_contracts launch recipe asks for applications to be fully configured in the constructor with no post-deployment initialization calls. The brief does not give the signer address, so an owner-settable signer is a reasonable placeholder, but the deployed contract cannot do anything until that follow-up transaction is sent.","line":159,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Deploy new BetPool(OWNER) and call createMarket with any signature: it reverts SignerNotSet (expected: usable after deploy if the signer were a constructor argument; actual: needs a setSigner tx from the owner). Covered by test/BetPool.t.sol::test_signerUnsetBlocksSignedActions and test/DeployBetPool.t.sol::test_deployConfiguration (signer() == 0).","severity":"low","title":"Result signer is unset at deploy; pool is unusable until the owner sends setSigner"},{"description":"The brief allows setSigner and says the owner can never settle without the signer. setSigner takes effect immediately with no delay, so the owner can set signer = an owner-held key and then sign any Outcome for any unsettled market, including one with funds on both sides, and choose the winner. This is a trust assumption that comes with the requested setSigner power, not a code bug. A timelock on signer changes, or freezing the signer per market at creation, would narrow it. The unit tests confirm the owner cannot settle with a forged signature while the real signer is in place (test_ownerCannotMoveFunds) and that old signatures die on rotation (test_settleAfterSignerRotationNeedsNewSigner).","line":170,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Owner calls setSigner(vm.addr(ownerKey)), then settle(marketId, 1, deadline, sigByOwnerKey) succeeds and pays side B. Expected by the brief's wording: the owner cannot pick outcomes. Actual: possible in two transactions with no delay.","severity":"info","title":"Owner can effectively settle any open market by rotating the signer to a key it controls"},{"description":"settle has no upper time bound. After closesAt + 24h a market can be either expired (refund) or settled (payout), whichever transaction lands first. The brief only says expire becomes available then, so this is ordering-dependent rather than wrong, but bettors on the losing side have an incentive to front-run a late settlement with expire.","line":294,"path":"src/BetPool.sol","reproduction":"Create market, bet both sides, warp to closesAt + 30h, settle with a valid Outcome: succeeds (test/BetPool.t.sol::test_settleStillPossibleLateIfNotExpired). Calling expire first at the same time instead refunds everyone.","severity":"info","title":"settle stays callable after the 24h expiry window until someone calls expire"}],"hash":"b5e588f721dfcf11b73e4db4db99b2367821ef69c73c9fe69a776df9422152e2","nodeId":"aed47e72-9cf4-44e1-a784-14cb830315d8","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added two test files on top of the existing suite. `forge build` and `forge test` both pass with the verifier's fuzz seed: 106 tests in all (63 existing, 43 new). None of my tests turned up a defect in `src/BetPool.sol`.\n\n**`test/BetPool.edge.t.sol`** (41 tests) covers gaps in the earlier suite:\n- **Time boundaries:** a market closing 1 second ahead, `closesAt` in the past, ticket expiry exactly +120s, a ticket whose expiry runs past `closesAt`, settling exactly at the deadline, and the exact `closesAt + 24h` cut-off between settle and expire.\n- **Nonces:** a nonce is used up across all markets and all bettors, and a bet that fails (no allowance or not enough balance) does not use up its nonce.\n- **Signatures:** these are all refused: a \"malleated\" signature (an altered copy of a valid one), empty, 64-byte or all-zero signatures, an outcome signed for another market, a Market signature reused as an Outcome or Ticket, and a void signature submitted as a win. Signatures also stop working if the chain changes or the signer is rotated.\n- **Payouts:** markets on the same token are isolated from each other; rounding dust stays at most 1 wei per winner; bets at the hard caps (10,000 IMD and 500M SHIFT, 20 bettors) settle without overflow. Also covered: someone betting both sides, refunds for whoever bet on the losing side, and market state staying frozen after claims.\n- **`claimMany`:** an empty list reverts, duplicate ids pay once, unsettled and losing markets are skipped, and it works while paused.\n- **Owner:** pausing or unpausing twice reverts; ownership handover moves every power to the new owner; the owner gets nothing from a claim and has no fee, recipient, token, rescue or upgrade setter.\n- **Fuzz:** payouts match the weighted formula for both tokens, refunds are exact, the bet limits hold at their edges, and `claimMany` pays the same as `claim`.\n\n**`test/BetPool.marketInvariant.t.sol`** is a random-sequence invariant test that tracks each market separately; the earlier one only totalled per token. Its random calls include owner actions (pause, `setLimits`), `claimMany` with duplicate and unknown ids, and calls that must fail: bets while paused, closed or settled, a replayed ticket, settling twice, expiring early, claiming twice, a loser claiming, and limits above the hard cap. It checks after every step:\n- each market holds at least what it still owes, and leftover dust stays within the bound;\n- the contract's token balances, fee-splitter receipts and owner balance match a separately kept ledger exactly;\n- the fee is exactly 5% of the losing side, and zero for void or one-sided markets;\n- settled markets never reopen or change;\n- winners get no more than their weighted share, and losers get nothing;\n- none of the must-fail calls ever succeeded.\n\nThe run made 10,240 calls with zero unexpected reverts. A separate sanity test confirms the random calls really reach settlement, fees and claims, so the invariants are not passing on empty markets.\n\nIn my own harness I found and fixed one bug: a `vm.prank` used up by a view call meant pausing never actually happened and some claims came from the wrong address.\n\nI recorded three low/info notes in `.imd-findings.json`. None is critical or high, so none needed a failing-test proof. Your git setup ignores that file (`.git/info/exclude`), so it won't appear in `git status`.\n- **Low:** the result signer is unset at deploy. Nothing works until the owner calls `setSigner`, which conflicts with the launch recipe's \"no post-deployment initialization calls\".\n- **Info:** `setSigner` takes effect immediately, so the owner can switch to a key they hold and choose any open market's outcome.\n- **Info:** after the 24-hour window, settle and expire are both allowed, and whichever transaction lands first wins.\n\nI haven't committed anything; the two new files are untracked in the working tree.","treeHash":"2bbd38b987d4a08023c16589dd5462383aab2b9b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2971259,"inputTokens":64,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":42095,"runtime":"claude","turns":33,"wallClockMs":469561}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"34687b4b5bc1214e2272db436eb678fa2c39bb17ea3a542569f95916ae3dfbee","device":"f9cb4fd544aa3c68","findings":[],"hash":"f6b4e88851a588387395e7ca80785f8d74939bc36ca18472535ffdbf2c9e7293","nodeId":"e331fc1a-45dc-4cd8-ae77-679b33ed6da1","outcome":"completed","summary":"The finding reproduced and is fixed. The revision changes only the manifest.\n\n**What was wrong.** The brief names the owner as a specific address, and the launch recipe requires a brief-named owner to be written as a static address. The previous manifest passed `$owner`, which resolves to whichever wallet paid for the launch. Since the owner controls setSigner and the pool trusts the current signer for every market, ticket and outcome, a different paying wallet would have gained control of all results.\n\n**What changed in launch.json.**\n- The single BetPool constructor argument is now the static address 0x6c4c78f2c3bdf4c4318fe305fb1c8bc1694d19b5, matching the contract's sole `owner_` parameter.\n- The notes no longer say the owner is resolved through `$owner`. They now state the owner is the brief's static address and that the result signer must still be set by the owner after deployment.\n\n**Verification.**\n- The manifest parses as JSON with exactly the keys kind, contracts and notes.\n- The build compiles cleanly and the full suite passes with the verifier's fuzz seed.\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| forge build | success |\n| forge test (verifier seed) | 63 passed, 0 failed |\n\nThe response to the finding is recorded in .imd-responses.json with verdict fixed. Git shows launch.json as the only modified tracked file. No source, config or dependency files were touched.","treeHash":"b1edabdd848c62726949f93a7a8c3196a550a3d9","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":274941,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":2904,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":58440}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":4558,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 52 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.36s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5148,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeployBetPool.t.sol:DeployBetPoolTest\n[PASS] test_deployConfiguration() (gas: 4690645)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2749857)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 173.35ms (10.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 60 tests for test/BetPool.t.sol:BetPoolTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeIsFivePercentOfLosers(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1289968, ~: 1290181)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 24732746102480737715431926\n  Bound result 6368427892220840958536187\n  Bound result 19717318526019160732569927\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_twoSidedPayoutConservation(uint256[6],uint16[6],uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 2516471, ~: 2595362)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 499900000000000000061\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 499900000000000010000\n  Bound result 9984\n  Bound result 499900000000000020771\n  Bound result 9628\n  Bound result 499900000000315850470\n  Bound result 9507\n  Bound result 499900000000000000230\n  Bound result 8261\n  Bound result 329208092688944160220\n  Bound result 9001\n\n[PASS] test_betAfterClosesAtRefused() (gas: 278351)\n[PASS] test_betEmitsAndPullsExactAmount() (gas: 451915)\n[PASS] test_betLimits() (gas: 1952171)\n[PASS] test_betOnSettledMarketRefused() (gas: 321055)\n[PASS] test_betOnUnknownMarketRefused() (gas: 191495)\n[PASS] test_betOneSecondBeforeCloseAccepted() (gas: 456986)\n[PASS] test_betWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 367814)\n[PASS] test_claimBeforeSettleRefused() (gas: 525609)\n[PASS] test_claimMany() (gas: 2624016)\n[PASS] test_constructorDefaults() (gas: 67848)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 4165)\n[PASS] test_createMarketEmitsAndStores() (gas: 115229)\n[PASS] test_createMarketParameterChecks() (gas: 729992)\n[PASS] test_createMarketSignatureChecks() (gas: 404157)\n[PASS] test_doubleClaimRefused() (gas: 1046330)\n[PASS] test_doubleSettleRefused() (gas: 916553)\n[PASS] test_emptyMarketSettlesRefundable() (gas: 202071)\n[PASS] test_expireAfter24Hours() (gas: 1228845)\n[PASS] test_expireRefusedOnSettledOrUnknown() (gas: 189595)\n[PASS] test_feeExactlyFivePercentOddAmountsManyBettors() (gas: 13069900)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferTokenRefused() (gas: 501311)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowIMD_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2700607)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowSHIFT_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2988050)\n[PASS] test_hedgerGetsOnlyWinningSide() (gas: 1245139)\n[PASS] test_loserClaimGetsNothing() (gas: 920311)\n[PASS] test_multipleBetsSameWalletAccumulate() (gas: 976691)\n[PASS] test_newLimitsApplyToBets() (gas: 670279)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketLosingSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 663095)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketWinningSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 1083669)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1333963)\n[PASS] test_pauseBlocksNewMarketsAndBetsOnly() (gas: 1993816)\n[PASS] test_payoutsFollowWeightedShares() (gas: 1184032)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyGuardOnClaim() (gas: 1192358)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabledAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 115728)\n[PASS] test_setLimits() (gas: 292027)\n[PASS] test_setSigner() (gas: 107776)\n[PASS] test_settleBeforeClosesAtClosesBetting() (gas: 644953)\n[PASS] test_settleSignatureChecks() (gas: 444802)\n[PASS] test_settleStillPossibleLateIfNotExpired() (gas: 863722)\n[PASS] test_signerRotationInvalidatesOldSigner() (gas: 323864)\n[PASS] test_signerUnsetBlocksSignedActions() (gas: 177848)\n[PASS] test_ticketAtExactExpiryAccepted() (gas: 441507)\n[PASS] test_ticketExpired() (gas: 278679)\n[PASS] test_ticketForOtherMarketRefused() (gas: 377840)\n[PASS] test_ticketInvalidSideValue() (gas: 278090)\n[PASS] test_ticketMalformedSignature() (gas: 284722)\n[PASS] test_ticketReusedNonce() (gas: 518596)\n[PASS] test_ticketTooFarExpiry() (gas: 477276)\n[PASS] test_ticketWeightOutOfRange() (gas: 828031)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongAmount() (gas: 291823)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongBettor() (gas: 293814)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongChain() (gas: 345230)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongContract() (gas: 291565)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSide() (gas: 291772)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSigner() (gas: 291620)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongWeight() (gas: 291835)\n[PASS] test_tinyMinRejectsZeroShareBet() (gas: 322453)\n[PASS] test_voidRefundsEverythingNoFee() (gas: 1376565)\nSuite result: ok. 60 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 192.35ms (445.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol:BetPoolInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nBetPoolInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_dustBounded\n[PASS] invariant_payoutsNeverExceedBets\n[PASS] invariant_poolHoldsWhatItOwes\n BetPoolInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| BetPoolHandler | bet          | 670   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | claim        | 697   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | createMarket | 708   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | expire       | 674   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | settle       | 680   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | warp         | 667   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8387\n  Bound result 8710\n  Bound result 1838\n  Bound result 6602\n  Bound result 121\n  Bound result 5778\n  Bound result 7912\n  Bound result 7925\n  Bound result 17305\n  Bound result 7630\n  Bound result 10412\n  Bound result 1904\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.88s (4.88s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 4.89s (5.25s CPU time): 63 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (63 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":133,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"BetPool.acceptOwnership()\",\"BetPool.bet(bytes32,uint8,uint256,uint16,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.claim(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.claimMany(bytes32[])\",\"BetPool.createMarket(bytes32,address,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.expire(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.pause()\",\"BetPool.setLimits(address,uint256,uint256)\",\"BetPool.setSigner(address)\",\"BetPool.settle(bytes32,uint8,uint256,bytes)\",\"BetPool.transferOwnership(address)\",\"BetPool.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":194,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployBetPool.s.sol\":24,\"src/BetPool.sol\":474,\"test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol\":193,\"test/BetPool.t.sol\":1047,\"test/DeployBetPool.t.sol\":34,\"test/utils/BetPoolBase.sol\":122,\"test/utils/Mocks.sol\":61},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2966,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/BetPool.sol:304: BetPool.settle(bytes32,uint8,uint256,bytes).fee (src/BetPool.sol#304) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/BetPool.sol:451: BetPool._verify(bytes32,bytes) (src/BetPool.sol#451-456) ignores return value by (recovered,err,None) = ECDSA.tryRecover(_hashTypedDataV4(structHash),signature) (src/BetPool.sol#454)\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/BetPool.sol:294: BetPool.settle(bytes32,uint8,uint256,bytes) (src/BetPool.sol#294-313) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/BetPool.sol:318: BetPool.expire(bytes32) (src/BetPool.sol#318-327) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/BetPool.sol:235: BetPool.bet(bytes32,uint8,uint256,uint16,uint64,bytes32,bytes) (src/BetPool.sol#235-281) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/BetPool.sol:209: BetPool.createMarket(bytes32,address,uint64,bytes32,bytes) (src/BetPool.sol#209-225) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":837,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] centralization-risk at src/BetPool.sol:21: Centralization Risk (6 places)\n[low] costly-loop at src/BetPool.sol:354: Costly operations inside loop\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/BetPool.sol:38: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/BetPool.sol:354: Loop Contains `require`/`revert`\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/BetPool.sol:354: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unused-error at src/BetPool.sol:128: Unused Error","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"60f3eb5f19c0c72c8ad3e34305efef039d97743bc37a2147091461c3fde75a53","verifiedTreeHash":"a08f0f3625183172dec8b97f852c900fe10f720c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4651,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 52 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.43s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5476,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeployBetPool.t.sol:DeployBetPoolTest\n[PASS] test_deployConfiguration() (gas: 4690645)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2749857)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.67ms (9.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 60 tests for test/BetPool.t.sol:BetPoolTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeIsFivePercentOfLosers(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1289968, ~: 1290181)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 24999000000000241606952247\n  Bound result 18862750779535660907548\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000002\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_twoSidedPayoutConservation(uint256[6],uint16[6],uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 2516471, ~: 2595362)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 499900000000000000061\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 499900000000000010000\n  Bound result 9984\n  Bound result 499900000000000020771\n  Bound result 9628\n  Bound result 499900000000315850470\n  Bound result 9507\n  Bound result 499900000000000000230\n  Bound result 8261\n  Bound result 329208092688944160220\n  Bound result 9001\n\n[PASS] test_betAfterClosesAtRefused() (gas: 278351)\n[PASS] test_betEmitsAndPullsExactAmount() (gas: 451915)\n[PASS] test_betLimits() (gas: 1952171)\n[PASS] test_betOnSettledMarketRefused() (gas: 321055)\n[PASS] test_betOnUnknownMarketRefused() (gas: 191495)\n[PASS] test_betOneSecondBeforeCloseAccepted() (gas: 456986)\n[PASS] test_betWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 367814)\n[PASS] test_claimBeforeSettleRefused() (gas: 525609)\n[PASS] test_claimMany() (gas: 2624016)\n[PASS] test_constructorDefaults() (gas: 67848)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 4165)\n[PASS] test_createMarketEmitsAndStores() (gas: 115229)\n[PASS] test_createMarketParameterChecks() (gas: 729992)\n[PASS] test_createMarketSignatureChecks() (gas: 404157)\n[PASS] test_doubleClaimRefused() (gas: 1046330)\n[PASS] test_doubleSettleRefused() (gas: 916553)\n[PASS] test_emptyMarketSettlesRefundable() (gas: 202071)\n[PASS] test_expireAfter24Hours() (gas: 1228845)\n[PASS] test_expireRefusedOnSettledOrUnknown() (gas: 189595)\n[PASS] test_feeExactlyFivePercentOddAmountsManyBettors() (gas: 13069900)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferTokenRefused() (gas: 501311)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowIMD_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2700607)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowSHIFT_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2988050)\n[PASS] test_hedgerGetsOnlyWinningSide() (gas: 1245139)\n[PASS] test_loserClaimGetsNothing() (gas: 920311)\n[PASS] test_multipleBetsSameWalletAccumulate() (gas: 976691)\n[PASS] test_newLimitsApplyToBets() (gas: 670279)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketLosingSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 663095)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketWinningSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 1083669)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1333963)\n[PASS] test_pauseBlocksNewMarketsAndBetsOnly() (gas: 1993816)\n[PASS] test_payoutsFollowWeightedShares() (gas: 1184032)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyGuardOnClaim() (gas: 1192358)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabledAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 115728)\n[PASS] test_setLimits() (gas: 292027)\n[PASS] test_setSigner() (gas: 107776)\n[PASS] test_settleBeforeClosesAtClosesBetting() (gas: 644953)\n[PASS] test_settleSignatureChecks() (gas: 444802)\n[PASS] test_settleStillPossibleLateIfNotExpired() (gas: 863722)\n[PASS] test_signerRotationInvalidatesOldSigner() (gas: 323864)\n[PASS] test_signerUnsetBlocksSignedActions() (gas: 177848)\n[PASS] test_ticketAtExactExpiryAccepted() (gas: 441507)\n[PASS] test_ticketExpired() (gas: 278679)\n[PASS] test_ticketForOtherMarketRefused() (gas: 377840)\n[PASS] test_ticketInvalidSideValue() (gas: 278090)\n[PASS] test_ticketMalformedSignature() (gas: 284722)\n[PASS] test_ticketReusedNonce() (gas: 518596)\n[PASS] test_ticketTooFarExpiry() (gas: 477276)\n[PASS] test_ticketWeightOutOfRange() (gas: 828031)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongAmount() (gas: 291823)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongBettor() (gas: 293814)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongChain() (gas: 345230)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongContract() (gas: 291565)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSide() (gas: 291772)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSigner() (gas: 291620)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongWeight() (gas: 291835)\n[PASS] test_tinyMinRejectsZeroShareBet() (gas: 322453)\n[PASS] test_voidRefundsEverythingNoFee() (gas: 1376565)\nSuite result: ok. 60 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 160.27ms (401.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol:BetPoolInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nBetPoolInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_dustBounded\n[PASS] invariant_payoutsNeverExceedBets\n[PASS] invariant_poolHoldsWhatItOwes\n BetPoolInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| BetPoolHandler | bet          | 670   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | claim        | 697   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | createMarket | 708   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | expire       | 674   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | settle       | 680   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | warp         | 667   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8387\n  Bound result 8710\n  Bound result 1838\n  Bound result 6602\n  Bound result 121\n  Bound result 5778\n  Bound result 7912\n  Bound result 7925\n  Bound result 17305\n  Bound result 7630\n  Bound result 10412\n  Bound result 1904\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.26s (5.26s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 5.26s (5.44s CPU time): 63 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (63 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":106,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"BetPool.acceptOwnership()\",\"BetPool.bet(bytes32,uint8,uint256,uint16,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.claim(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.claimMany(bytes32[])\",\"BetPool.createMarket(bytes32,address,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.expire(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.pause()\",\"BetPool.setLimits(address,uint256,uint256)\",\"BetPool.setSigner(address)\",\"BetPool.settle(bytes32,uint8,uint256,bytes)\",\"BetPool.transferOwnership(address)\",\"BetPool.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":194,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":10,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployBetPool.s.sol\":24,\"src/BetPool.sol\":474,\"test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol\":193,\"test/BetPool.t.sol\":1047,\"test/DeployBetPool.t.sol\":34,\"test/utils/BetPoolBase.sol\":122,\"test/utils/Mocks.sol\":61},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"9808145b78cfba585a5169141140238bad27caf108d010464d265d1aa64f94f6","verifiedTreeHash":"b539860694e5abd6fbabe15468bd4fa5806a44e4","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3228,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.15s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":6126,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeployBetPool.t.sol:DeployBetPoolTest\n[PASS] test_deployConfiguration() (gas: 4690645)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2749857)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 206.73ms (5.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 60 tests for test/BetPool.t.sol:BetPoolTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeIsFivePercentOfLosers(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1290001, ~: 1290186)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 22677339986362113687020324\n  Bound result 8766416657577785896877190\n  Bound result 2099136303356455239660905\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_twoSidedPayoutConservation(uint256[6],uint16[6],uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 2504974, ~: 2593935)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 115114323394201586910\n  Bound result 6813\n  Bound result 499900000000000000009\n  Bound result 9532\n  Bound result 499900000000001407543\n  Bound result 501\n  Bound result 35808688231993956441\n  Bound result 8903\n  Bound result 114244244355220194\n  Bound result 9506\n  Bound result 499902109125720876088\n  Bound result 6375\n\n[PASS] test_betAfterClosesAtRefused() (gas: 278351)\n[PASS] test_betEmitsAndPullsExactAmount() (gas: 451915)\n[PASS] test_betLimits() (gas: 1952171)\n[PASS] test_betOnSettledMarketRefused() (gas: 321055)\n[PASS] test_betOnUnknownMarketRefused() (gas: 191495)\n[PASS] test_betOneSecondBeforeCloseAccepted() (gas: 456986)\n[PASS] test_betWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 367814)\n[PASS] test_claimBeforeSettleRefused() (gas: 525609)\n[PASS] test_claimMany() (gas: 2624016)\n[PASS] test_constructorDefaults() (gas: 67848)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 4165)\n[PASS] test_createMarketEmitsAndStores() (gas: 115229)\n[PASS] test_createMarketParameterChecks() (gas: 729992)\n[PASS] test_createMarketSignatureChecks() (gas: 404157)\n[PASS] test_doubleClaimRefused() (gas: 1046330)\n[PASS] test_doubleSettleRefused() (gas: 916553)\n[PASS] test_emptyMarketSettlesRefundable() (gas: 202071)\n[PASS] test_expireAfter24Hours() (gas: 1228845)\n[PASS] test_expireRefusedOnSettledOrUnknown() (gas: 189595)\n[PASS] test_feeExactlyFivePercentOddAmountsManyBettors() (gas: 13069900)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferTokenRefused() (gas: 501311)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowIMD_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2700607)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowSHIFT_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2988050)\n[PASS] test_hedgerGetsOnlyWinningSide() (gas: 1245139)\n[PASS] test_loserClaimGetsNothing() (gas: 920311)\n[PASS] test_multipleBetsSameWalletAccumulate() (gas: 976691)\n[PASS] test_newLimitsApplyToBets() (gas: 670279)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketLosingSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 663095)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketWinningSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 1083669)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1333963)\n[PASS] test_pauseBlocksNewMarketsAndBetsOnly() (gas: 1993816)\n[PASS] test_payoutsFollowWeightedShares() (gas: 1184032)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyGuardOnClaim() (gas: 1192358)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabledAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 115728)\n[PASS] test_setLimits() (gas: 292027)\n[PASS] test_setSigner() (gas: 107776)\n[PASS] test_settleBeforeClosesAtClosesBetting() (gas: 644953)\n[PASS] test_settleSignatureChecks() (gas: 444802)\n[PASS] test_settleStillPossibleLateIfNotExpired() (gas: 863722)\n[PASS] test_signerRotationInvalidatesOldSigner() (gas: 323864)\n[PASS] test_signerUnsetBlocksSignedActions() (gas: 177848)\n[PASS] test_ticketAtExactExpiryAccepted() (gas: 441507)\n[PASS] test_ticketExpired() (gas: 278679)\n[PASS] test_ticketForOtherMarketRefused() (gas: 377840)\n[PASS] test_ticketInvalidSideValue() (gas: 278090)\n[PASS] test_ticketMalformedSignature() (gas: 284722)\n[PASS] test_ticketReusedNonce() (gas: 518596)\n[PASS] test_ticketTooFarExpiry() (gas: 477276)\n[PASS] test_ticketWeightOutOfRange() (gas: 828031)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongAmount() (gas: 291823)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongBettor() (gas: 293814)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongChain() (gas: 345230)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongContract() (gas: 291565)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSide() (gas: 291772)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSigner() (gas: 291620)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongWeight() (gas: 291835)\n[PASS] test_tinyMinRejectsZeroShareBet() (gas: 322453)\n[PASS] test_voidRefundsEverythingNoFee() (gas: 1376565)\nSuite result: ok. 60 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 206.74ms (307.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 41 tests for test/BetPool.edge.t.sol:BetPoolEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_betLimitBoundaries(uint256,bool) (runs: 512, μ: 338247, ~: 299067)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_claimManyEqualsIndividualClaims(uint256[4],uint16[4],uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 3221599, ~: 3315052)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 499900000000000007085\n  Bound result 8252\n  Bound result 208665966666666666666\n  Bound result 5584\n  Bound result 100000000000000002\n  Bound result 8000\n  Bound result 499900000000000005987\n  Bound result 7866\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_payoutMatchesWeightedFormula(uint256[3],uint16[2],bool) (runs: 512, μ: 1552732, ~: 1552812)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 10714630130739364319970576\n  Bound result 7038256899817773798835496\n  Bound result 3298\n  Bound result 9577\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_refundableAlwaysReturnsExactStake(uint256,uint256,uint8,bool) (runs: 512, μ: 1124193, ~: 1118087)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3800000000000000000\n  Bound result 499900000000000000061\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_chainForkInvalidatesSignatures() (gas: 190206)\n[PASS] test_claimManyDuplicateIdsPayOnce() (gas: 954891)\n[PASS] test_claimManyEmptyArrayReverts() (gas: 37782)\n[PASS] test_claimManySkipsUnsettledAndLosing() (gas: 2190235)\n[PASS] test_claimManyWorksWhilePaused() (gas: 989972)\n[PASS] test_claimableViewsForUnknownAndUnsettled() (gas: 52754)\n[PASS] test_constantsCannotBeChangedByOwner() (gas: 128823)\n[PASS] test_createMarketInPastRefused() (gas: 43964)\n[PASS] test_createMarketOneSecondAheadAccepted() (gas: 577517)\n[PASS] test_createMarketZeroTokenRefused() (gas: 43564)\n[PASS] test_crossTypeSignatureRefused() (gas: 285638)\n[PASS] test_dustAtMostOneWeiPerWinner() (gas: 1879868)\n[PASS] test_emptyAndShortSignaturesRefused() (gas: 203624)\n[PASS] test_expireMarketWithoutBets() (gas: 186590)\n[PASS] test_expiredMarketRefusesBets() (gas: 307676)\n[PASS] test_failedBetDoesNotConsumeNonce() (gas: 639586)\n[PASS] test_hardCapBetsSettleWithoutOverflow() (gas: 7956395)\n[PASS] test_hedgerRefundedBothSidesOnVoidAndOneSided() (gas: 1837235)\n[PASS] test_highSMalleatedTicketRefused() (gas: 480512)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRefused() (gas: 415340)\n[PASS] test_loserInRefundableMarketGetsStakeBack() (gas: 646107)\n[PASS] test_marketIdCannotBeReusedAfterSettlement() (gas: 171199)\n[PASS] test_marketsAreIsolatedSameToken() (gas: 1958844)\n[PASS] test_minWeightWinnerStillGetsWholeLosingPotWhenAlone() (gas: 1013207)\n[PASS] test_nonceIsGlobalAcrossMarkets() (gas: 543029)\n[PASS] test_nonceReuseRefusedForOtherBettor() (gas: 553671)\n[PASS] test_outcomeSignedForOtherMarketRefused() (gas: 222891)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotExpireEarlyOrClaimOthersAfterSettle() (gas: 1225865)\n[PASS] test_ownerSettingsWorkWhilePausedAndPauseIsNotIdempotent() (gas: 231876)\n[PASS] test_ownershipHandoverMovesAllPowers() (gas: 223860)\n[PASS] test_settleAfterSignerRotationNeedsNewSigner() (gas: 214022)\n[PASS] test_settleExactlyAtDeadlineAndExpireBoundary() (gas: 544863)\n[PASS] test_settledStateFrozenAfterClaims() (gas: 1076352)\n[PASS] test_ticketExpiryExactlyMaxTtlAccepted() (gas: 436256)\n[PASS] test_ticketWithExpiryAfterCloseStillStopsAtClose() (gas: 261535)\n[PASS] test_voidSignatureCannotSettleAsWin() (gas: 914600)\n[PASS] test_weightBoundsExactSharesRecorded() (gas: 796858)\nSuite result: ok. 41 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 206.82ms (639.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol:BetPoolInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nBetPoolInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_dustBounded\n[PASS] invariant_payoutsNeverExceedBets\n[PASS] invariant_poolHoldsWhatItOwes\n BetPoolInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| BetPoolHandler | bet          | 670   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | claim        | 697   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | createMarket | 708   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | expire       | 674   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | settle       | 680   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | warp         | 667   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8387\n  Bound result 8710\n  Bound result 1838\n  Bound result 6602\n  Bound result 15200\n  Bound result 5777\n  Bound result 7876\n  Bound result 1047\n  Bound result 17305\n  Bound result 7363\n  Bound result 10410\n  Bound result 1802\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.89s (2.89s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/BetPool.marketInvariant.t.sol:BetPoolMarketInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nBetPoolMarketInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_eachMarketSolventAndDustBounded\n[PASS] invariant_feeRule\n[PASS] invariant_finishedMarketsNeverReopenOrChange\n[PASS] invariant_noForbiddenCallSucceeded\n[PASS] invariant_perBettorPayoutRules\n[PASS] invariant_tokenBalancesMatchGhostLedger\n BetPoolMarketInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 10240, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| MarketHandler | bet          | 1140  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | claim        | 1069  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | claimMany    | 1149  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | createMarket | 1163  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | expire       | 1182  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | setLimits    | 1147  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | settle       | 1080  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | togglePause  | 1160  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | warp         | 1150  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9999000000000000000991\n  Bound result 1000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1000000000000000001\n  Bound result 6400\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 9999000000000000010001\n  Bound result 416094634107107684928494313\n  Bound result 400018277075510399635499251\n  Bound result 499999999000000000000000061\n  Bound result 499999998000000000000010969\n  Bound result 5583\n  Bound result 4760\n  Bound result 1024\n  Bound result 9999000000000000009002\n  Bound result 9998000000000000009320\n  Bound result 15640\n  Bound result 13210\n  Bound result 9998999999999996833144\n  Bound result 3753\n  Bound result 9999000000000000006001\n  Bound result 9998000000000000007676\n  Bound result 1001000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000014963\n  Bound result 9998000000000014650851\n  Bound result 9519\n  Bound result 12245\n  Bound result 9998999999999983267092\n  Bound result 3700\n  Bound result 6366748511968992192515\n  Bound result 6365748511968992206540\n  Bound result 6117\n  Bound result 1000999999999985030538\n  Bound result 6117\n  Bound result 9999000000000000005289\n  Bound result 9998000000000000010907\n  Bound result 1000125305042645446288\n  Bound result 678\n\n[PASS] test_handlerReachesAllPaths() (gas: 5197353)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 478107100108681338614\n  Bound result 500\n  Bound result 4731273571044275199074950\n  Bound result 1500\n  Bound result 85650728311194533285\n  Bound result 2500\n  Bound result 19561856484516324395329303\n  Bound result 3500\n  Bound result 211197556000487096756\n  Bound result 4500\n  Bound result 21161065012091956949283084\n  Bound result 5500\n  Bound result 477780246533752081742\n  Bound result 6500\n  Bound result 22016999309518080210540042\n  Bound result 7500\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000001\n  Bound result 501\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.01s (6.02s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 6.02s (9.52s CPU time): 106 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (106 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":55,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"BetPool.acceptOwnership()\",\"BetPool.bet(bytes32,uint8,uint256,uint16,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.claim(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.claimMany(bytes32[])\",\"BetPool.createMarket(bytes32,address,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.expire(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.pause()\",\"BetPool.setLimits(address,uint256,uint256)\",\"BetPool.setSigner(address)\",\"BetPool.settle(bytes32,uint8,uint256,bytes)\",\"BetPool.transferOwnership(address)\",\"BetPool.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":194,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployBetPool.s.sol\":24,\"src/BetPool.sol\":474,\"test/BetPool.edge.t.sol\":719,\"test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol\":193,\"test/BetPool.marketInvariant.t.sol\":478,\"test/BetPool.t.sol\":1047,\"test/DeployBetPool.t.sol\":34,\"test/utils/BetPoolBase.sol\":122,\"test/utils/Mocks.sol\":61},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b5e588f721dfcf11b73e4db4db99b2367821ef69c73c9fe69a776df9422152e2","verifiedTreeHash":"2bbd38b987d4a08023c16589dd5462383aab2b9b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2315,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 52 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.22s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2982,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeployBetPool.t.sol:DeployBetPoolTest\n[PASS] test_deployConfiguration() (gas: 4690645)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2749857)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.53ms (7.52ms CPU time)\n\nRan 60 tests for test/BetPool.t.sol:BetPoolTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeIsFivePercentOfLosers(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1289968, ~: 1290181)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 24999000000000241606952247\n  Bound result 18862750779535660907548\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000002\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_twoSidedPayoutConservation(uint256[6],uint16[6],uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 2516471, ~: 2595362)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 499924115146037030128\n  Bound result 1049\n  Bound result 29766967833928719967\n  Bound result 503\n  Bound result 380957542842447244983\n  Bound result 898\n  Bound result 100000000000000002\n  Bound result 9924\n  Bound result 100000000000000000\n  Bound result 9709\n  Bound result 499900000103372181410\n  Bound result 8945\n\n[PASS] test_betAfterClosesAtRefused() (gas: 278351)\n[PASS] test_betEmitsAndPullsExactAmount() (gas: 451915)\n[PASS] test_betLimits() (gas: 1952171)\n[PASS] test_betOnSettledMarketRefused() (gas: 321055)\n[PASS] test_betOnUnknownMarketRefused() (gas: 191495)\n[PASS] test_betOneSecondBeforeCloseAccepted() (gas: 456986)\n[PASS] test_betWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 367814)\n[PASS] test_claimBeforeSettleRefused() (gas: 525609)\n[PASS] test_claimMany() (gas: 2624016)\n[PASS] test_constructorDefaults() (gas: 67848)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 4165)\n[PASS] test_createMarketEmitsAndStores() (gas: 115229)\n[PASS] test_createMarketParameterChecks() (gas: 729992)\n[PASS] test_createMarketSignatureChecks() (gas: 404157)\n[PASS] test_doubleClaimRefused() (gas: 1046330)\n[PASS] test_doubleSettleRefused() (gas: 916553)\n[PASS] test_emptyMarketSettlesRefundable() (gas: 202071)\n[PASS] test_expireAfter24Hours() (gas: 1228845)\n[PASS] test_expireRefusedOnSettledOrUnknown() (gas: 189595)\n[PASS] test_feeExactlyFivePercentOddAmountsManyBettors() (gas: 13069900)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferTokenRefused() (gas: 501311)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowIMD_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2700607)\n[PASS] test_fullFlowSHIFT_weightedPayouts() (gas: 2988050)\n[PASS] test_hedgerGetsOnlyWinningSide() (gas: 1245139)\n[PASS] test_loserClaimGetsNothing() (gas: 920311)\n[PASS] test_multipleBetsSameWalletAccumulate() (gas: 976691)\n[PASS] test_newLimitsApplyToBets() (gas: 670279)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketLosingSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 663095)\n[PASS] test_oneSidedMarketWinningSideOnlyRefunds() (gas: 1083669)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1333963)\n[PASS] test_pauseBlocksNewMarketsAndBetsOnly() (gas: 1993816)\n[PASS] test_payoutsFollowWeightedShares() (gas: 1184032)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyGuardOnClaim() (gas: 1192358)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabledAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 115728)\n[PASS] test_setLimits() (gas: 292027)\n[PASS] test_setSigner() (gas: 107776)\n[PASS] test_settleBeforeClosesAtClosesBetting() (gas: 644953)\n[PASS] test_settleSignatureChecks() (gas: 444802)\n[PASS] test_settleStillPossibleLateIfNotExpired() (gas: 863722)\n[PASS] test_signerRotationInvalidatesOldSigner() (gas: 323864)\n[PASS] test_signerUnsetBlocksSignedActions() (gas: 177848)\n[PASS] test_ticketAtExactExpiryAccepted() (gas: 441507)\n[PASS] test_ticketExpired() (gas: 278679)\n[PASS] test_ticketForOtherMarketRefused() (gas: 377840)\n[PASS] test_ticketInvalidSideValue() (gas: 278090)\n[PASS] test_ticketMalformedSignature() (gas: 284722)\n[PASS] test_ticketReusedNonce() (gas: 518596)\n[PASS] test_ticketTooFarExpiry() (gas: 477276)\n[PASS] test_ticketWeightOutOfRange() (gas: 828031)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongAmount() (gas: 291823)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongBettor() (gas: 293814)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongChain() (gas: 345230)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongContract() (gas: 291565)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSide() (gas: 291772)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongSigner() (gas: 291620)\n[PASS] test_ticketWrongWeight() (gas: 291835)\n[PASS] test_tinyMinRejectsZeroShareBet() (gas: 322453)\n[PASS] test_voidRefundsEverythingNoFee() (gas: 1376565)\nSuite result: ok. 60 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.92ms (256.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol:BetPoolInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nBetPoolInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_dustBounded\n[PASS] invariant_payoutsNeverExceedBets\n[PASS] invariant_poolHoldsWhatItOwes\n BetPoolInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| BetPoolHandler | bet          | 670   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | claim        | 697   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | createMarket | 708   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | expire       | 674   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | settle       | 680   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| BetPoolHandler | warp         | 667   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8387\n  Bound result 8710\n  Bound result 1838\n  Bound result 6602\n  Bound result 121\n  Bound result 5778\n  Bound result 7912\n  Bound result 7925\n  Bound result 17305\n  Bound result 7630\n  Bound result 10412\n  Bound result 1904\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.86s (2.86s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 2.87s (2.98s CPU time): 63 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (63 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"BetPool.acceptOwnership()\",\"BetPool.bet(bytes32,uint8,uint256,uint16,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.claim(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.claimMany(bytes32[])\",\"BetPool.createMarket(bytes32,address,uint64,bytes32,bytes)\",\"BetPool.expire(bytes32)\",\"BetPool.pause()\",\"BetPool.setLimits(address,uint256,uint256)\",\"BetPool.setSigner(address)\",\"BetPool.settle(bytes32,uint8,uint256,bytes)\",\"BetPool.transferOwnership(address)\",\"BetPool.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":194,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":10,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployBetPool.s.sol\":24,\"src/BetPool.sol\":474,\"test/BetPool.invariant.t.sol\":193,\"test/BetPool.t.sol\":1047,\"test/DeployBetPool.t.sol\":34,\"test/utils/BetPoolBase.sol\":122,\"test/utils/Mocks.sol\":61},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f6b4e88851a588387395e7ca80785f8d74939bc36ca18472535ffdbf2c9e7293","verifiedTreeHash":"b1edabdd848c62726949f93a7a8c3196a550a3d9","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"}]}