{"assessments":[],"deployments":[{"attestationHash":"db237124c881c6540359e643440aff9e8f5fa12cadb2e8d7b8f7a4be6643de9a","chainId":1,"contracts":[{"address":"0xecb21b6c3bf69e09a2e34db1f0b25c34586ff1c9","blockNumber":26187614,"name":"VisualIdentityEdition2","role":"other","txHash":"0xd841831c2bc1af9ad950b5f3c3effdc4401ec011cbe4d194039ba2125a2f0c2e"}],"id":"5cbfe549-6fb7-4351-a15f-581ee1582c68","manifestHash":"f3e1a8798f256ae8410d36ebc1202f50ea9bdf5a4be7ffb03c4a33a87a985c8a","status":"live"}],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"a7227c55-15c6-473d-8584-898317adf043","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"73c0d417e877f7d08a1361b5f8a54218d047c6f5fbef6f2c54539c2a529ed838","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d853b47f010424f0181454e4ce0e180f6d619eff7c273445696d652162338089","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f8db25c55a6900ea1932214dc9abac60a333cae2922154390a96bb2cad9db769","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0126b185bc0686226c7a935fc388d7d9c1ce732577fb2c6856a3f8058c9f53d4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"19a7a6b0a6aaa38b9187df85aa707a1f8af2cdbc515af5e33677d369ccb01e39","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"22bcc039c786bba94fbcaa6517e5d8f1039fe320e3c83c482370e2f080b9966d","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d998234ff343325e73d0984d7c9206160a36cfbce1057f172645ea1a6a712d68","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"54f9530a789fef4308e525c2c143d4e08e115c80c0d14ab4dd921a63219ffa7f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"VisualIdentity.md Edition 2 is an open call where the owner of each identity.md agent seat enters a brand package for IMD together with a portrait of their agent drawn by another agent of the swarm, and seat holders then vote for a winner.\n\nContracts only, on Ethereum mainnet (chain id 1): one contract, VisualIdentityEdition2. No fungible token is created and there is no pool, distributor, swarm allocation or website in this launch. It uses the existing VIMD token of launch 1645. The only token made is an ERC-721, one per entry.\nToken name: VisualIdentity.md Edition 2\nToken symbol: VIMD2\nTotal supply: 0 at deployment; one NFT is minted per entry, at most one per seat (2,000 seats).\nWho can call what: anyone who holds or is delegated a seat. No owner, admin, role or setting. Upgrades and pausing: none.\n\nBUILD RULES\n- Simplest code that satisfies this text: add no feature, role, setting or safeguard.\n- solc 0.8.26, optimizer on, 200 runs, evm cancun, bytecode_hash none; OpenZeppelin v5 ERC721; custom errors; events on every state change.\n- No constructor arguments. The constructor calls no other contract and checks no code length: the launch checks deploy in an empty EVM.\n- No proxy, delegatecall, selfdestruct, rescue or sweep. enter, vote and claimPrize are nonReentrant.\n- Tests mock VIMD, the seats and the delegate registry under test/; no fork tests, no vm.env.\n\nOUTSIDE CONTRACTS (constants)\n- VIMD, a plain ERC-20 with 18 decimals: 0x931fD96a22BcA8E1008D18ed827D5C042932BE17\n- identity.md seats, an ERC-721 with ids 0 to 1999; ownerOf reverts for an id that does not exist: 0x0000eC93127BAA929E58E97dd0095A2BFb38ec1D\n- delegate.xyz DelegateRegistry v2: 0x00000000000000447e69651d841bD8D104Bed493, function checkDelegateForERC721(address to, address from, address contract_, uint256 tokenId, bytes32 rights) returns (bool)\n- Burn address: 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. VIMD is burned by transferring it there.\n\nWHO MAY ACT FOR A SEAT: msg.sender is ownerOf(seatId), or checkDelegateForERC721(msg.sender, ownerOf(seatId), seats, seatId, bytes32(0)) is true. Otherwise revert.\n\nTIMES, fixed in the constructor: ENTRY_END = deployment + 4 days; VOTE_END = deployment + 7 days. Nothing can change them.\n\nenter(seatId, portraitJob bytes16, portraitHash bytes32, portraitURI string, packageHash bytes32, packageURI string) returns the entry id\n- Only before ENTRY_END, only by someone who may act for the seat, once per seat ever.\n- Both links must be 1 to 200 bytes of printable ASCII (0x21 to 0x7e) with no double quote and no backslash; otherwise revert. They are placed in JSON unescaped.\n- Stores the entry: seat, entrant (msg.sender), the IMD image job id that drew the portrait, the sha256 of the portrait file, its link, the sha256 of the brand package, its link, and a vote count of 0. Entry ids start at 1 and are also the NFT ids.\n- Mints NFT number id to msg.sender, then transfers exactly 25,000 VIMD from msg.sender to the burn address. The contract does not check the job or the files: the website checks them against IMD's public job record.\n\nvote(seatId, entryId)\n- Only from ENTRY_END until VOTE_END, only by someone who may act for the seat, once per seat ever, only for an entry that exists. A seat may vote for any entry, its own included.\n- Costs exactly 50,000 VIMD from msg.sender: 25,000 to the burn address and 25,000 kept by the contract and added to pot.\n- Adds one vote to the entry.\n\nleader(): the entry with the most votes; on a tie the entry with the lower id. Reverts if no vote was cast.\n\nclaimPrize(): anyone, once, at or after VOTE_END. Pays the whole pot in VIMD to the entrant address stored in the leading entry and sets pot to 0. Reverts if no vote was cast; the pot is then 0, because only votes fund it.\n\ntokenURI(id): a data:application/json;base64 document built on chain. name \"VisualIdentity.md Edition 2: Agent <seatId>\"; description \"Portrait of IMD agent <seatId>, drawn by a fellow agent of the swarm, with its owner's brand package for IMD.\"; image = portraitURI; external_url = packageURI; attributes Edition 2, Agent <seatId>, Votes <votes>.\n\nVIEWS: entryCount(), entry(id) returning every stored field, entryOfSeat(seatId), seatVoted(seatId), pot(), totalVotes(), prizeClaimed(), ENTRY_END, VOTE_END, and the three prices as constants.\n\nREVIEW. Accepted, add no mechanism: (1) a seat sold or re-delegated after it entered or voted cannot enter or vote again; (2) a wallet holding several seats has several votes; (3) the links and hashes are the entrant's own claim; (4) VIMD sent to the contract outside vote is not part of pot and stays there; (5) if nobody votes, nothing is paid. MUST ATTACK: any way to enter or vote for a seat without holding it or a live delegation; a second entry or second vote for one seat; a vote outside its window; any way VIMD leaves the contract except claimPrize paying the leader exactly pot, once; reentrancy through the NFT mint's receiver callback or through VIMD; a link that breaks or injects into the tokenURI JSON; pot differing from the VIMD the votes left in the contract.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"54dde940859117703aa47ba01083dc88b48845f4416cbb0e27176d22b37d9f6e","previousHash":"f7f12f9d36b1189d05469201305d4b7ea42b4978bca18b2e78d7dffe593a960b","projectId":"a7227c55-15c6-473d-8584-898317adf043","publication":{"commit":"9cd9d43f071b2add993ca072d4f956a0d7334013","deliveredAt":"2026-10-14T02:00:23.994Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1671-visualidentity-md-edition-2"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"5dd239bc89bcdfabb01071a2007b9d9052716d5fc5f939219b995249c7109542","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d73af718d55ba788","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"enter() mints with _safeMint, so OpenZeppelin's ERC721Utils.checkOnERC721Received runs when msg.sender has code. A seat whose owner (or delegate) is a contract that does not implement IERC721Receiver (a bare custody contract, a minimal multisig without a fallback handler) reverts with ERC721InvalidReceiver and the seat is permanently unable to enter, while the same contract can still vote because vote() mints nothing. This is consistent with the brief, which names the mint's receiver callback as an attack surface and so expects _safeMint; it is recorded as a trust/usability note, not a defect to fix. The nonReentrant guard on enter() blocks re-entry through this callback; inside the callback the entry is already stored and the NFT already owned, but the 25,000 VIMD has not yet been pulled, so a receiver can move the NFT away or read entryCount early; the payment still follows and the whole call reverts atomically if it fails, so no state is reachable without the burn. Verified with a scratch test (MovingReceiver / NoReceiver) under test/scratch, removed after the run.","line":144,"path":"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol","reproduction":"Deploy; mint seat 0 to a contract N with no onERC721Received; fund N with 25,000e18 VIMD and approve the call. N calls enter(0, 0x0, 0x0, \"ipfs://a\", 0x0, \"ipfs://b\") before ENTRY_END. Expected per brief wording 'Mints NFT number id to msg.sender': entry recorded. Actual: revert ERC721InvalidReceiver(N); entryCount stays 0; after ENTRY_END the same N can still vote(0, id) successfully.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _safeMint(msg.sender, entryId);","title":"A seat held by a contract without onERC721Received can vote but can never enter (safeMint receiver check)"}],"hash":"0126b185bc0686226c7a935fc388d7d9c1ce732577fb2c6856a3f8058c9f53d4","nodeId":"0044275b-2ff6-41c2-ae7f-9e6bf7c298a4","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written, validated, and the scratch tests are removed.\n\n**Outcome: no defect found in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas.** The findings file holds one informational note and twelve coverage rows, all eight listed entry points answered as `holds`.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- **Arithmetic.** The contract has no division, downcast, decimal scaling or unchecked block. All sums are bounded by the 2,000 seats, so the largest pot is 5e25 and nothing can overflow.\n- **Windows.** Enter is strictly before ENTRY_END, vote is from ENTRY_END up to but excluding VOTE_END, and claim is at or after VOTE_END. I confirmed the exact-second edges leave no overlap and no gap.\n- **Links.** An exhaustive test of all 256 byte values plus lengths 0, 1, 200 and 201 matched the spec rule exactly, so the tokenURI JSON cannot be broken or injected.\n- **Leader bookkeeping.** The incremental update was checked against a scan through self-votes, ties from higher ids, overtakes and re-ties.\n- **Conservation.** Across a full 2,000-entry, 2,000-vote run the contract balance equalled the pot at every step, the claim paid exactly the pot once, and a donation stayed behind.\n- **External boundaries.** The mint callback sees the stored entry before the VIMD burn, but the burn still follows atomically and the guard blocks re-entry. SafeERC20 v5 handles no-code and false-returning tokens.\n\n**Informational note recorded.** A seat owned by a contract that lacks an ERC-721 receiver hook can vote but can never enter, because the mint uses the safe variant. This matches the brief, which names the receiver callback as an attack surface, so it is a trust note rather than a fix request.\n\n**Not verified.** VIMD is assumed to be the plain 18-decimal token the brief states. No fork is allowed, so I could not confirm that on chain. The real delegate.xyz v2 semantics were only exercised through the mock, which belongs to another specialist's area.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":668674,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":31837,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":397634}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a7b8747ac077deb9","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect: the brief says the entrant is msg.sender, the NFT is minted to msg.sender and claimPrize pays the stored entrant. The consequence is recorded here as a trust assumption for the seat owner, as the Trust Gap guide (access x economics) asks. Anyone the seat owner has delegated on delegate.xyz with empty rights (the real DelegateRegistry v2 returns true for wallet-level 'all', contract-level and token-level delegations alike when rights is bytes32(0)) can spend the seat's single entry and single vote, pays the fees from its own wallet, and is the address that receives the VIMD2 NFT and, if the entry wins, the whole pot. The seat owner has no on-chain way to redirect the prize or the NFT; the mapping entryOfSeat is keyed by seat so the owner also cannot enter again. Seat owners who hold a broad 'all' delegation to a hot wallet should know that wallet controls the seat's participation and winnings. No change is proposed; the behaviour matches the brief and the README's accepted property 6.","line":136,"path":"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol","reproduction":"State: alice owns seat 0 and has set a delegate.xyz delegation (to = d, from = alice, contract = seats, tokenId = 0, rights = bytes32(0)). d holds and approved 25,000 VIMD. Call: d calls enter(0, ...) before ENTRY_END. Actual and expected (per brief): entry(1).entrant == d, ownerOf(1) == d, d paid 25,000 VIMD. Then after one vote for entry 1 and VOTE_END, anyone calls claimPrize(): d receives 25,000 VIMD; alice receives nothing and cannot enter seat 0 again (SeatAlreadyEntered). Verified with a scratch test (test_claimAtExactlyVoteEnd_andEntrantIsDelegateNotOwner) against the current code; it passes, i.e. the code does what the brief says.","severity":"info","snippet":"        e.entrant = msg.sender;","title":"Trust assumption (by design): a delegate who enters becomes the entrant and receives the NFT and the prize in its own name, not the seat owner"}],"hash":"19a7a6b0a6aaa38b9187df85aa707a1f8af2cdbc515af5e33677d369ccb01e39","nodeId":"25b3ec83-9651-46cc-bf8f-acf31d05485f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is valid, the quoted snippet matches line 136 exactly, and the working tree is clean apart from the ignored scratch directory and the findings file.\n\n**Result: no defect found in the Access Control, Asymmetry or Trust Gap area of VisualIdentityEdition2.** The findings file holds one info-level trust assumption and a full coverage record.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- **Access control.** Every state-changing path reads live seat ownership and a live delegate.xyz delegation from that owner, so a stale delegation from a former owner is refused. Seat-keyed mappings block a second entry or vote after a sale or re-delegation. Windows are half-open as the brief states. The inherited ERC-721 functions touch no contest state.\n- **Asymmetry.** The entry and vote fee paths mirror their specification. The pot increment and the pull to the contract sit in the same guarded function and revert together. The incremental leader update is correct because counts only grow and only the voted entry changes. The leader's own tie vote and a lower-id tie both resolve as specified.\n- **Trust gap and reentrancy.** All writes and events precede the mint and the VIMD pulls. From inside the mint receiver callback, re-entry into enter, vote and claimPrize is rejected, and the unguarded ERC-721 calls it can make are harmless. A reverting receiver blocks only its own entry. The only outbound VIMD transfer is claimPrize paying exactly the pot, once, to the stored entrant.\n\n**Probes run.** Six scratch tests under test/scratch/ covering callback-time NFT moves and seat sales, a rejecting receiver, the leader's own tie vote, a seat sold mid-window, a former owner's delegate, and claim at exactly VOTE_END. All passed, confirming intended behaviour. The existing 56-test suite also passes.\n\n**Recorded as info.** A delegate with an empty-rights delegation becomes the entrant and receives the NFT and the prize in its own name. This matches the brief and is documented as a trust assumption for seat owners, not as a defect.\n\n**Coverage.** All eight listed entry points are marked holds, plus four invariant rows. One note flags that the registry mock matches exact tuples while the real registry also honours wallet-level and contract-level delegations, which the contract delegates to the registry as specified.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":750316,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":18883,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":319897}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7bfa9838fc2f53e421e92ddb094672b0d5cea7e0803971562a92e0c5d2c3c304","device":"7e50667f872c7f5e","findings":[],"hash":"22bcc039c786bba94fbcaa6517e5d8f1039fe320e3c83c482370e2f080b9966d","nodeId":"e15a456d-c06c-4130-8c55-136fc0de071d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The deliverable is complete and committed on `main` (commit `cb69807`).\n\n**What was built**\n\n- `src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol`: one contract, ERC-721 `VisualIdentity.md Edition 2` / `VIMD2`, no constructor arguments, no owner or settings. It fixes `ENTRY_END` and `VOTE_END` in the constructor without calling any contract. The VIMD, seats, delegate registry and burn addresses are constants. `enter`, `vote` and `claimPrize` are `nonReentrant` and write all state before the mint and the VIMD transfers. The leader is tracked incrementally per vote, so claiming never loops over entries. `tokenURI` builds the base64 JSON on chain, and links are restricted to 1 to 200 printable ASCII bytes without quote or backslash.\n- `foundry.toml` pins solc 0.8.26, optimizer 200 runs, cancun, `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`, no ffi, no fs permissions.\n- `lib/`: OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.4.0 and forge-std v1.11.0 vendored as plain files, no submodules.\n- `README.md`: outside contracts, deployment parameters, behaviour, accepted properties, security notes and operational responsibilities.\n\n**Checks run**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` | clean, only informational block.timestamp lints |\n| `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed, empty environment | 56 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | clean |\n| Runtime opcode scan as in the protected floor | no delegatecall, callcode or selfdestruct; about 9.4 KB |\n\n**Test coverage** includes entry and vote by owner and by delegate, every window edge, wrong, revoked or mis-scoped delegation, nonexistent seat, duplicate entry and vote after a seat is sold or re-delegated, insufficient VIMD or allowance, every bad link class plus a fuzzed comparison against a reference checker, leader tie ordering plus a fuzzed scan comparison, prize paid to the stored entrant rather than the NFT holder, donations staying outside the pot, fuzzed VIMD conservation, reentrancy via the mint receiver and via a hooked token on all three guarded functions, and exact tokenURI output.\n\n**Open items for the launch, not this task**: explorer source verification after deployment, and an independent adversarial review before release.","treeHash":"f27c46b1f6f42861e4b2f205f77a022d09bb6cc4","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":731953,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":38341,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":516450}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"af4755252d09465196ffbc99b98c4c2da16b513740c2aff970da94de463bfce1","device":"dff6c0d3de4aa913","findings":[],"hash":"54f9530a789fef4308e525c2c143d4e08e115c80c0d14ab4dd921a63219ffa7f","nodeId":"c68cdd9c-0a0a-45f5-9392-cdf52f13a6cb","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The full suite passes under the verifier's seed and the two new test files are committed. No defect was found in the contract, so no findings file was written.\n\n**What I added**\n\n- `test/VisualIdentityEdition2.invariant.t.sol`: a handler that drives the contract with six actors, 25 real seats plus two nonexistent ids, seat sales, live and stale delegations, donations, NFT transfers, time warps and exact boundary jumps. Every action is modelled first, so an unexpected success fails as loudly as an unexpected revert. Thirteen invariants cover VIMD conservation against pot plus donations, burn accounting, one entry and one vote per seat, leader equal to a linear scan with lowest id on ties, immutable entry fields, NFT supply equal to entry count, tokenURI equal to the brief's JSON, and a single claim paying exactly the votes' pot to the stored entrant. A scripted lifecycle test walks through all phases and evaluates each invariant, proving the random runs are not vacuous.\n- `test/VisualIdentityEdition2.edges.t.sol`: gaps in the existing unit suite. Delegations from a previous owner stop counting after a seat sale for both enter and vote. The owner cannot act after its delegate did. A contract caller without the ERC-721 receiver hook is refused with no state left behind. The prize follows the stored entrant after both the seat and the NFT are sold. Every allowed link byte, and injection-shaped links, round-trip through forge's real JSON parser unchanged, fuzzed at 512 runs.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build | clean |\n| forge test with verifier seed | 70 passed, 0 failed |\n| Invariant suite with two other seeds | passed |\n| Mutation check in scratch | broken tie rule and removed seat lock both caught |\n\n**Review verdict on the contract**\n\nI read it adversarially against every attack listed in the brief and found nothing to report. Checks, effects and events precede the mint and both token transfers in all three guarded functions. The incremental leader update is equivalent to a scan because only one entry's count changes per vote. Window checks match the brief's inclusive and exclusive ends.\n\n**Still owed against live state**\n\nThe delegate registry mock models only explicit per-token delegations. The real registry also honours wallet-wide and contract-wide delegations with empty rights, which the contract would accept through the same call. A fork test against mainnet would confirm that, and cannot run here with no network.","treeHash":"78d522fbc527f7404fa5ed91353a832ee330b1f5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1197627,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":46132,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":846110}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e6de8d4c6cf97551","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect under the brief, recorded as a trust assumption for the judge. The brief promises at most one NFT per seat over 2,000 seats and relies on SEATS.ownerOf reverting for ids outside 0..1999. The contract itself never bounds seatId: any id the seats contract reports an owner for may enter and vote. If the identity.md seats contract ever mints an id of 2000 or more, those seats gain entries and votes here, and the stated supply bound of 2,000 entries no longer holds. The build rules forbid adding a safeguard, so the correct action is to confirm the seats contract cannot mint beyond id 1999 (immutable cap), and to accept the dependency if it is. Pot accounting, the single-entry and single-vote rules, and the prize flow are unaffected either way.","line":230,"path":"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol","reproduction":"State: mock seats contract (etched at 0x0000eC93127BAA929E58E97dd0095A2BFb38ec1D) mints seat id 2000 to address B; B holds and approves 25,000 VIMD. Call: B calls enter(2000, 0x0, 0x0, \"ipfs://z\", 0x0, \"ipfs://z\") before ENTRY_END. Expected per brief wording: only seats 0..1999 can ever enter. Actual: the call succeeds and returns entry id 1, mints VIMD2 #1 to B and burns 25,000 VIMD. Confirmed with a scratch Foundry test (test_seatIdAbove1999Accepted) that passed on the current code.","severity":"info","snippet":"        address owner = SEATS.ownerOf(seatId);","title":"Seat cap of 2,000 entries is a dependency assumption on the seats contract, not enforced on chain"}],"hash":"73c0d417e877f7d08a1361b5f8a54218d047c6f5fbef6f2c54539c2a529ed838","nodeId":"522f2fa3-f799-41ad-b75c-b93d5de08422","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written. The working tree is clean apart from the `.imd-findings.json` deliverable, which git ignores.\n\n**Outcome: no economic, invariant or flow-gap defect found in VisualIdentityEdition2.** One informational trust assumption is recorded.\n\n**What I checked, against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides**\n\n- **Pot conservation.** Only `vote` writes pot and totalVotes, together, with exactly 25,000 VIMD pulled into the contract per vote. Only `claimPrize` moves VIMD out, exactly pot, once. Donations stay. Confirmed by the existing fuzz test and a scratch test with six votes.\n- **Leader rule.** The inductive update handles strict lead, ties to the lower id, and a re-vote of the current leader. A scratch sequence of votes for entries 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1 produced the expected leaders at every step.\n- **Single entry and single vote per seat.** Both maps are keyed by seat id and never cleared, so a sale or re-delegation cannot reset them.\n- **Windows.** Entry strictly before ENTRY_END, voting from ENTRY_END up to but excluding VOTE_END, claim from VOTE_END. The boundaries are disjoint and match the brief.\n- **Reentrancy.** All three actions share one guard, state and events are written before the mint callback and the token transfers, and the receiver callback can only move its own freshly minted NFT, which affects nothing.\n- **JSON injection.** The link filter admits only printable ASCII without quote or backslash. I decoded a tokenURI built from a link containing every other punctuation byte and it parsed as valid JSON.\n- **Dependencies.** VIMD is plain, so assumed and received amounts match. A reverting ownerOf or a false registry answer fails closed. The prize is paid by plain ERC-20 transfer, so no recipient can block it.\n\n**The one recorded item (info).** The 2,000-entry bound rests entirely on the seats contract never minting an id of 2000 or more. A scratch test showed that a minted seat 2000 can enter. This is consistent with the brief, which forbids extra safeguards, so I framed it as a dependency to confirm rather than a code defect.\n\n**Coverage.** All eight ABI entry points are marked `holds`, plus six invariant and economic rows. The scratch directory has been deleted. Nothing outside the findings file was changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":965902,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17804,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":339350}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"323aec17bfc8d652","findings":[],"hash":"d853b47f010424f0181454e4ce0e180f6d619eff7c273445696d652162338089","nodeId":"dbe65029-277c-400a-8ca4-99fe5ba87abc","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds the result: no defects, with coverage rows for all eight entry points plus the invariants I checked.\n\n**What I checked, in my area (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles):**\n\n- **enter / vote / claimPrize traces.** Every state write and event precedes the mint and the VIMD transfers. The shared reentrancy guard blocks re-entry from the mint's receiver callback and from a hooking token. Windows are exclusive at ENTRY_END for entering and at VOTE_END for voting, so no block allows both enter and vote, or both vote and claim.\n- **Leader rule.** The incremental update (strictly more votes, or equal votes and lower id) is provably equivalent to a full scan since each vote adds exactly one.\n- **Pot conservation.** The amount added to pot equals the amount pulled into the contract. Donations stay and are never paid.\n- **Link whitelist.** Every allowed byte is a legal unescaped JSON string character, so no link can break or inject into the tokenURI document.\n- **Periphery on mainnet.** I ran a scratch fork test against the real contracts and then deleted it. VIMD moved exact amounts to the burn address and the winner, and its runtime exposes only the nine plain ERC-20 selectors. The seats contract reverts for id 2000, reports a total supply of 2000, and its owner is the CREATE2 deployer proxy, so nobody can mint more seats. The real delegate.xyz v2 registry accepted a seat delegation with empty rights from the current owner and rejected one from a non-owner and one with specific rights.\n- **Static-analysis leads.** All five are false positives against the specified behavior.\n\n**Not a defect but worth knowing:** the test suite's delegate registry mock matches exact tuples only, so ALL and CONTRACT-scope delegations are untested locally. I verified them on the fork instead.\n\nThe working tree is unchanged apart from the findings file.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":750470,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":23847,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":355840}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"fbd62d3122e6981dd97c0c5b4a7d27aef18b1f55116ed4c553f57811fed5a0ff","device":"f009de0ce52c7b3a","findings":[],"hash":"d998234ff343325e73d0984d7c9206160a36cfbce1057f172645ea1a6a712d68","nodeId":"69ae18da-bac1-4fa2-bdd5-d06c7a72aaa4","outcome":"completed","summary":"`launch.json` is written and validated. Nothing else in the tree changed.\n\n**What I did**\n\n- Read the accepted source at `src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol` and the two protected checks. The contract has a parameterless constructor that only fixes the two deadlines and calls no other contract, so it passes the empty-EVM deployment rehearsal and has no owner for the owners check to object to.\n- Confirmed the compiled ABI has no constructor inputs, so the manifest entry has an empty constructorArgs list.\n- Wrote `launch.json` with kind evm_contracts, one contract named VisualIdentityEdition2, no constructor arguments, and notes describing the ERC-721, the fixed windows, the compiled-in VIMD, seats, delegate registry and burn addresses, the two prices and the prize mechanics. No $owner is used because the brief and the source define no owner, admin or role.\n- Checked the manifest against the schema rules with a script in a temporary command: exactly the three keys, unique identifier under 32 characters, string arguments, notes under 4,000 characters.\n\n**Verification**\n\n```\nforge build: ok\nforge test (FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0x93e9...c369): 56 passed, 0 failed\ngit status: only launch.json is new\n```\n\nTwo of my shell commands in the middle were accidental no-ops with mistyped paths. They ran nothing and changed nothing.","treeHash":"1a2984184972d823420b94b9c3b274f9939488ce","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":319541,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":8626,"runtime":"claude","turns":9,"wallClockMs":126451}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"60c045240bb09c33","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect: the brief says the entrant is msg.sender, the NFT is minted to msg.sender and claimPrize pays the stored entrant. Recorded as a trust assumption for seat owners: any wallet delegated on delegate.xyz with empty rights (wallet-wide, contract-wide or token-level delegations all satisfy checkDelegateForERC721 with rights bytes32(0)) spends the seat's single entry and single vote, pays from its own wallet, and is the address that receives VIMD2 and, if its entry leads, the whole pot. entryOfSeat is keyed by seat so the owner cannot enter again. Merged from audit_permissions; reproduced against the code.","line":136,"path":"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol","reproduction":"State: alice owns seat 0; registry has delegation (to=d, from=alice, contract=seats, tokenId=0, rights=0). d holds 25,000e18 VIMD and approved the contract. Call: d calls enter(0, 0x0, 0x0, \"ipfs://p\", 0x0, \"ipfs://q\") before ENTRY_END. Actual (and per brief): entry(1).entrant == d, ownerOf(1) == d, d paid 25,000 VIMD. alice calling enter(0, ...) then reverts SeatAlreadyEntered(0). After one vote for entry 1 and VOTE_END, claimPrize() pays d; alice receives nothing. Covered by existing test_enter_byDelegate and test_claimPrize_paysEntrantEvenAfterSeatAndNFTAreSold, which pass.","severity":"info","snippet":"        e.entrant = msg.sender;","title":"Trust assumption (by design): a delegate who enters is the entrant, receives the NFT and the prize in its own name, and the seat owner cannot enter again"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect: the brief names reentrancy through the mint's receiver callback as an attack surface, which presupposes _safeMint. Consequence worth telling seat holders: a contract wallet (bare custody contract, minimal multisig without a fallback handler) that does not return the IERC721Receiver selector reverts with ERC721InvalidReceiver and the seat can never enter, while the same wallet can still vote because vote mints nothing. Inside the callback the entry is stored and the NFT owned but the 25,000 VIMD has not yet been pulled; the receiver may move the NFT or read entryCount early, and every guarded function re-entered from there reverts ReentrancyGuardReentrantCall; the VIMD pull still follows and the whole call reverts atomically if it fails, so no entry exists without its burn. Merged from audit_math; reproduced.","line":144,"path":"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol","reproduction":"State: seats.mint(N, 0) where N is a contract with no onERC721Received; N holds 25,000e18 VIMD and approved the contract. Call: N calls enter(0, 0x0, 0x0, \"ipfs://a\", 0x0, \"ipfs://b\") before ENTRY_END. Expected per brief wording 'Mints NFT number id to msg.sender': entry recorded. Actual: revert ERC721InvalidReceiver(N); entryCount stays 0, entryOfSeat(0) == 0, no VIMD moved. At ENTRY_END the same N calls vote(0, id) for an existing entry and succeeds. Existing test_enter_contractWithoutReceiverIsRefusedAndLeavesNoState passes; scratch test with a receiver that moves the NFT inside the callback (test_receiverMovingNFTDuringMintLeavesConsistentState) showed entrant stays N, ownerOf moves, 25,000 VIMD still burned, re-entered vote/claimPrize revert ReentrancyGuardReentrantCall.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _safeMint(msg.sender, entryId);","title":"Trust assumption (by design): a seat held or delegated to a contract without onERC721Received can vote but can never enter"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect under the brief, which forbids adding safeguards and states ownerOf reverts for ids that do not exist. The contract never bounds seatId, so any id the seats contract reports an owner for may enter and vote. Verified against Ethereum mainnet through the public RPC for chain 1: the seats contract at 0x0000eC93127BAA929E58E97dd0095A2BFb38ec1D returns MAX_SUPPLY() = 2000 and totalSupply() = 2000, ownerOf(0) and ownerOf(1999) return holders, and ownerOf(2000) reverts TokenDoesNotExist. So the stated bound of at most 2,000 entries and 2,000 votes holds as long as that cap stays. Merged from audit_economics; reproduced with the mock.","line":230,"path":"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol","reproduction":"State: mock seats etched at 0x0000eC93127BAA929E58E97dd0095A2BFb38ec1D mints seat 2000 to alice; alice holds and approved 25,000e18 VIMD. Call: alice calls enter(2000, 0x0, 0x0, \"ipfs://p\", 0x0, \"ipfs://q\") before ENTRY_END. Actual: returns entry id 1 and burns 25,000 VIMD (scratch test_seatIdAbove1999AcceptedIfSeatsContractReportsOwner passes). On mainnet the same call reverts because ownerOf(2000) reverts TokenDoesNotExist and MAX_SUPPLY() is 2000.","severity":"info","snippet":"        address owner = SEATS.ownerOf(seatId);","title":"Dependency assumption confirmed on chain: the 2,000-seat bound comes from the seats contract, not from this one"}],"hash":"f8db25c55a6900ea1932214dc9abac60a333cae2922154390a96bb2cad9db769","nodeId":"6d575618-7a28-4c6a-9528-8fe3d726ee61","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written, snippets match the source lines, and the working tree shows no modified files beyond build output already ignored by git.\n\n**Outcome: no defects found.** The VisualIdentityEdition2 contract does what the brief specifies on every attack the brief lists. The report in `.imd-findings.json` holds three info-level trust assumptions and a full coverage record marking all eight entry points as holding.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- Every required check reproduces: entry window, seat holder or live delegation, one entry and one vote per seat keyed by seat id, vote window with no gap or overlap, exact pot accounting, leader tie-break by lower id, single claim paying exactly the pot, and the link rule keeping the tokenURI JSON intact.\n- Reentrancy through the mint callback and through a hooked token is blocked by the guard on all three functions. My scratch test had a receiver move the fresh NFT and re-approve it inside the callback. The entrant stayed fixed, the fee was still burned, and nested vote and claimPrize calls reverted.\n- The existing suite of 70 tests plus invariants passes. Build is clean under the pinned toolchain, the manifest has only the allowed keys with an empty constructor argument list, and the runtime has no forbidden opcodes.\n- Mainnet dependencies match the brief over the chain 1 RPC: VIMD is an 18-decimal ERC-20 with no hook selectors or owner, the seats contract has MAX_SUPPLY 2000 with ownerOf(2000) reverting, and the delegate registry answers.\n\n**Specialist findings**\n\nAll three info items reproduced and were kept as documented trust assumptions, none merged since their root causes differ. The seat-cap item is now settled with on-chain evidence that the cap is enforced upstream. The write_foundry_tests and audit_flow areas reported nothing, consistent with my own reading. The slither timestamp lines and the aderyn leads are by design and were left out.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":635606,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":18232,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":277149}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1688,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 48 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.54s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":412,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 56 tests for test/VisualIdentityEdition2.t.sol:VisualIdentityEdition2Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservation_contractHoldsExactlyPotPlusDonations(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 2750380, ~: 1959687)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_enter_acceptsEveryValidByte(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 359170, ~: 292354)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 108\n  Bound result 75\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_enter_linkRuleMatchesReference(bytes,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 49918, ~: 49571)\n[PASS] testFuzz_leader_matchesScan(uint8,uint16[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 6068956, ~: 5606464)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_donationsAreNotPartOfPotAndStay() (gas: 710524)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysLeadingEntrantOnce() (gas: 1314909)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysStoredEntrantNotCurrentNFTHolder() (gas: 740683)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsBeforeVoteEnd() (gas: 606964)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsWithoutEntriesOrVotes() (gas: 44500)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsWithoutVotes() (gas: 419935)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoOtherContract() (gas: 11696)\n[PASS] test_enter_acceptsEdgePrintableAsciiAndMaxLength() (gas: 613660)\n[PASS] test_enter_byDelegate() (gas: 484440)\n[PASS] test_enter_byOwnerStoresMintsAndBurns() (gas: 485867)\n[PASS] test_enter_delegationForOtherSeatOrRightsDoesNotCount() (gas: 297443)\n[PASS] test_enter_idsAreSequentialAndOnePerSeat() (gas: 1448496)\n[PASS] test_enter_justBeforeEntryEnd() (gas: 375675)\n[PASS] test_enter_rejectsBadLinks() (gas: 998616)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsAtEntryEnd() (gas: 48851)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForHolderOfAnotherSeat() (gas: 55281)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForNonHolder() (gas: 55244)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForNonexistentSeat() (gas: 49270)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsOnSecondEntryForSeat() (gas: 411907)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 378998)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsWithoutVIMD() (gas: 400078)\n[PASS] test_enter_revokedDelegationDoesNotCount() (gas: 132883)\n[PASS] test_enter_seatRedelegatedAfterEntryCannotEnterAgain() (gas: 550122)\n[PASS] test_enter_seatSoldAfterEntryCannotEnterAgain() (gas: 459889)\n[PASS] test_leader_mostVotesThenLowerId() (gas: 1763772)\n[PASS] test_leader_revertsWithoutVotes() (gas: 373175)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndConstants() (gas: 106387)\n[PASS] test_noOtherWayForVIMDToLeave() (gas: 729367)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerOrAdminSurface() (gas: 48678)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughMintReceiverIsBlocked() (gas: 1000677)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnClaimIsBlocked() (gas: 1061273)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnEnterIsBlocked() (gas: 925536)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnVoteIsBlocked() (gas: 1052678)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_isOnChainJSON() (gas: 720749)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_revertsForUnknownToken() (gas: 13109)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_votesUpdateLive() (gas: 790295)\n[PASS] test_views_defaults() (gas: 66949)\n[PASS] test_vote_addsVoteSplitsVIMDAndFundsPot() (gas: 677087)\n[PASS] test_vote_byDelegate() (gas: 655516)\n[PASS] test_vote_forOwnEntryAllowed() (gas: 597219)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsAtVoteEnd() (gas: 408335)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsBeforeEntryEnd() (gas: 408439)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForNonHolder() (gas: 420421)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForNonexistentSeat() (gas: 413909)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForUnknownEntry() (gas: 458253)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsOnSecondVoteForSeat() (gas: 973298)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsWithoutVIMDAndLeavesNoState() (gas: 640714)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatRedelegatedAfterVoteCannotVoteAgain() (gas: 782473)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatSoldAfterVoteCannotVoteAgain() (gas: 653500)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatThatDidNotEnterMayVote() (gas: 597200)\n[PASS] test_vote_walletWithSeveralSeatsHasSeveralVotes() (gas: 735301)\n[PASS] test_vote_windowBoundaries() (gas: 710691)\nSuite result: ok. 56 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 265.48ms (577.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 266.58ms (265.48ms CPU time): 56 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (56 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VisualIdentityEdition2.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.claimPrize()\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.enter(uint256,bytes16,bytes32,string,bytes32,string)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.vote(uint256,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":134,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol\":248,\"test/VisualIdentityEdition2.t.sol\":853,\"test/mocks/Attackers.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/MockDelegateRegistry.sol\":22,\"test/mocks/MockSeats.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/MockVIMD.sol\":14},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1626,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] timestamp at src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol:119: VisualIdentityEdition2.enter(uint256,bytes16,bytes32,string,bytes32,string) (src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol#119-146) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol:150: VisualIdentityEdition2.vote(uint256,uint256) (src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol#150-171) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol:174: VisualIdentityEdition2.claimPrize() (src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol#174-186) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":598,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] unchecked-return at src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol:203: Unchecked Return\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol:242: Uninitialized Local Variable","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"22bcc039c786bba94fbcaa6517e5d8f1039fe320e3c83c482370e2f080b9966d","verifiedTreeHash":"f27c46b1f6f42861e4b2f205f77a022d09bb6cc4","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ca31e79a"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2398,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 50 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.32s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":8403,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 12 tests for test/VisualIdentityEdition2.edges.t.sol:VisualIdentityEdition2EdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenURI_anyValidLinkRoundTripsThroughJsonParser(bytes,bytes) (runs: 512, μ: 510810, ~: 470673)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 90\n  Bound result 19\n\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_atVoteEndExactlyAndLateVoteRefused() (gas: 573291)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_muchLaterStillWorksOnce() (gas: 559963)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysEntrantEvenAfterSeatAndNFTAreSold() (gas: 695242)\n[PASS] test_delegateOfOneSeatMayActForEachSeatDelegatedSeparately() (gas: 941809)\n[PASS] test_enter_contractWithoutReceiverIsRefusedAndLeavesNoState() (gas: 575455)\n[PASS] test_enter_delegationFromPreviousOwnerStopsCountingAfterSale() (gas: 460018)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotEnterOrVoteAfterItsDelegateDid() (gas: 601121)\n[PASS] test_toValidLinkCoversAlphabetExactly() (gas: 74500)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_injectionShapedLinksAreInertWithoutQuoteOrBackslash() (gas: 775050)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_jsonSurvivesEveryPrintableCharacterAllowedInLinks() (gas: 605499)\n[PASS] test_vote_delegationFromPreviousOwnerStopsCountingAfterSale() (gas: 682677)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 60.52ms (66.21ms CPU time)\n\nRan 56 tests for test/VisualIdentityEdition2.t.sol:VisualIdentityEdition2Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservation_contractHoldsExactlyPotPlusDonations(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 2748375, ~: 1959855)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_enter_acceptsEveryValidByte(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 359294, ~: 293391)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 107\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_enter_linkRuleMatchesReference(bytes,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 49801, ~: 49568)\n[PASS] testFuzz_leader_matchesScan(uint8,uint16[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 6008443, ~: 5345632)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_donationsAreNotPartOfPotAndStay() (gas: 710524)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysLeadingEntrantOnce() (gas: 1314909)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysStoredEntrantNotCurrentNFTHolder() (gas: 740683)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsBeforeVoteEnd() (gas: 606964)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsWithoutEntriesOrVotes() (gas: 44500)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsWithoutVotes() (gas: 419935)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoOtherContract() (gas: 11696)\n[PASS] test_enter_acceptsEdgePrintableAsciiAndMaxLength() (gas: 613660)\n[PASS] test_enter_byDelegate() (gas: 484440)\n[PASS] test_enter_byOwnerStoresMintsAndBurns() (gas: 485867)\n[PASS] test_enter_delegationForOtherSeatOrRightsDoesNotCount() (gas: 297443)\n[PASS] test_enter_idsAreSequentialAndOnePerSeat() (gas: 1448496)\n[PASS] test_enter_justBeforeEntryEnd() (gas: 375675)\n[PASS] test_enter_rejectsBadLinks() (gas: 998616)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsAtEntryEnd() (gas: 48851)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForHolderOfAnotherSeat() (gas: 55281)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForNonHolder() (gas: 55244)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForNonexistentSeat() (gas: 49270)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsOnSecondEntryForSeat() (gas: 411907)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 378998)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsWithoutVIMD() (gas: 400078)\n[PASS] test_enter_revokedDelegationDoesNotCount() (gas: 132883)\n[PASS] test_enter_seatRedelegatedAfterEntryCannotEnterAgain() (gas: 550122)\n[PASS] test_enter_seatSoldAfterEntryCannotEnterAgain() (gas: 459889)\n[PASS] test_leader_mostVotesThenLowerId() (gas: 1763772)\n[PASS] test_leader_revertsWithoutVotes() (gas: 373175)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndConstants() (gas: 106387)\n[PASS] test_noOtherWayForVIMDToLeave() (gas: 729367)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerOrAdminSurface() (gas: 48678)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughMintReceiverIsBlocked() (gas: 1000677)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnClaimIsBlocked() (gas: 1061273)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnEnterIsBlocked() (gas: 925536)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnVoteIsBlocked() (gas: 1052678)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_isOnChainJSON() (gas: 720749)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_revertsForUnknownToken() (gas: 13109)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_votesUpdateLive() (gas: 790295)\n[PASS] test_views_defaults() (gas: 66949)\n[PASS] test_vote_addsVoteSplitsVIMDAndFundsPot() (gas: 677087)\n[PASS] test_vote_byDelegate() (gas: 655516)\n[PASS] test_vote_forOwnEntryAllowed() (gas: 597219)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsAtVoteEnd() (gas: 408335)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsBeforeEntryEnd() (gas: 408439)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForNonHolder() (gas: 420421)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForNonexistentSeat() (gas: 413909)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForUnknownEntry() (gas: 458253)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsOnSecondVoteForSeat() (gas: 973298)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsWithoutVIMDAndLeavesNoState() (gas: 640714)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatRedelegatedAfterVoteCannotVoteAgain() (gas: 782473)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatSoldAfterVoteCannotVoteAgain() (gas: 653500)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatThatDidNotEnterMayVote() (gas: 597200)\n[PASS] test_vote_walletWithSeveralSeatsHasSeveralVotes() (gas: 735301)\n[PASS] test_vote_windowBoundaries() (gas: 710691)\nSuite result: ok. 56 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 155.09ms (306.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/VisualIdentityEdition2.invariant.t.sol:VisualIdentityEdition2InvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVisualIdentityEdition2InvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_burnMatchesEntriesAndVotes\n[PASS] invariant_claimOnlyAfterVoteEndWithVotes\n[PASS] invariant_contractHoldsPotPlusDonations\n[PASS] invariant_countersMatchGhosts\n[PASS] invariant_entriesAreImmutableAndMinted\n[PASS] invariant_leaderMatchesScan\n[PASS] invariant_nftSupplyIsEntryCount\n[PASS] invariant_noVoteBeforeEntryEnd\n[PASS] invariant_onePerSeat\n[PASS] invariant_onlyClaimPaysAndOnlyOnce\n[PASS] invariant_potIsVoteSharesUntilClaimed\n[PASS] invariant_timesAreFixed\n[PASS] invariant_tokenURIMatchesSpec\n VisualIdentityEdition2InvariantTest invariants (runs: 96, calls: 11520, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract        | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=================================================================+\n| Edition2Handler | claimPrize       | 885   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | delegate         | 894   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | donate           | 812   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | enter            | 1812  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | fund             | 857   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | sellSeat         | 912   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | staleDelegate    | 879   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | transferEntryNFT | 880   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | vote             | 1868  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | warp             | 879   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Edition2Handler | warpToBoundary   | 842   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 246\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 10228\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9213\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 680\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10347\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4241238034\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 946887921604763813402619\n  Bound result 63826\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 50000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 44218\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 13600260536849225352\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 78196631707561974452686\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 8192\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4789\n  Bound result 7013\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4598\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 23103\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_handlerScriptedLifecycleHoldsEveryInvariant() (gas: 15555333)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 123000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.32s (8.32s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 8.32s (8.53s CPU time): 70 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":39,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VisualIdentityEdition2.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.claimPrize()\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.enter(uint256,bytes16,bytes32,string,bytes32,string)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.vote(uint256,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":134,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol\":248,\"test/VisualIdentityEdition2.edges.t.sol\":310,\"test/VisualIdentityEdition2.invariant.t.sol\":668,\"test/VisualIdentityEdition2.t.sol\":853,\"test/mocks/Attackers.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/MockDelegateRegistry.sol\":22,\"test/mocks/MockSeats.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/MockVIMD.sol\":14},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"54f9530a789fef4308e525c2c143d4e08e115c80c0d14ab4dd921a63219ffa7f","verifiedTreeHash":"78d522fbc527f7404fa5ed91353a832ee330b1f5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+67c588fa"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1573,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 48 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.50s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":221,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 56 tests for test/VisualIdentityEdition2.t.sol:VisualIdentityEdition2Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_conservation_contractHoldsExactlyPotPlusDonations(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 2750380, ~: 1959687)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_enter_acceptsEveryValidByte(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 359170, ~: 292354)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 33\n  Bound result 11\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_enter_linkRuleMatchesReference(bytes,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 49918, ~: 49571)\n[PASS] testFuzz_leader_matchesScan(uint8,uint16[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 6068956, ~: 5606464)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_donationsAreNotPartOfPotAndStay() (gas: 710524)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysLeadingEntrantOnce() (gas: 1314909)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_paysStoredEntrantNotCurrentNFTHolder() (gas: 740683)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsBeforeVoteEnd() (gas: 606964)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsWithoutEntriesOrVotes() (gas: 44500)\n[PASS] test_claimPrize_revertsWithoutVotes() (gas: 419935)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoOtherContract() (gas: 11696)\n[PASS] test_enter_acceptsEdgePrintableAsciiAndMaxLength() (gas: 613660)\n[PASS] test_enter_byDelegate() (gas: 484440)\n[PASS] test_enter_byOwnerStoresMintsAndBurns() (gas: 485867)\n[PASS] test_enter_delegationForOtherSeatOrRightsDoesNotCount() (gas: 297443)\n[PASS] test_enter_idsAreSequentialAndOnePerSeat() (gas: 1448496)\n[PASS] test_enter_justBeforeEntryEnd() (gas: 375675)\n[PASS] test_enter_rejectsBadLinks() (gas: 998616)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsAtEntryEnd() (gas: 48851)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForHolderOfAnotherSeat() (gas: 55281)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForNonHolder() (gas: 55244)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsForNonexistentSeat() (gas: 49270)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsOnSecondEntryForSeat() (gas: 411907)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 378998)\n[PASS] test_enter_revertsWithoutVIMD() (gas: 400078)\n[PASS] test_enter_revokedDelegationDoesNotCount() (gas: 132883)\n[PASS] test_enter_seatRedelegatedAfterEntryCannotEnterAgain() (gas: 550122)\n[PASS] test_enter_seatSoldAfterEntryCannotEnterAgain() (gas: 459889)\n[PASS] test_leader_mostVotesThenLowerId() (gas: 1763772)\n[PASS] test_leader_revertsWithoutVotes() (gas: 373175)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndConstants() (gas: 106387)\n[PASS] test_noOtherWayForVIMDToLeave() (gas: 729367)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerOrAdminSurface() (gas: 48678)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughMintReceiverIsBlocked() (gas: 1000677)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnClaimIsBlocked() (gas: 1061273)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnEnterIsBlocked() (gas: 925536)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_throughVIMDOnVoteIsBlocked() (gas: 1052678)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_isOnChainJSON() (gas: 720749)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_revertsForUnknownToken() (gas: 13109)\n[PASS] test_tokenURI_votesUpdateLive() (gas: 790295)\n[PASS] test_views_defaults() (gas: 66949)\n[PASS] test_vote_addsVoteSplitsVIMDAndFundsPot() (gas: 677087)\n[PASS] test_vote_byDelegate() (gas: 655516)\n[PASS] test_vote_forOwnEntryAllowed() (gas: 597219)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsAtVoteEnd() (gas: 408335)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsBeforeEntryEnd() (gas: 408439)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForNonHolder() (gas: 420421)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForNonexistentSeat() (gas: 413909)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsForUnknownEntry() (gas: 458253)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsOnSecondVoteForSeat() (gas: 973298)\n[PASS] test_vote_revertsWithoutVIMDAndLeavesNoState() (gas: 640714)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatRedelegatedAfterVoteCannotVoteAgain() (gas: 782473)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatSoldAfterVoteCannotVoteAgain() (gas: 653500)\n[PASS] test_vote_seatThatDidNotEnterMayVote() (gas: 597200)\n[PASS] test_vote_walletWithSeveralSeatsHasSeveralVotes() (gas: 735301)\n[PASS] test_vote_windowBoundaries() (gas: 710691)\nSuite result: ok. 56 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 144.41ms (272.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 145.33ms (144.41ms CPU time): 56 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (56 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":36,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VisualIdentityEdition2.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.claimPrize()\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.enter(uint256,bytes16,bytes32,string,bytes32,string)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"VisualIdentityEdition2.vote(uint256,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":134,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"launch.json\":10,\"src/VisualIdentityEdition2.sol\":248,\"test/VisualIdentityEdition2.t.sol\":853,\"test/mocks/Attackers.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/MockDelegateRegistry.sol\":22,\"test/mocks/MockSeats.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/MockVIMD.sol\":14},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d998234ff343325e73d0984d7c9206160a36cfbce1057f172645ea1a6a712d68","verifiedTreeHash":"1a2984184972d823420b94b9c3b274f9939488ce","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ca31e79a"}]}