{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"e44657c6-8993-4ac2-a724-79ac4528ed96","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"271583d15798867cd65c14c14926ada3bd2ba42a61eba0ab5439cff019a9f23e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"72b782306d6e4f0304280c4434fc22e3920ead3aab588d20ec51946d5151ea19","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"92116c6051df8d3ad91be01a0f7badd8a8a42234ddc506f193d2f58345826902","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d7f05d5537b2615e2611fb1d81108700d29bdc4a254ecc5a3fdefaa1f110cc9a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"5ce97160df5c90cf28f944664a3965abbed023e171855c2da2f3a91d478bddae","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6eb5792d08633481f83a43335e9dcac3ecd96169c7130104a01e7a37d14272f2","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"aa5dba1d1b4d986ce996572fb0773df6109688a6de7f69a6b5c36f4afca2f141","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2ba959cd14d1689b3629fa6d09d3dd7aaba841a04cc21f4362196b6b2f585920","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: idm (IDM).\nToken name: idm\nToken symbol: IDM\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.\nWhat it does: x.com/theidmfun\nidm-16","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"a259bd6bc8d42a4ef56d970facc363d235e7bf94f21798addd129e3fb66b58ba","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"e44657c6-8993-4ac2-a724-79ac4528ed96","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2307-idm"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51020","feedbackHash":"16ddf97c062fe90541eba754649c655f54f974281e93af921971cf7d7a031aa9","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"271583d15798867cd65c14c14926ada3bd2ba42a61eba0ab5439cff019a9f23e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53938","feedbackHash":"5adbec65fc05f1903a55923675d79a5d83ebc2458bf54203145dbd26260af878","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"72b782306d6e4f0304280c4434fc22e3920ead3aab588d20ec51946d5151ea19","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52176","feedbackHash":"fd72f73eb1177e9d470126ad1d6a44db29f4f0d1300ebe8c3fa81fbee9b9fe69","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"92116c6051df8d3ad91be01a0f7badd8a8a42234ddc506f193d2f58345826902","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52011","feedbackHash":"c403955cd1a31e192be59efffbfb1adcf472f05a11061e83ec5ab7bf2507880e","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"d7f05d5537b2615e2611fb1d81108700d29bdc4a254ecc5a3fdefaa1f110cc9a","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52268","feedbackHash":"52a40b05a80da1c0308d4151f8cf0ae5a0a2411455b4ecda1eb6de8b876fd61e","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"5ce97160df5c90cf28f944664a3965abbed023e171855c2da2f3a91d478bddae","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51481","feedbackHash":"de4e53d57bc1a18e303a3a9c3d376919fb2d551a93dbd8dee582116ac566daf8","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"6eb5792d08633481f83a43335e9dcac3ecd96169c7130104a01e7a37d14272f2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52639","feedbackHash":"95d69aebc772d7f736f8f2b83d675a06d6a4bd4e44e77cd692624b072b86a9ee","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"aa5dba1d1b4d986ce996572fb0773df6109688a6de7f69a6b5c36f4afca2f141","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51514","feedbackHash":"27ea9d431ecaa7671585b04fca01bcf22a3c01c62757a1266cc45f218997aeda","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"2ba959cd14d1689b3629fa6d09d3dd7aaba841a04cc21f4362196b6b2f585920","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"4f9e64d99e4e60ced77d787e7b56341be233a1a646c820aea35579c38efc4d75","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a31e321b410aaa02","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"IDMToken inherits OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20Permit unchanged (vendored file is byte-identical to the upstream release). permit(owner, spender, value, deadline, v, r, s) accepts the signature from any msg.sender and consumes nonces[owner]. A third party who sees a signed permit in the mempool can submit it first. The allowance is then set exactly as signed and the nonce advances, so a later submission of the same signature by the signer or their relayer reverts with ERC2612InvalidSigner (the recovered signer no longer matches, because the nonce in the struct hash is now stale). No tokens move and the allowance is exactly what was signed, so there is no value loss; only an integrator that bundles permit and transferFrom in one transaction without a try/catch (or a check of allowance before calling permit) can have that bundle reverted. This is inherent to ERC-2612 and documented by OpenZeppelin; it is recorded as a trust/integration note for the economics area, not as a defect that needs a change in this token. Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap checks otherwise found no defect: the constructor mints exactly 1e27 to msg.sender (the factory), every transfer/transferFrom moves exactly the amount passed, allowances are reduced exactly (and the type(uint256).max allowance is not reduced), the sum of balances equals totalSupply across randomized sequences of all four entry points, the domain separator is bound to chain id and contract address, malleated high-s signatures and owner == address(0) are rejected, and the runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.","line":15,"path":"src/IDMToken.sol","reproduction":"State: token deployed; signer S holds key K; S signs digest for Permit(owner=S, spender=P, value=1e18, nonce=0, deadline=block.timestamp+1). Step 1: an unrelated address F calls token.permit(S, P, 1e18, deadline, v, r, s) -> succeeds, allowance(S,P)=1e18, nonces(S)=1. Step 2: S (or S's relayer) calls token.permit with the identical arguments -> reverts (ERC2612InvalidSigner), because the struct hash now uses nonce 1. Expected by an integrator bundling permit+transferFrom atomically: the bundle succeeds. Actual: the bundle reverts; a second transaction calling transferFrom(S, P, 1e18) from P succeeds since the allowance already exists. Verified with a Foundry test (test_permitFrontRunConsumesNonceOnly) against the current tree; balances unchanged, allowance exactly 1e18.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract IDMToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit {","title":"permit can be relayed by anyone, so a batched permit+transferFrom from the signer can be griefed into reverting (standard ERC-2612 behaviour, no loss)"}],"hash":"271583d15798867cd65c14c14926ada3bd2ba42a61eba0ab5439cff019a9f23e","nodeId":"a7985aa3-f968-4241-9eb2-2bc29360172f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the working tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n**Outcome: no defect in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap area.** The token is OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 plus ERC20Permit with a fixed-supply constructor and no overrides. The findings record holds one info-level note and nine coverage rows.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- All nineteen vendored OpenZeppelin files compiled into the token are byte-identical to the upstream v5.4.0 release tarball, so there is no tampered dependency.\n- The constructor mints exactly 1e27 minor units to the caller and makes no external call. A CREATE2 deployment from a factory stand-in lands the whole supply at the factory, matching the manifest supply and 18 decimals.\n- A stateful Foundry invariant over random sequences of transfer, approve, transferFrom and permit across seven actors never broke the sum-of-balances equals totalSupply conservation law.\n- Launch hops to the distributor, a claimant, the pool manager and the remainder address each arrive whole, and a max-allowance pull of the entire supply leaves no dust.\n- Permit is nonce-, deadline-, chain- and contract-bound. Malleated high-s signatures, a zero owner and cross-chain replay are rejected. The deadline is inclusive as the standard requires.\n- The ABI exposes no owner, mint, pause, blacklist or burn surface. The runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and ether is rejected.\n- Static analysis's one lead, the large numeric literal, is the supply constant and is not a defect.\n\n**The one note reported (info)**\n\nAnyone may relay a permit. A signed permit submitted first by a third party sets the allowance exactly as signed and advances the nonce, so a later atomic bundle of permit plus transferFrom from the signer reverts. No value moves and nothing is lost. This is inherent to ERC-2612 and needs no change in the token. I recorded it because it is the only reproducible economic interaction integrators should know about.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll four entry points have rows. approve, transfer and transferFrom hold. permit points to the info note. Five further rows record the invariants checked. Nothing in my area was left unreached. The scratch test used for the invariant and edge cases was removed since no critical or high finding required a proof file.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":795743,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":18176,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":306027}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"82ea10f5c1c4238e2832b52d9688f7ff7429eeb951d45998574e4d86940d6141","device":"4ebee02fc506f27c","findings":[],"hash":"2ba959cd14d1689b3629fa6d09d3dd7aaba841a04cc21f4362196b6b2f585920","nodeId":"edaf9e0c-00f0-42f6-9fc9-b4201c43cb8d","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added two test files. All 55 tests pass under `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed, and I found no defect in the token, so I didn't write `.imd-findings.json`.\n\nThe token (`src/IDMToken.sol`) is a plain OpenZeppelin 5.4 ERC-20 with signature approvals (`permit`). It has no owner, mint, pause, blacklist or transfer tax, and mints exactly 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸ to the deployer. I kept the existing tests as they were.\n\n**`test/IDMToken.edge.t.sol`** — 25 tests for edge cases and failure paths:\n- **Balances:** sending the whole supply, then 1 wei more; going 1 wei over a balance; sending to the token's own address; sending to address(0); spending from address(0).\n- **Allowances:** spending an allowance twice; spending your own balance via `transferFrom` without an allowance; a new approval replacing the old one instead of adding to it; an unlimited allowance still being capped by the balance; a failed `transferFrom` leaving the allowance untouched.\n- **Signature approvals:** a signature at exactly its deadline and one second past it; changing the amount, spender or nonce after signing; a flipped (high-S) signature; a garbage signature; a forged signature for owner address(0); a zero spender, with no nonce used up; replaying on another chain.\n- **Unknown functions:** calls like `burn` and unknown selectors are rejected.\n- **Fuzz tests (1,000 runs each):** balances add up after a transfer between holders; going over an allowance reverts and changes nothing; a signed approval can set any amount; a signature from the wrong key never approves.\n\n**`test/IDMToken.invariant.t.sol`** — random call sequences (256 runs × 64 calls). A handler drives five keyed accounts plus the token's own address through transfer, approve, transferFrom, signed approval and time jumps. It also makes calls that must revert and checks they do. A separate record of balances, allowances and nonces is kept alongside, and after every call these must hold:\n- the supply never changes;\n- all balances add up to the supply;\n- every balance, allowance and nonce matches the separate record;\n- the token never holds ETH.\n\nMy first run showed 2 reverts. They came from an overflow in my own test helper when an allowance was near the maximum value, not from the token; I fixed the helper, and the rerun had 0 reverts.\n\n**Not committed:** git has no author identity set on this machine, so the commit failed. I didn't change the git configuration, which is outside my allowed paths. The two files are staged and ready; the upload step or the requester needs to commit them.\n\nSome untracked entries appeared in the repo root (`.bashrc`, `.gitmodules`, `.claude/…`). They are sandbox placeholders that point at `/dev/null`, not files I created, so I left them alone. They must not be committed — the `.gitmodules` one in particular.","treeHash":"a0968fb7703b3423e1ecd2c6e6eb5613a4ddb50d","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":513901,"inputTokens":22,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":14849,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":263096}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ff35db055462d2ad","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access-control / asymmetry note, recorded as a trust assumption rather than a defect. The token has exactly one entry point whose caller class differs from the signer: approve(address,uint256) is bound to msg.sender, while permit(owner,spender,value,deadline,v,r,s) (inherited unchanged from OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20Permit) may be submitted by anyone who holds the owner's signature. The signature fixes owner, spender, value, nonce and deadline, so a relayer cannot change who is approved or for how much (checked: relaying with a different spender reverts with ERC2612InvalidSigner). The only asymmetric effect is griefing: a mempool observer who submits the same permit first consumes nonces(owner), and the owner's own transaction carrying that permit reverts with InvalidAccountNonce. Integrators that call permit and transferFrom in one transaction without a try/catch around permit are the party affected; the allowance itself is still set exactly as signed and no balance moves. This is the documented behaviour of ERC-2612 and of OpenZeppelin's implementation; no change to IDMToken is required, and the launch floor is unaffected. It is reported so the judge has the one caller-class asymmetry in the contract on record.","line":15,"path":"src/IDMToken.sol","reproduction":"State: owner = vm.addr(0xA11CE) holds 100e18 IDM; nonces(owner) == 0. Owner signs the EIP-712 Permit digest for (owner, spender=0x5BE4, value=50e18, nonce=0, deadline=block.timestamp+1 days) under DOMAIN_SEPARATOR(). Step 1: an unrelated address 0xBAD calls permit(owner, 0x5BE4, 50e18, deadline, v, r, s). Result: succeeds; allowance(owner, 0x5BE4) == 50e18; nonces(owner) == 1. Step 2: owner calls permit with the identical arguments. Expected by the owner: success. Actual: revert (ERC2612InvalidSigner, because the struct hash now embeds nonce 1 and recovers a different address). Allowance remains 50e18, no token moves. A test exercising both steps passed on this tree (test/scratch/PermitRelay.t.sol, not kept).","severity":"info","snippet":"contract IDMToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit {","title":"permit is relayable by any caller: a front-run consumes the owner's nonce and makes the owner's own identical call revert (inherent ERC-2612 property, not a token defect)"}],"hash":"5ce97160df5c90cf28f944664a3965abbed023e171855c2da2f3a91d478bddae","nodeId":"ea384b12-ddae-470f-bd5e-0d15e877f09a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written. The git working tree shows no modified tracked files, and the scratch test directory is removed.\n\n**Outcome: no defects in the permission model.** The findings file holds one informational note and eight coverage rows, all four verifier-listed entry points answered.\n\n**What I checked, against the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry guides:**\n\n- **Permission map.** The token inherits only OpenZeppelin ERC20 and ERC20Permit. It has no owner, role, modifier, initializer, proxy, receive or fallback. Storage holds only balances, allowances, name, symbol and nonces. The ABI exposes no mint, burn, pause, blacklist, upgrade or setter selector, so supply cannot grow and no caller can move or freeze another holder's balance.\n- **Constructor.** It mints the full 1e27 supply once to the deployer, which under the launch is the factory. The protected floor's own harness confirms that path.\n- **Paired surfaces.** approve and permit both write the same allowance slot and emit Approval. transfer and transferFrom share one internal path, with transferFrom spending allowance first. Infinite allowance is not decremented, as documented. mint and burn have no external reach.\n- **Trust gap seams.** There is no privileged actor and no pricing formula inside the token, so none of the access-times-economics seams exist. The remaining trust assumptions sit outside this code: the factory holds the supply during launch, and the requester's remainder wallet receives forty percent.\n- **Library integrity.** Every non-mock file in the vendored OpenZeppelin tree is byte-identical to the published v5.4.0 package, and the token imports no mock. The vendored forge-std matches the v1.9.7 release. The project's 29 tests pass.\n\n**The one note, severity info.** permit can be submitted by anyone holding the owner's signature. A front-runner cannot change the spender or amount, but it consumes the nonce, so the owner's own identical transaction then reverts. This is inherent ERC-2612 behaviour and needs no change to the token. I recorded it with a concrete reproduction so the judge has the only caller-class asymmetry on file.\n\n**Static analysis leads.** Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note is the supply constant and is not a defect.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing within the assigned area was left unexamined. The deploy script's broadcast path was read but is local-only and not part of the launched artifact.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":662088,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":16395,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":246842}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7675d63dc1bd36321e79c2ca204e2ed9eb97c6f83492777665a0bc9607208d3e","device":"3f91b58cf7cd2d45","findings":[],"hash":"6eb5792d08633481f83a43335e9dcac3ecd96169c7130104a01e7a37d14272f2","nodeId":"6570fe7a-199a-4993-bb04-90e337326c90","outcome":"completed","summary":"The deliverable is complete and committed. All checks pass locally.\n\n**What was built**\n\n- `src/IDMToken.sol` is a fixed-supply ERC-20 named `idm` with symbol `IDM` and 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments and mints the full supply once to the deployer, which is the factory at launch.\n- The contract has no owner, no mint, no pause, no blacklist, no tax and no burn-on-transfer. ERC-2612 `permit` is included for signature approvals. All OpenZeppelin code it uses is internal, so the bytecode has no link placeholders.\n- `script/DeployIDMToken.s.sol` is a local deploy script whose `deploy()` function tests call directly with no environment reads.\n- `README.md` documents the design assumptions, the manifest values for review, the empty \"After launch\" section, and operational responsibilities. It states that the production launch is done by IMD's deployer through the factory, not by this script.\n\n**Configuration**\n\n- `foundry.toml` pins `solc = \"0.8.26\"`, `evm_version = \"cancun\"`, optimizer on, and `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`. `ffi` is off and there are no filesystem permissions.\n- forge-std v1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.4.0 are vendored under `lib/` as plain files. No submodule, and the project builds offline.\n\n**Checks run**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` from clean | pass |\n| `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed | 29 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | pass |\n\nThe tests cover metadata, the one-time mint to the deployer, CREATE2 deployment from a factory stand-in, the launch flows arriving whole, transfer and allowance success and failure cases, permit success, replay, expiry and wrong-signer rejection, the protected test's admin and privileged call lists, an opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT, and three fuzz tests.\n\n**Open items for the launch**\n\n- Slither and Mythril were not available here, so only the Foundry toolchain ran. The README says so.\n- The manifest step owns `launch.json`. The README lists the values it should carry but none were written to the tree.","treeHash":"97ae96aba3cc6a1adf0939791dbd21545627d1d4","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":689119,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":19255,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":244076}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"01695e9524859621","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"IDMToken inherits OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 unchanged and adds no transfer hook, so `transfer(address(token), amount)` and `transferFrom(from, address(token), amount)` succeed and credit the contract's own balance. The contract has no function that can move its own balance, and by design no owner, so those tokens are permanently out of circulation. This is ordinary ERC-20 behaviour (OpenZeppelin only rejects the zero address) and is consistent with the README's statement that holders may burn by sending to a dead address; it is recorded as a trust/usage note for the author and integrators, not as a defect that needs a code change. Any fix (rejecting `to == address(this)` in `_update`) would add a transfer rule the brief did not ask for, so this is informational only.","line":15,"path":"src/IDMToken.sol","reproduction":"Deploy IDMToken from `deployer`. `vm.prank(deployer); token.transfer(address(token), 5);` returns true, `token.balanceOf(address(token)) == 5`, `totalSupply()` stays 1e27 and there is no entry point that can move those 5 units again. Verified with a scratch Foundry test (test_transferToTokenContractIsAllowedAndStuck) on this tree.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract IDMToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit {","title":"Tokens transferred to the token's own address are irrecoverable (standard ERC-20 behaviour, no admin can rescue)"}],"hash":"72b782306d6e4f0304280c4434fc22e3920ead3aab588d20ec51946d5151ea19","nodeId":"1bd7d243-38b8-4b44-9101-f7d374ad33f2","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds the result.\n\n**Outcome: no defects found in the token.** The code is OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 plus ERC20Permit with a constructor that mints 1e27 to the deployer, and every path I traced behaves as intended. The findings list carries one informational note only, and the coverage record answers all four listed entry points plus the constructor and six invariants, every one `holds`.\n\nWhat I checked, in the order of the three assigned guides:\n\n- **Execution Trace.** Traced approve, transfer, transferFrom and permit from entry to final state. No fee or burn diverges the amount passed downstream, no sentinel path skips validation, no partial state update exists. Permit consumes the nonce only on success, so a malleated or wrong-chain signature cannot grief the real one.\n- **Periphery.** Hashed all 18 vendored OpenZeppelin files the token compiles against and compared them with the upstream v5.4.0 tag. All identical, so no tampered library hides a defect. The deploy script is local-only and does what it says.\n- **First Principles.** Tested the implicit assumptions with a scratch Foundry suite: high-s signature rejected, zero-owner signature rejected, domain bound to chain and contract, deadline inclusive, permit never touches balances, approve overwrites rather than accumulates, no receive or fallback, runtime 3,833 bytes with no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. All ten probes passed, and I removed the scratch directory afterwards.\n\n**Leads dismissed.** The aderyn large-literal line is exactly 1e27 and matches the README manifest supply. Slither reported nothing.\n\n**Informational note recorded.** Tokens sent to the token's own address are stuck forever because there is no owner or rescue function. That is ordinary ERC-20 behaviour consistent with the README's own burn-to-dead-address statement, so I marked it `info` and said no code change is needed.\n\n**Outside the code.** The paired-currency address the README names resolves on chain 4663 to a live contract with symbol IMD and 18 decimals. No launch.json exists in the tree yet, which is expected before the manifest step. The existing 29 tests pass and `forge fmt --check` is clean. No file in the repository was modified.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":550488,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13658,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":226941}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ee2cc12e7dfe571a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics and audit_permissions (same root cause). IDMToken inherits OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20Permit unchanged: every vendored file the token compiles (ERC20.sol, ERC20Permit.sol, EIP712.sol, ECDSA.sol, Nonces.sol, ShortStrings.sol, StorageSlot.sol, Context.sol and the interfaces) hashes identically to the upstream v5.4.0 release. permit(owner, spender, value, deadline, v, r, s) accepts the signature from any msg.sender, consumes nonces[owner] and sets the allowance exactly as signed. A mempool observer who submits the signed permit first makes the signer's own later submission of the same signature revert with ERC2612InvalidSigner, because the struct hash now embeds the advanced nonce. The allowance is still exactly what was signed, the relayer cannot change spender or value (a relay with a different spender reverts), and no balance moves. The only party affected is an integrator that bundles permit and transferFrom in one transaction without a try/catch or an allowance check. This is the documented behaviour of ERC-2612 and of OpenZeppelin's implementation, recorded as an integration note. No change to the token is needed and the launch floor is unaffected.","line":15,"path":"src/IDMToken.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced with test/scratch/Judge.t.sol test_permitRelayedByAnyoneThenSignerRetryReverts (not kept). State: token deployed; owner = vm.addr(0xA11CE); nonces(owner) == 0. Owner signs the EIP-712 digest keccak256(0x1901 || DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() || keccak256(abi.encode(PERMIT_TYPEHASH, owner, 0x5BE4, 50e18, 0, block.timestamp + 1 days))). Step 1: vm.prank(0xBAD); permit(owner, 0x5BE4, 50e18, deadline, v, r, s) -> succeeds; allowance(owner, 0x5BE4) == 50e18; nonces(owner) == 1. Step 2: vm.prank(owner); permit with identical arguments -> expected by the signer: success; actual: revert ERC2612InvalidSigner. Relaying the same signature with spender 0x1234 reverts; after vm.warp(deadline + 1) the signature reverts with ERC2612ExpiredSignature. Balances unchanged throughout.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract IDMToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit {","title":"permit is relayable by anyone: a front-run consumes the signer's nonce so the signer's own identical permit reverts (inherent ERC-2612 behaviour, no loss)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow, reproduced. OpenZeppelin's _transfer rejects only the zero address as a receiver, and IDMToken overrides nothing, so transfer(address(token), amount) and transferFrom(from, address(token), amount) succeed and credit the contract's own balance. The contract exposes no function that can move its own balance and, by the brief's design, has no owner, so those units are permanently out of circulation while totalSupply stays 1e27. This is ordinary ERC-20 behaviour and consistent with the README, which says holders may burn by sending to a dead address. Rejecting to == address(this) would add a transfer rule the brief did not ask for; recorded as a usage note only.","line":15,"path":"src/IDMToken.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced with test/scratch/Judge.t.sol test_transferToTokenItselfIsStuck (not kept). Deploy IDMToken from the test contract (it holds 1e27). token.transfer(address(token), 5) returns true; token.balanceOf(address(token)) == 5; token.totalSupply() == 1e27. The ABI's only state-changing functions are approve, permit, transfer and transferFrom, and none can be invoked with msg.sender == address(token) or with an allowance granted by the token contract, so the 5 units cannot move again. Expected by a holder who mis-sends: a rescue path; actual: none, by design.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract IDMToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit {","title":"Tokens sent to the token contract's own address are irrecoverable (standard ERC-20 behaviour; by design no admin can rescue them)"}],"hash":"92116c6051df8d3ad91be01a0f7badd8a8a42234ddc506f193d2f58345826902","nodeId":"d12fafa9-272b-470a-b738-d6e03b577b0a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and the working tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n**Outcome:** no defects. The token is OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 plus ERC20Permit with nothing overridden, a parameterless constructor that mints 1e27 to msg.sender, and no privileged entry point. I kept two info notes from the specialists and dropped nothing else.\n\n**What I verified**\n- Every vendored OpenZeppelin file the token compiles hashes identically to the upstream v5.4.0 release, so the inherited logic is the audited one.\n- A CREATE2 deployment from a factory contract mints the whole supply to the factory, and the factory to distributor to claimant flow moves exact amounts. Name, symbol, decimals and supply match launch.json.\n- Creation and runtime bytecode are far under the size limits, and the runtime holds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.\n- The project's own 55 tests pass, including the invariant suite. The protected tests could not run here because they need the verifier's v4-core harness, which the coverage record states.\n\n**Findings kept, both info**\n1. permit can be relayed by anyone, so a front-run consumes the nonce and makes the signer's own identical submission revert. The two specialist reports on this were the same root cause and are merged. Allowance is set exactly as signed and nothing moves.\n2. Tokens sent to the token's own address are stuck, since there is no owner or rescue path by design.\n\nThe aderyn large-literal lead is a correctly underscored 1e27 and was dropped. The coverage record answers all four entry points plus four invariant rows.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":613326,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11331,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":161005}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"bb533842850f49b5d522a63a8246e7ff32d2bbd20c714d6bb349ee55931f2dc7","device":"21173e2f9a010d0b","findings":[],"hash":"aa5dba1d1b4d986ce996572fb0773df6109688a6de7f69a6b5c36f4afca2f141","nodeId":"e53b4f69-c1f3-4ce6-8e17-ecc5dd0e343c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd/.identitymd/work/e44657c6-8993-4ac2-a724-79ac4528ed96/e53b4f69-c1f3-4ce6-8e17-ecc5dd0e343c/launch.json) matching `IDMToken`, its constructor and exact supply, with the required pool and economics values.\n\n`forge build` succeeded. All 29 tests passed with the supplied fuzz seed. Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"f219c346abbe1f7ea398b32d4099a9080f5bc666","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":308224,"inputTokens":45271,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3016,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":106056}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a406deaac63a93b0","findings":[],"hash":"d7f05d5537b2615e2611fb1d81108700d29bdc4a254ecc5a3fdefaa1f110cc9a","nodeId":"546f9f65-e5ac-44fa-acdd-f02d6fcafc91","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written. No defects were found in the assigned area.\n\n**What was reviewed.** The token at `src/IDMToken.sol` is a 30-line fixed-supply ERC-20 that inherits OpenZeppelin's ERC20 and ERC20Permit and mints the whole supply to the deployer in its constructor. It has no custom arithmetic, no external calls, no payable path and no privileged function, so the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap checks reduce to the inlined library math and the supply constant.\n\n**What I verified.**\n- The vendored OpenZeppelin tree is byte-identical to upstream v5.4.0 and forge-std to v1.9.7, checked with a recursive diff against the GitHub tag tarballs. The inlined transfer, allowance, permit, EIP-712 and ECDSA code is therefore the audited library, not a modified copy.\n- The supply constant is an exact compile-time value equal to the manifest's total supply, and it divides evenly by 10,000, so the 10/50/40 launch split leaves no dust. The aderyn large-literal lead is not a defect.\n- Scratch tests exercised every edge the guides name: transfer of max uint and of exact balance, 1-wei and zero transfers, self-transfer, allowance of max versus max minus one, exactly spent allowance, allowance above balance, transfers to the zero address, permit at deadline equal to now, max deadline and value, high-s and bad-v signatures, wrong nonce, zero owner and spender, and domain separator change on chain id change. A fuzz test confirmed the sum of balances always equals the total supply. All behaved as the standard intends.\n- Ether and unknown selectors are rejected, and the existing 29 project tests pass.\n\n**Output.** `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and nine coverage rows: one for each of the four entry points, all marked holds with the traced reason, plus rows for the supply and launch-split invariants, the external-boundary surface, the vendored dependencies and the static-analysis lead. The scratch tests were removed, and the working tree is clean.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":577909,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13580,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":192528}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":3729,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 45 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.56s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":19968,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/DeployIDMToken.t.sol:DeployIDMTokenTest\n[PASS] test_deployMintsSupplyToTheDeployingAccount() (gas: 2277990)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.20ms (355.27µs CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/IDMToken.t.sol:IDMTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 41953, ~: 42292)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639564039457584007913129642762\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 97486, ~: 97921)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 32171\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromSpendsExactAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 147377, ~: 148740)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2104\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 224764)\n[PASS] test_approveRevertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32950)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 22207)\n[PASS] test_eip712DomainMatchesTheToken() (gas: 15701)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotReduced() (gas: 121373)\n[PASS] test_launchFlowsArriveWhole() (gas: 526968)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 50940)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminCallGrowsSupply() (gas: 756157)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 469102)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsExpiredDeadline() (gas: 49856)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsReplay() (gas: 134657)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsWrongSigner() (gas: 80392)\n[PASS] test_permitSetsAllowanceAndConsumesNonce() (gas: 121574)\n[PASS] test_rejectsEther() (gas: 39733)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 4854638)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 18799)\n[PASS] test_supplyLandsAtTheCreate2DeployerLikeTheFactory() (gas: 268713)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondAllowance() (gas: 85933)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWhenOwnerBalanceIsShort() (gas: 91598)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 38364)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmount() (gas: 96220)\n[PASS] test_transferOfZeroSucceeds() (gas: 47797)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 37757)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 32937)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 43857)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.78ms (197.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/IDMToken.edge.t.sol:IDMTokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_permitFromTheWrongKeyNeverApproves(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 80546, ~: 80528)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 28354162036456058193930652002689850664\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_permitSetsAnyValue(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 122790, ~: 123164)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 150475466\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferBetweenHoldersConservesBalances(uint256,uint256,address) (runs: 1000, μ: 176550, ~: 178171)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 60000000000000000000\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromBeyondAllowanceRevertsAndChangesNothing(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 113281, ~: 113688)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 207867202184191147368443251\n  Bound result 468552540051619088995571386\n\n[PASS] test_approvalOfAnotherHolderIsNotSharedBySpenders() (gas: 88065)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 157052)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceStillBoundByBalance() (gas: 88654)\n[PASS] test_permitAtExactDeadlineSucceeds() (gas: 106341)\n[PASS] test_permitForAnotherSpenderReverts() (gas: 82588)\n[PASS] test_permitForAnotherValueReverts() (gas: 82173)\n[PASS] test_permitForZeroOwnerCannotBeForged() (gas: 66361)\n[PASS] test_permitOneSecondPastDeadlineReverts() (gas: 50212)\n[PASS] test_permitSignatureIsBoundToTheChain() (gas: 93652)\n[PASS] test_permitSignedForAFutureNonceReverts() (gas: 76019)\n[PASS] test_permitToZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 78393)\n[PASS] test_permitWithGarbageSignatureReverts() (gas: 62187)\n[PASS] test_permitWithMalleableHighSReverts() (gas: 73171)\n[PASS] test_transferFromBySelfStillNeedsAllowance() (gas: 38477)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCannotSpendTheSameAllowanceTwice() (gas: 147260)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 96475)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroAddressCannotBeSpent() (gas: 36077)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheWholeSupplyEmptiesTheSender() (gas: 113469)\n[PASS] test_transferOneWeiOverBalanceReverts() (gas: 99867)\n[PASS] test_transferToTheTokenItselfIsKeptInSupply() (gas: 78222)\n[PASS] test_unknownSelectorReverts() (gas: 58049)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.56ms (425.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IDMToken.invariant.t.sol:IDMTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIDMTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesAndNoncesMatchTheLedger\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchTheLedger\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToSupply\n[PASS] invariant_supplyNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_tokenHoldsNoEther\n IDMTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract        | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================================+\n| IDMTokenHandler | approve                     | 2404  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IDMTokenHandler | permit                      | 2337  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IDMTokenHandler | transfer                    | 2379  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IDMTokenHandler | transferFrom                | 2324  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IDMTokenHandler | transferFromBeyondAllowance | 2256  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IDMTokenHandler | transferTooMuch             | 2422  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IDMTokenHandler | warp                        | 2262  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-----------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 31535999\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7015\n  Bound result 2946\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4896856\n  Bound result 10446\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999997054\n  Bound result 4152\n  Bound result 2983\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 60000000000000000000\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 4069379762\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 239135\n  Bound result 150077280344961478452048385\n  Bound result 1759\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 439927560139343459804019721\n  Bound result 5749\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 3406\n  Bound result 1825694313\n  Bound result 5312\n  Bound result 691\n  Bound result 1851217\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 814\n  Bound result 4680870\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 31536000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 8881\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 39156819\n  Bound result 649916806315243529075039293\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10000\n  Bound result 8858\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 150077280344961478452049393\n  Bound result 57\n  Bound result 676940263509336591035156878\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.76s (19.74s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 19.78s (19.99s CPU time): 55 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (55 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":78,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IDMToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IDMToken.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)\",\"IDMToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IDMToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":129,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployIDMToken.s.sol\":24,\"src/IDMToken.sol\":30,\"test/DeployIDMToken.t.sol\":20,\"test/IDMToken.edge.t.sol\":280,\"test/IDMToken.invariant.t.sol\":237,\"test/IDMToken.t.sol\":379},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"2ba959cd14d1689b3629fa6d09d3dd7aaba841a04cc21f4362196b6b2f585920","verifiedTreeHash":"a0968fb7703b3423e1ecd2c6e6eb5613a4ddb50d","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6a374fcd"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1249,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 43 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.14s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":137,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/DeployIDMToken.t.sol:DeployIDMTokenTest\n[PASS] test_deployMintsSupplyToTheDeployingAccount() (gas: 2277990)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 462.72µs (237.83µs CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/IDMToken.t.sol:IDMTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 41946, ~: 42292)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 179917754716233632805403789396799370303507665386940253364610978530057417304\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 97466, ~: 97921)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 40294898976\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromSpendsExactAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 147605, ~: 148732)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 174158591\n  Bound result 174158588\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 224764)\n[PASS] test_approveRevertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32950)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 22207)\n[PASS] test_eip712DomainMatchesTheToken() (gas: 15701)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotReduced() (gas: 121373)\n[PASS] test_launchFlowsArriveWhole() (gas: 526968)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 50940)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminCallGrowsSupply() (gas: 756157)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 469102)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsExpiredDeadline() (gas: 49856)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsReplay() (gas: 134657)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsWrongSigner() (gas: 80392)\n[PASS] test_permitSetsAllowanceAndConsumesNonce() (gas: 121574)\n[PASS] test_rejectsEther() (gas: 39733)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 4854638)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 18799)\n[PASS] test_supplyLandsAtTheCreate2DeployerLikeTheFactory() (gas: 268713)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondAllowance() (gas: 85933)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWhenOwnerBalanceIsShort() (gas: 91598)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 38364)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmount() (gas: 96220)\n[PASS] test_transferOfZeroSucceeds() (gas: 47797)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 37757)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 32937)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 43857)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.44ms (45.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 16.14ms (15.90ms CPU time): 29 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (29 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":40,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IDMToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IDMToken.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)\",\"IDMToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IDMToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":129,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployIDMToken.s.sol\":24,\"src/IDMToken.sol\":30,\"test/DeployIDMToken.t.sol\":20,\"test/IDMToken.t.sol\":379},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1835,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":1557,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IDMToken.sol:23: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"6eb5792d08633481f83a43335e9dcac3ecd96169c7130104a01e7a37d14272f2","verifiedTreeHash":"97ae96aba3cc6a1adf0939791dbd21545627d1d4","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6a374fcd"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":977,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 43 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 901.89ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":93,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/DeployIDMToken.t.sol:DeployIDMTokenTest\n[PASS] test_deployMintsSupplyToTheDeployingAccount() (gas: 2277990)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 377.53µs (198.77µs CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/IDMToken.t.sol:IDMTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 41946, ~: 42292)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639564039457584007913129664511\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 97466, ~: 97921)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 32171\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromSpendsExactAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 147605, ~: 148732)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 224764)\n[PASS] test_approveRevertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32950)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 22207)\n[PASS] test_eip712DomainMatchesTheToken() (gas: 15701)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotReduced() (gas: 121373)\n[PASS] test_launchFlowsArriveWhole() (gas: 526968)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 50940)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminCallGrowsSupply() (gas: 756157)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 469102)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsExpiredDeadline() (gas: 49856)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsReplay() (gas: 134657)\n[PASS] test_permitRejectsWrongSigner() (gas: 80392)\n[PASS] test_permitSetsAllowanceAndConsumesNonce() (gas: 121574)\n[PASS] test_rejectsEther() (gas: 39733)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 4854638)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 18799)\n[PASS] test_supplyLandsAtTheCreate2DeployerLikeTheFactory() (gas: 268713)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondAllowance() (gas: 85933)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWhenOwnerBalanceIsShort() (gas: 91598)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 38364)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmount() (gas: 96220)\n[PASS] test_transferOfZeroSucceeds() (gas: 47797)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 37757)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 32937)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 43857)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.04ms (32.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 13.76ms (13.41ms CPU time): 29 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (29 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":42,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IDMToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IDMToken.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)\",\"IDMToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IDMToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":129,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/DeployIDMToken.s.sol\":24,\"src/IDMToken.sol\":30,\"test/DeployIDMToken.t.sol\":20,\"test/IDMToken.t.sol\":379},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"aa5dba1d1b4d986ce996572fb0773df6109688a6de7f69a6b5c36f4afca2f141","verifiedTreeHash":"f219c346abbe1f7ea398b32d4099a9080f5bc666","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6a374fcd"}]}